Opinion
19-P-569
04-02-2020
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Owen M. McCants, appeals from the orders denying his motions for postconviction relief. The defendant argues that due process requires that his unnatural and lascivious acts (unnatural acts) convictions be vacated; he also seeks a reduction in his convictions of unarmed robbery to larceny. We affirm.
Background. We summarize the relevant portions of the extensive procedural history of this case. In May, 1974, after a jury trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of two counts of unnatural and lascivious acts, in violation of G. L. c. 272, § 35, and two counts of unarmed robbery, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 19 (b ) (May, 1974 convictions). The jury found the defendant not guilty of one count of rape. The defendant did not appeal from the May, 1974 convictions.
Thereafter, the defendant filed several motions seeking various forms of postconviction relief. Relevant to this appeal, in June, 2014, the defendant filed a motion for relief from the May, 1974 convictions under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (a) and 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001) (June, 2014 motion). Arguing that his acquittal on the rape charge demonstrated that the jury had accepted his defense of consent, and relying on Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298 (1974), and Commonwealth v. Hill, 377 Mass. 59 (1979), the defendant contended that his conviction of unnatural acts should have been vacated and his conviction of unarmed robbery should have been reduced to a larceny conviction. A Superior Court judge denied the defendant's June, 2014 motion. The defendant appealed from the order denying that motion; this court affirmed that order. See Commonwealth v. McCants, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2017).
The docket reflects that the motion, while dated May 7, 2014, was filed June 2, 2014.
As to all charges, the judge treated the motion as one for a new trial. The defendant has not objected to the ruling on this basis. It appears that the judge understood the defendant's robbery convictions to have been convictions of armed robbery, see G. L. c. 265, § 17, rather than of unarmed robbery. See G. L. c. 265, § 19 (b ). As the defendant's challenge to his convictions of robbery focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence of force (an element common to both armed and unarmed robbery), however, that distinction does not alter our analysis.
The defendant's application for further appellate review was denied. See Commonwealth v. McCants, 478 Mass. 1109 (2017). The defendant then filed an appeal with the single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court pursuant to G. L. c. 211, § 3. The single justice denied the petition and the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed. See McCants v. Commonwealth, 480 Mass. 1022 (2018).
In January, 2019, the defendant filed a third motion for postconviction relief as to the May, 1974 convictions (January 2019 motion), claiming, as he had in his June, 2014 motion, that Hill and Balthazar required that his convictions for unnatural acts be vacated. He also challenged again the sufficiency of the evidence on the unarmed robbery convictions. A Superior Court judge denied the motion; the defendant appealed.
The defendant's appeal from the order denying the January, 2019 motion was stayed pending the judge's ruling on the defendant's third motion for relief from the same judgment, which was docketed in April, 2019 (April, 2019 motion). In the April, 2019 motion, as in its predecessors, the defendant argued that under Hill and Balthazar, his acquittal on the rape charge required that his May, 1974 convictions of unnatural acts be vacated. The motion was denied; the defendant appealed. We consider here the defendant's consolidated appeal from the orders denying his January, 2019 and April, 2019 motions.
The defendant's April, 2019 motion did not challenge the unarmed robbery conviction.
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Discussion. We review the denial of a motion for postjudgment relief under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 for abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Perez, 480 Mass. 562, 567 (2018) (motion to correct sentence, Mass. R. Civ. P. 30 [a] ); Commonwealth v. Martin, 467 Mass. 291, 316 (2014) (motion for new trial, Mass. R. Civ. P. 30 [b] ). As the issues raised in the instant appeal have already been conclusively adjudicated in response to the defendant's earlier appeals, there was no abuse of discretion in the denial of the January, 2019 and April, 2019 motions.
"Principles of issue preclusion derive[d] from the common law with roots in civil proceedings" are applicable in criminal cases. Commonwealth v. Williams, 431 Mass. 71, 74 (2000). Where the issue actually litigated arises from the same indictment, issue preclusion is more appropriately referred to as direct estoppel. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 709 (2005). For direct estoppel to apply, the Commonwealth must show that the issues raised in the defendant's motion for new trial "were actually litigated and determined on the defendant's original motion [for new trial], that such determination was essential to the defendant's conviction, and that the defendant had an opportunity to obtain review of the determination of [his] motion [for new trial]." Id. at 710. The application of direct estoppel is appropriate here.
All of the issues raised in the defendant's 2019 motions for relief were advanced nearly verbatim in the defendant's June, 2014 motion and were actually litigated; the Superior Court judge's decision was affirmed on appeal. See Commonwealth v. McCants, 92 Mass. App. Ct. 1116 (2017). As the defendant here raises no new factual or legal issue in his motion for new trial, and "simply seeks to relitigate a motion that was previously denied by the motion judge and rejected on direct appeal," we conclude that principles of direct estoppel operate as a bar to the defendant's attempt to relitigate the issue. Commonwealth v. Ellis, 475 Mass. 459, 475 (2016). See Rodriguez, 443 Mass. at 710. The motion judge did not abuse her discretion in denying the motions.
Orders denying January, 2019 and April, 2019 motions for postconviction relief affirmed.