Opinion
No. 90 MAP 2023 No. 91 MAP 2023 No. 92 MAP 2023
10-24-2024
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Jason Andrew LEAR, Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Jason Andrew Lear, Appellee Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellant v. Jason Andrew Lear, Appellee
Brian Ray Sinnett, Esq., Adams County District Attorney’s Office, Maureen Flannery Spang, Esq., for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association. Marissa Ann Booth, Esq., Robert Martin Falin, Esq., Kevin R. Steele, Esq., Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, for Appellant. James F. Berardinelli, Esq., Christine Pierce Lora, Esq., Gregory L. Nester, Esq., Carol Ann Sweeney, Esq., Montgomery County Public Defender’s Office, for Appellee.
Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 700 EDA 2022, entered on February 1, 2023, Affirming and Remanding the Judgment of Sentence of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at No. CP-46-CR-0002239-2020 entered on February 16, 2022. Henry S. Hilles, III, Judge
Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 701 EDA 2022, entered on February 1, 2023, Affirming and Remanding the Judgment of Sentence of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at No. CP-46-CR-0002816-2020 entered on February 16, 2022. Henry S. Hilles, III, Judge
Appeal from the Order of the Superior Court at No. 702 EDA 2022, entered on February 1, 2023, Affirming and Remanding the Judgment of Sentence of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Criminal Division, at No. CP-46-CR-0003882-2020 entered on February 16, 2022. Henry S. Hilles, III, Judge
Brian Ray Sinnett, Esq., Adams County District Attorney’s Office, Maureen Flannery Spang, Esq., for Amicus Curiae Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association.
Marissa Ann Booth, Esq., Robert Martin Falin, Esq., Kevin R. Steele, Esq., Montgomery County District Attorney’s Office, for Appellant.
James F. Berardinelli, Esq., Christine Pierce Lora, Esq., Gregory L. Nester, Esq., Carol Ann Sweeney, Esq., Montgomery County Public Defender’s Office, for Appellee.
TODD, C.J., DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, BROBSON, McCAFFERY, JJ.
OPINION
JUSTICE DOUGHERTY
We granted review to determine whether Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 600 requires the Commonwealth to demonstrate it acted with due diligence while criminal trials were suspended during a judicial emergency caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The Superior Court, relying on Commonwealth v. Harth, 666 Pa. 300, 252 A.3d 600 (2021), held Rule 600 requires such proof, and remanded the case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the Commonwealth acted with due diligence. For the reasons that follow, we now reverse.
Rule 600 provides in relevant part:
(A) Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial
(1) For the purpose of this rule, trial shall be deemed to commence on the date the trial judge calls the case to trial, or the defendant tenders a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.
(2) Trial shall commence within the following time periods.
(a) Trial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.
* * *
(C) Computation of Time
(1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.
* * *
(D) Remedies
(1) When a defendant has not been brought to trial within the time periods set forth in paragraph (A), at any time before trial, the defendant’s attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a written motion requesting that the charges be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this rule has been violated. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge shall conduct a hearing on the motion.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.
666 Pa. 300, 252 A.3d 600, 618 (2021).
On March 16, 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, this Court authorized president judges to declare judicial emergencies and suspend Rule 600 in their respective judicial districts. See In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 658 Pa. 426, 228 A.3d 1281, 1281-82 (2020) (per curiam) (Statewide Emergency I) . The same day, the President Judge of Montgomery County (hereinafter referred to as "MontCo PJ") declared a local judicial emergency and, among other things, ordered Rule 600 suspended during the period of the local judicial emergency; additional orders extended the judicial emergency until May 31, 2020. See President Judge Declaration, 3/16/2020 (Original Emergency Declaration). On May 5, 2020, however, MontCo PJ entered an order rescinding his previous orders effective May 31, 2020. See President Judge Order, 5/5/2020. On May 28, 2020, MontCo PJ declared the judicial emergency extended until further order of the court. See President Judge Declaration, 5/28/2020. Finally, on June 3, 2020, MontCO PJ filed an order noting that the judicial emergency had been extended by filings dated March 31, 2020, April 14, 2020, and May 28, 2020, and ordered "that any postponement of criminal case scheduling caused by the declaration of this judicial emergency, from March 12, 2020 through the expiration of the judicial emergency, shall be considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable time for purposes of the application of [Rule 600]." President Judge Order, 6/3/2020.
