Opinion
J-S06044-17 No. 1747 EDA 2016
02-15-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. LONDON LINTON, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order May 13, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0807241-1991 BEFORE: MOULTON, RANSOM, and FITZGERALD, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, London Linton, appeals pro se from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his serial Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition. Appellant argues his sentence of life without parole is illegal because it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. We affirm.
We adopt the facts and procedural history set forth by the PCRA court's opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op., 5/13/16, at 1-2. Appellant raises the following issues in his pro se brief:
We note the PCRA court's opinion states that Appellant's first petition for post-conviction relief was dismissed on February 15, 2007. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 2. However, a review of the docket reveals Appellant's first petition was dismissed on February 15, 2001.
I. Whether the PCRA court erred in denying without a hearing [Appellant's] claim that [his] sentence is illegal because it violates the Equal Protection provisions of the United States Constitution[.]Appellant's Brief at 3 (capitalization removed).
II. Whether the PCRA court erred in denying [Appellant's] petition without a hearing based upon findings of fact, deliberately misstated, and an error on the order and opinion not supported by the record[.]
"Our standard of review of a PCRA court's dismissal of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the PCRA court's determination is supported by the evidence of record and free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Wilson , 824 A.2d 331, 333 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc) (citation omitted).
As our Supreme Court has explained:
the PCRA timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a PCRA court is precluded from considering untimely PCRA petitions. We have also held that even where the PCRA court does not address the applicability of the PCRA timing mandate, th[e] Court will consider the issue sua sponte, as it is a threshold question implicating our subject matter jurisdiction and ability to grant the requested relief.Commonwealth v. Whitney , 817 A.2d 473, 477-78 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted).
After careful consideration of Appellant's pro se brief, the record, and the decision of the PCRA court, we affirm on the basis of the PCRA court's opinion. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 2-4 (holding: Appellant's current PCRA petition, filed August 20, 2015, was patently untimely because his judgment of sentence became final in 1994; Appellant has not proven any of the timeliness exceptions because Obergefell v. Hodges , 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) does not establish either a newly recognized constitutional right applicable to Appellant or qualify as "after-discovered information;" the PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to address the merits of Appellant's claims). Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court's dismissal of Appellant's petition.
In Obergefell , the United States Supreme Court held that same-sex couples are entitled to the same right to marry as heterosexual couples under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. Obergefell , 135 S. Ct. at 2588.
In its discussion, the PCRA court cites to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(b)(3) for the statement that an appellant has one year from the time his judgment of sentence becomes final to file a PCRA petition. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 2. However, the citation for this principle is 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1), (3).
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 2/15/2017
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