Opinion
11-P-1396
04-23-2012
COMMONWEALTH v. WAYNE LUTZ.
NOTICE: Decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28 are primarily addressed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, rule 1:28 decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28, issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant appeals from the denial of his motion for a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(a), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001), in connection with his convictions of rape of a child and indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen, his biological daughter. In denying the defendant's motion, a judge of the Superior Court ruled that the issues complained of by the defendant were raised and addressed in the defendant's direct appeal from his convictions, see Commonwealth v. Lutz, 72 Mass. App. Ct. 1101 (2008), and to the extent the issues were not raised, they were waived. We affirm substantially for the reasons relied upon by the motion judge, as amplified in the Commonwealth's brief at pages 16 through 20.
Preliminarily, we observe that the defendant's motion was properly denied for the reason, if no other, that it failed to allege any error concerning his sentence. A motion for habeas corpus under rule 30(a) is 'designed to enable defendants to challenge the legality or the technical basis of a sentence,' not as a substitute for ordinary appellate procedure. Commonwealth v. Christian, 429 Mass. 1022, 1023 (1999). A rule 30(a) motion is not a proper vehicle to raise a challenge to the indictment, trial, conviction, and sentencing stages of the case. See Bates v. Commonwealth, 434 Mass. 1019, 1020 (2001). 'To hold otherwise would render meaningless statutes and rules limiting appeals and other postconviction challenges to criminal convictions. Almost anyone could assert that if his conviction were reversed he would be entitled to immediate release.' Crowley, petitioner, 54 Mass. App. Ct. 447, 451 (2002).
Were that not enough, even were we to view the defendant's motion as one under rule 30(b), principles of direct estoppel operate as a bar to the defendant's attempt to relitigate those already decided issues. See Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 443 Mass. 707, 711 (2005). The defendant's motion merely seeks to relitigate evidentiary issues under State law regarding (1) the admission of testimony from the victim and her mother concerning a telephone call that led to the victim's disclosure, and (2) the judge's limiting instruction regarding that testimony. These issues formed the centerpiece of the defendant's direct appeal, and were considered and rejected. See Commonwealth v. Lutz, supra.
To the extent that the defendant's challenge obliquely incorporates the testimony of a police officer detailing the process of his investigation, an evidentiary matter under State law not specifically addressed in resolving his direct appeal, we discern no error, and therefore no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice in the admission of that testimony.
Order denying motion for writ of habeas corpus affirmed.
By the Court (Grasso, Mills & Trainor, JJ.),