The Court subsequently ordered a statewide Rule 600 suspension that lasted through June 1, 2020. See In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 659 Pa. 27, 230 A.3d 1015, 1019 (2020) (per curiam) (Statewide Emergency II).
See Commonwealth v. Mills, 640 Pa. 118, 162 A.3d 323, 325 (2017) (holding that the time associated with the normal progression of a criminal case does not constitute delay, and, thus is attributable to the Commonwealth in a Rule 600 calculation).
The parties dispute whether Montgomery County’s May 5th order rescinded the original emergency declaration or only the emergency orders that followed the original emergency declaration. As we resolve this case based on the text of Rule 600, we do not need to decide this question.
Commonwealth v Browne, 526 Pa. 83, 584 A.2d 902, 906 (1990). But see Commonwealth v. Bradford, 616 Pa. 122, 46 A.3d 693, 705 (2012) (holding that a prosecutor acts with due diligence by relying upon the magisterial district judge’s personnel to forward paperwork in a criminal case to the court of common pleas for trial). But also see Mills, 162 A.3d at 327 n.2 (Wecht, J., concurring) (expressing need to reconsider the Court's broad interpretation of due diligence in Bradford).
The Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reopened in various stages. Court facilities reopened on June 1, 2020, but with limited in-person hearings. See Montgomery County Phase II Reopening Statement at 1, https://montgomerycountypa.gov/Archive/ViewFile/Item/5215 (last visited Oct. 21, 2024). Phase II began on July 20, 2020, but the only criminal hearings held in person were for violations of probation and parole, summary criminal appeals, and arraignments. See id. at 5-7. Civil cases also remained on hold at this time. See id. at 7. However, custody proceedings in the court’s family division began to be held in-person to "provide stability for those children who are affected by the uncertainty caused by custody litigation." Id. at 3-4. Phase III was implemented on October 5, 2020, and brought about the initiation of non-jury criminal, non-jury civil, and juvenile delinquency trials. See Montgomery County Phase III Reopening Statement, https://www.montgomerycountypa.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/5274 (last visited Oct. 21, 2024). The protocols adopted by the Court, however, required pending criminal cases to first proceed to a triage conference to determine whether a plea agreement could be reached or if the parties would agree to proceed to a bench trial, as the court was still not prepared to conduct jury trials. See Montgomery County Criminal Bench Trials Protocol at 1, https://www.montgomerycountypa.gov/ArchiveCenter/ViewFile/Item/5272 (last visited Oct. 21, 2024). These conferences were only held at a rate of twelve per day. See id.
On June 21, 2021, this Court ordered the Unified Judicial System to return to prepandemic status, fully opening courthouses and other judicial facilities. See Order, In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, No. 553 Judicial Administration Docket (Pa. filed June 21, 2021) (per curiam). However, the order also allowed local judicial emergencies to remain in effect until August 31, 2021, if such emergencies suspended Rule 600. See id.
Meanwhile, criminal complaints were filed against appellee Jason Andrew Lear on May 19, June 8, and July 17, 2020, in connection with the thefts of snowplowing equipment and an incident in which he threw a bicycle at a police officer. These matters sat in abeyance during the various phases of the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas’ reopening. Finally, on June 22, 2021, Lear’s triage conference was scheduled for August 10, 2021. At the conference, Lear requested a bench trial. Thereafter, the trial court ordered trial to begin on November 1, 2021, 531 days after the Commonwealth filed its first complaint against him, 511 days after the second complaint was filed, and 472 after the third complaint was filed. On October 21, 2021, Lear filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600(D)(1). The court heard argument on the Rule 600 motion on the day of trial and denied the motion, concluding "the delay in trying this case is a direct result of the judicial emergency and in accordance with Judge DelRicci’s order as the President Judge[.]" N.T., 11/1/21 at 8. As the court further explained, "the earliest date for the cessation of the Rule 600 suspension was when the first criminal jury trial resumed in this judicial district, at which time Montgomery County court leaders determined jury trials were safe to resume. The first open date for criminal jury trials was July 12, 2021. Computing the time between the resumption of jury trials and the bench trial for [Lear] would still place the trial comfortably within the 365 non-excludable days. Therefore, the Commonwealth did not delay in bringing this case to trial[.]" Trial Court Opinion, 4/15/2022, at 18.
Following the nonjury trial, Lear was convicted of aggravated assault, theft by unlawful taking, and related offenses, and sentenced to five to twelve years’ imprisonment. Lear’s post-sentence motion was denied, and he appealed to the Superior Court.
In a unanimous published opinion, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court vacated the judgment of sentence, reversed the trial court’s decision denying Lear’s Rule 600 motion, and remanded for a hearing under Rule 600(D). Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709 (Pa. Super. 2023). The panel stated: "Lear argues that although Montgomery County declared a judicial emergency, the delay in his cases was not excludable when it was feasible to hold trial, noting that other court divisions and other counties held trials while his case was pending." Id. at 718. The panel then quoted the text of Rule 600 and explained the Rule 600 analysis begins with determining the "mechanical run date," which is 365 days after the criminal complaint was filed. Id. The panel further explained that then the "adjusted run date" must be calculated by adding any time that is excludable from the computation under Rule 600(C)(1), and a case is properly dismissed under Rule 600 if it is not brought to trial by the adjusted run date. Id. at 718-19.
According to the panel, two cases guided its analysis: Harth and Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743 (Pa. Super. 2022). The Harth Court held "before a trial court excludes time from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of ‘judicial delay,’ " the Commonwealth must "demonstrate that it acted with due diligence," Harth, 252 A.3d at 617, while in Carl, the Superior Court noted that any period during which Rule 600 was suspended should be excluded and added to the adjusted run date regardless of the Commonwealth’s diligence, Carl, 276 A.3d at 751. Based on Harth and Carl, the panel held: "If an order unambiguously suspends Rule 600 without qualification, then the period of the suspension is added to the [adjusted] run date without considering the Commonwealth’s diligence. Alternatively, if an order characterizes a delay as a court postponement, then that period is only excluded if the trial court determines after a hearing that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence through the life of the case." Lear, 290 A.3d at 719 (internal citations omitted).
The panel then examined the COVID-19 emergency orders entered in Montgomery County, and based its ultimate decision on its interpretation of them. Initially, the panel rejected Lear’s argument the county was actually able to hold jury trials during the relevant period, like other counties did, because this Court expressly authorized president judges to suspend Rule 600. See id. at 720, citing Statewide Emergency I, 228 A.3d at 1282. Nevertheless, the panel determined "the plain language of the orders reflects that Montgomery County did not continue its unqualified suspension of Rule 600 beyond May 31, 2020" because the May 5th order rescinded all previous orders and "[t]here were no later orders suspending Rule 600." Id. The panel concluded "Montgomery County opted to order on June 3, 2020, that any emergency-related delay ‘shall be considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable time’ under Rule 600(C)." Id., quoting President Judge Order, 6/3/2020.
Finding no order suspending Rule 600 after May 31, 2020, the panel directed the trial court on remand to determine whether the Commonwealth exercised due diligence for any period of judicial delay occurring between June 3, 2020 and August 31, 2021. See id. The panel directed that the case be dismissed if the Commonwealth does not meet its burden. See id. The panel denied the Commonwealth’s application for reconsideration.
[1] We granted review to consider the following question as phrased by the Commonwealth:
Whether a court must assess the Commonwealth’s due diligence during a worldwide pandemic for purposes of Rule 600 before it excludes delay attributable to a local judicial emergency during which the president judge cancelled and suspended all trials, suspended Rule 600 and otherwise excluded judicial delay caused by the judicial emergency, and implemented strict procedures to protect the public?
Commonwealth v. Lear, — Pa.—, 305 A.3d 541 (2023) (per curiam). We generally review Rule 600 decisions for an abuse of discretion, but our review is plenary where "the dispositive question implicates legal issues[.]" Harth, 252 A.3d at 614 n.13.
First, we recognize the Commonwealth and Lear have different opinions on how the emergency orders below should be interpreted, specifically, whether MontCo PJ's unqualified suspension of Rule 600 ended on June 3, 2020 or remained in effect until August 31, 2021. However, as stated above, we need not decide this particular dispute because we may resolve the present appeal based on the plain text of Rule 600 and the fact that criminal jury trials in Montgomery County were judicially suspended from the dates the criminal complaints against Lear were filed until July 12, 2021.
Although Lear was ultimately tried in a bench trial, he did not waive his constitutional right to a jury trial until the triage conference on August 10, 2021. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/15/2022, at 17 ("A review of the docket confirms that at a pre-trial conference on August 10, 2021, [Lear] requested a bench trial[.]").
In re: General Statewide Emergency, 658 Pa. 426, 228 A.3d 1281, 1281 (2020) (per curiam).
Regarding the appropriate application of Rule 600, the Commonwealth argues neither this Court’s holding in Harth nor the text of Rule 600 requires a court to assess the Commonwealth’s diligence before excluding delay caused by a pandemic and the related judicial emergency. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 25. The Commonwealth contends the panel below "erred when it used the ‘judicial delay' framework that applies to an individual judge’s congested court calendar to analyze delay caused by a worldwide pandemic[.]" Id. The Commonwealth claims the judicial delay framework used in Harth is inapt, and instead, the time at issue here "should have been excluded as an ‘other period of delay' or delay not caused by the Commonwealth, which is excludable under the rule without a diligence inquiry." Id., quoting Pa.R.Crim.P 600(C).
Although the Commonwealth acknowledges Harth memorialized an exception to the general rule excluding delay not caused by the Commonwealth where judicial delay is involved, it argues judicial delay should be limited to "delay caused by an individual judge and that particular judge’s congested calendar or other scheduling issues." Id. at 26. Put simply, the Commonwealth contends "a Worldwide pandemic that leads to statewide disaster emergency declarations and the local declaration of a judicial emergency is not the same as a single judge’s ‘congested calendar' or ‘other scheduling problems’ considered in Harth." Id. at 27. According to the Commonwealth, the reason for this dichotomy is simple: even if "the lower court [had] been available in Harth, trial could not have commenced because the Commonwealth never met its discovery obligations" and the Commonwealth "cannot benefit from the trial judge’s congested court calendar"; but here, "Montgomery County did not have a jury trial calendar or any jury trials scheduled from March 12, 2020 to July 12, 2021." Id. at 29-30.
The Commonwealth contends there is no need to force this type of pandemic-related delay into the Harth judicial delay framework because the text of Rule 600 "expressly provides for the exclusion of delays that do not fit within that framework, explaining that ‘[a]ny other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.’ " Id. at 31, quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C). Further, the Commonwealth notes this Court has recognized as much post-Harth by stating, "where delay is not caused by the Commonwealth …, it must be excluded from the computation of the Rule 600 deadline." Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, — Pa.—, 289 A.3d 959, 982 (2023). The Commonwealth again empha- sizes that "[t]his case involves an unexpected pandemic that created chaos across the world and upended the day-to-day operations of the courthouse[,] … [t]he Commonwealth did not cause the pandemic, and it had no control over the judicial emergency response to COVID-19." Id. As such, the Commonwealth contends "this delay is excludable under the text of the rule as ‘any other periods of delay.’ " Id., quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C).
The Pennsylvania District Attorneys Association (PDAA) filed an amicus curiae brief in support of the Commonwealth in which it agrees with the Commonwealth that the present case is distinguishable from Harth. See PDAA Brief at 11-12. PDAA observes that "[t]he purpose of Rule 600 is two-fold, it protects a defendant’s speedy trial rights and seeks to protect the interest of society/the Commonwealth in prosecuting crime[,]" and requiring the Commonwealth to prove its diligence after it relied on orders suspending Rule 600 "completely ignores the dual purpose of Rule 600[.]" Id. at 12.
Id.
The Commonwealth also summarizes numerous Superior Court cases holding COVID-19 delay as excludable without consideration of the Commonwealth’s diligence to stress that the decision below is an outlier that conflicts with numerous other Superior Court decisions. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 32-40, citing Commonwealth v. Faison, 297 A.3d 810 (Pa. Super. 2023); Carl, 276 A.3d at 751; Commonwealth v. Feazell, 1488 MDA 2021, 2022 WL 3349335 (Pa. Super., Aug. 15, 2022) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Fitzpatrick, 1489 MDA 2021, 2023 WL 2566440 (Pa. Super., Mar. 20, 2023) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Carbaugh, 410 MDA 2022, 2022 WL 17348880 (Pa. Super., Dec. 1, 2022) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. McDonald, 218 MDA 2022, 2023 WL 7481625 (Pa. Super., Nov. 13, 2023) (unpublished memorandum).
Id
In response, Lear argues the panel below correctly interpreted Harth as applying to all types of judicial delay, including emergency-related court closures that affect every judge in a particular county. See Appellee’s Brief at 33-34. Lear points out that Harth itself concerned emergency-type judicial delays caused by the September 2015 Papal Visit to Philadelphia. See id. at 34. Lear claims Harth "explicitly rejected the notion that judicial delay could create an extended period where no examination of due diligence was warranted[,]" based on the following language:
We do not suggest that the Commonwealth must be prepared to proceed to trial the moment that a criminal case is initiated; rather, the Commonwealth must utilize that year to prepare itself for trial, as is required under Rule 600(A). We have not altered that timeline, but, instead, seek merely to ensure that the Commonwealth does not summarily rely upon the judiciary as an excuse to forego preparation for pending criminal cases, consistent with the language and purpose of Rule 600. Indeed, under the dissent’s approach, were the judiciary unable to proceed with a trial within the first year after a case was initiated, the Commonwealth could do nothing during that delay, and then take another year to prepare its case.
Id. at 34-35, quoting Harth, 252 A.3d at 618 n. 15 (emphasis in original).
Lear also contends the Commonwealth’s reliance on Johnson is misplaced as this Court in that case specifically stated, "judicial delay is delay caused by the court, rather than the Commonwealth, and is likewise excludable if the Commonwealth exercised diligence during that time." Id. at 35, quoting Johnson, 289 A.3d at 982. Lear claims the Commonwealth’s approach to Harth is unworkable as it would "create[ ] a morass in which lower courts must determine whether Harth's two-step framework applies or whether the cause of judicial delay must be first examined." Id. at 36. According to Lear, this would "invite[] a never-ending stream of factual scenarios through which lower courts would need to navigate in an effort to apply the proper standard." Id. In Lear’s view, "[t]here is simply no reason why [the Harth] analysis cannot be extended to an assessment … of the Commonwealth’s due diligence during the post-June 1, 2020 pandemic period." Id. For all these reasons, Lear asserts the Superior Court properly remanded his case for the trial court to assess the Commonwealth’s due diligence. See id. at 40-42.
In reply, the Commonwealth denies the standard it forwards is unworkable, as any emergency-related closure is obviously beyond the control of both the courts and the Commonwealth, and there is no reason to assess the Commonwealth’s due diligence because trial could not possibly have occurred in any event. See Commonwealth’s Reply Brief at 22-23. The Commonwealth insists that forcing it to prove due diligence during an emergency "flies in the face of the second purpose of Rule 600: protecting society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases." Id. at 23.
[2] Rule 600 requires that "[t]rial in a court case in which a written complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed." Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). To decide whether the rule was violated, "a court must first calculate the ‘mechanical run date,’ which is 365 days after the complaint was filed, and then must account for any ‘Excludable time[.]’ " Johnson, 289 A.3d at 981 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Rule 600 explains the computation of time as follows: "periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation." Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
[3–5] As this Court unanimously clarified post-Harth, the first sentence of Rule 600(C)(1) expresses the general rule: "Rule 600 establishes two requirements that must be met for delay to count toward the 365-day deadline: (1) the delay must be caused by the Commonwealth; and (2) the Commonwealth must have failed to exercise due diligence." Johnson, 289 A.3d at 982 (emphasis added); see id. ("Put differently, where delay is not caused by the Commonwealth or delay caused by the Commonwealth is not the result of lack of diligence, it must be excluded from the computation of the Rule 600 deadline.") (emphasis added). The second sentence of Rule 600(C)(1) then explains that "[a]ny other periods of delay" — meaning any periods of delay not caused by the Commonwealth or not resulting from the Commonwealth’s lack of due diligence — are "exclud[able]" and are removed from the computation of the Rule 600 deadline. Pa. R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). Once the "excludable time" is calculated, this time is added to the "mechanical run date" to produce the "adjusted run date," which is the deadline for the Commonwealth to bring the defendant to trial under Rule 600. See Johnson, 289 A.3d at 981-83. Harth announced a limited exception to the general rule in certain cases involving "judicial delay." See 252 A.3d at 603 ("we find that a trial court may invoke ‘judicial delay' in order to deny a defendant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss only after the Commonwealth has demonstrated that it complied with the due diligence requirements of Rule 600 at all relevant periods throughout the life of the case"). That case involved a number of dates where Harth’s criminal trial was continued. Some continuances were explained in docket entries, such as those stemming from the 2015 Papal Visit to Philadelphia, and the Commonwealth’s refusal to sever Harth’s case from that of his co-defendant, while others were seemingly unexplained. See id. at 603-05. However, the critical fact was that the Commonwealth failed to complete discovery on numerous occasions and even passed fifteen pieces of discovery on the morning scheduled for trial. See id. at 604-06, 622 ("the record here amply demonstrates that the Commonwealth failed to complete its discovery obligations through the date of trial"). Harth filed a Rule 600 motion, which was denied, and he appealed to the Superior Court after he was convicted and sentenced. The Superior Court ordered a remand to the trial court to conduct a hearing to clarify the record with respect to the cause of each continuance, the Commonwealth’s readiness for trial, and the Commonwealth’s due diligence or lack thereof. Harth petitioned this Court for allowance of appeal, and we granted review.
The dissent insists we have " circumvent[ed] Rule 600's order of operations" and "misconstrue[d] Rule 600's analytical sequencing." Dissenting Opinion at 570, 571. But it is the dissent that reads the language of the rule out of order. Again, the pertinent computational provision provides that "periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has , failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation." Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, "[t]he first thing that the Rule instructs courts to do, when determining whether time is excludable" is not, as the dissent claims, "an assessment of the Commonwealth’s diligence[.]" Dissenting Opinion at 570. Rather, "the path expressly prescribed by the rule" is to first assess whether the Commonwealth caused the delay in question. Id. Moreover, we do not "disregard[] the possibility that it will be the Commonwealth's lack of due diligence that caused the delay." Id. (emphasis omitted). We simply recognize, in accordance with the plain text of the rule, that the causation analysis precedes the due diligence inquiry, and it is only when the Commonwealth both caused the delay and lacked due diligence that the delay is properly included in the Rule 600 calculation.
Id.
Due to the Pope’s visit, the courts of the First Judicial District in Philadelphia County were closed from 5 P.M. on September 22, 2015 to 9 A.M. on September 29, 2015. See In re: Administrative Closure of the Courts and Offices of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania September 23, 2015 to September 28, 2015 (Administrative Governing Board of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania No 01 of 2015), https://www.courts.phila.gov/pdf/ notices/2015/Papal-Visit-Operational-Changes Notice.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 2024).
Id.
Harth requested that all the delay in his case be included in the Rule 600 calculation since the Commonwealth never completed discovery and was therefore not diligent in bringing the case to trial. More specifically, Harth asked this Court to adopt Justice Wecht’s concurrence in Commonwealth v. Mills, 640 Pa. 118, 162 A.3d 323 (2017), which argued that trial courts must assess the Commonwealth’s diligence before labeling a continuance "judicial delay." See Harth, 252 A.3d at 610-11, citing Mills, 162 A.3d at 325-27 (Wecht, J., concurring). The Commonwealth, on the other hand, relied on the text of Rule 600(C)(1) to argue periods of delay caused by the trial judge’s calendar should be excluded from the Rule 600 calculation. The Commonwealth observed, consistent with our explanation above, that Rule 600 provides two requirements before a period of delay may be included in the computation — (1) the Commonwealth caused the delay; and (2) the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence — and the first requirement is not met when the delay is caused by the trial judge’s calendar rather than the Commonwealth.
In a sharply divided 4-3 decision, with this author writing for the dissenters, this Court held "a trial court may invoke ‘judicial delay' in order to deny a defendant’s Rule 600 motion to dismiss only after the Commonwealth has demonstrated that it complied with the due diligence requirements of Rule 600 at all relevant periods throughout the life of the case." Id. at 603. The Harth majority reasoned that "requiring the Commonwealth to demonstrate that it acted with due diligence before a trial court excludes time from its Rule 600 time computation on the basis of ‘judicial delay’ comports with the language of Rule 600(C)(1) and its commentary, the purpose behind the rule, and our prior jurisprudence interpreting Rule 600 and its predecessor." Id. at 617. The Court then determined a remand was unnecessary as the Commonwealth had neglected to fulfill its discovery obligations without providing a reasonable explanation for this deficiency and, as a result, failed to prosecute Harth’s case with due diligence. See id. at 621-22.
Although the facts of Harth involved other sorts of delays in addition to judicial delays, including delays due to the Papal Visit and the lack of severance, the Court’s holding regarding the Commonwealth’s due diligence obligation, which is what binds future decisions, was explicitly limited to "judicial delay." Id. at 603, 617. More precisely, though, it was about judicial delay in conjunction with other periods of delay caused by the Commonwealth. Delay actually occasioned by the Commonwealth was essential to the Harth majority’s analysis, because without it, the second sentence of Rule 600(C)(1) would have controlled rather than the first. See Johnson, 289 A.3d at 982 ("judicial delay is delay caused by the court"); Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) ("Any other periods of delay [not caused by the Commonwealth] shall be excluded from the computation."). In those limited circumstances, where the Commonwealth caused multiple periods of delay and attempted to excuse them by pointing to other periods of judicial delay, the Harth majority determined "a trial court must first determine whether the Commonwealth has met its obligation to act with due diligence throughout the life of the case; if the Commonwealth meets its burden of proving due diligence, only then may the trial court rely upon its own congested calendar or other scheduling problems as justification for denying the defendant’s motion." Harth, 252 A.3d at 618. In establishing this exception to the general rule, the Harth majority expressed that Rule 600(C)(1) is "not a model of clarity," hence its decision to turn to the Rule’s "commentary, the purpose behind the rule, and our prior jurisprudence interpreting Rule 600 and its predecessor." Id. at 617.
[6, 7] Unlike Harth, this case does not involve judicial delay in conjunction with delay caused by the Commonwealth. In fact, it involves neither. Judicial delay is delay caused by an individual judge’s "own congested calendar or other scheduling problems[.]" Id. at 618; see also id. at 619 ("trial courts must assess the Commonwealth’s due diligence before relying upon their own scheduling difficulties and congested court calendars as justification for denying Rule 600 motions to dismiss"). Here, Lear’s trial was not delayed because of the assigned trial judge’s heavy caseload or because the judge had other scheduling conflicts or difficulties. Rather, trial was postponed because of a global pandemic, during which emergency orders completely closed the Montgomery County Courthouse for an extended period of time, with narrow exceptions not relevant here. See President Judge Emergency Order, 3/16/2020 at 1. When court reopened on a limited basis, proceedings involved stringent protocols that limited the kinds of hearings that could take place as well as the pace and volume of proceedings. See President Judge Order, 5/5/2020; Montgomery County Phase II Reopening Statement at 1, https://montgomerycountypa.gov/Archive/ViewFile/Item/5215 (last visited Oct. 21, 2024). Importantly, criminal jury trials were suspended entirely from March 12, 2020 (before the criminal complaints against Lear were filed) to July 12, 2021. Moreover, there was no hearing scheduled in Lear’s criminal matters until August 10, 2021, already more than 365 days from when the Commonwealth filed each set of charges. These circumstances stand in stark contrast to the situation of a single judge unable to entertain a case because of a scheduling problem, and so they are not properly characterized as "judicial delay" as envisioned by Harth.
Nor can it be seriously argued that the Commonwealth caused the delay from the filing of the complaints to the triage conference on August 10, 2021. This delay was necessitated by the COVID-19 pandemic and its concomitant emergency court closures and restrictive protocols, not anything the Commonwealth did or did not do. Likewise, the Commonwealth is not alleged to have caused any other periods of delay during the relevant timeframe.
In the absence of judicial delay in conjunction with some period of delay caused by the Commonwealth, the limited Harth exception does not apply. The general rule instead controls. Applying that rule here, we conclude that since the Commonwealth was not responsible for the suspension of all criminal jury trials or the protocols adopted in Montgomery County in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the time period up until the August 10, 2021 conference is properly excluded from the Rule 600 computation as an "other period[ ] of delay." Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). Moreover, because the matter proceeded to trial within three months on November 1, 2021, well before the adjusted run date expired, there was no violation of the Rule 600 deadline in this case.
There is good reason not to extend the narrow Harth exception, which itself constituted an expansive construction of the rule language providing that only delay "caused by the Commonwealth" should be included in the computation of time, to the COVID-19 delay here. Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1). Delay stemming from the unavailability of a single judge could conceivably be averted if the Commonwealth is ready to proceed, as the case could potentially be reassigned to a different judge. On the other hand, when a global pandemic precipitates a court-wide shutdown followed by a court-wide slowdown, delay is unavoidable irrespective of the Commonwealth’s diligence. No amount of due diligence on the part of the Commonwealth could have possibly hastened Lear’s trial, date. As such, we hold the delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic-related emergency court closures and restrictive protocols do not fall under Harth’s limited exception but, instead, constitute "other periods of delay" for purposes of Rule 600. And since the Commonwealth’s diligence is never relevant to the Rule 600 analysis for "other periods of delay," we reverse the Superior Court’s decision remanding this case to the trial court for a hearing to determine whether the Commonwealth acted with due diligence. Because we hold Rule 600 was not violated in this case, no hearing is necessary. Chief Justice Todd and Justices Mundy, Brobson and McCaffery join the opinion.
It is not hard to imagine other types of delays that fit neatly in this category. For example, medical , weather-, and security-related emergencies often lead to court delays, by no fault of the Commonwealth. Such circumstances, like the COVID-19 pandemic, properly constitute "other periods of delay" under Rule 600(C)(1).
Id.
As should be obvious, we do not endorse the approach taken by the Superior Court. Whereas the panel below crafted a rule for assessing the validity of Rule 600 suspension orders and then applied that rule to the suspension orders issued by the MontCo PJ, our analysis turns on Rule 600 itself. There is simply no need to parse the suspension orders given our conclusion that, even if Rule 600 was in effect at all relevant times, it was not violated in these circumstances.
In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 658 Pa. 429, 228 A.3d 1283, 1283 (2020) (per curiam).
Justice Wecht files a dissenting opinion in which Justice Donohue joins.
JUSTICE WECHT, dissenting
Recently, in Commonwealth v. Harth, we confirmed the fundamental speedy trial principle that a prosecutor’s obligation to act with due diligence lasts "throughout the life of the case."1a This burden is triggered when a criminal complaint is filed, and ends only when the case is called for trial. The prosecutor is duty-bound to undertake all reasonable efforts in order to ensure that a criminal case constantly is moving forward. The obligation is unceasing, continuing even during those natural lulls which occur between court hearings, as the case moves through the court system.2a A prosecutor must monitor his or her cases, and must maintain "simple recordkeeping systems" in order to ensure that no cases are forgotten or that none fall through the cracks.3a
Thus, we recognized in Harth what always has been true. With regard to due diligence, a prosecutor gets no time-outs. A prosecutor must act with due diligence "throughout the life of a case." That was the law of Pennsylvania, until now. Today’s Majority unnecessarily creates a loophole in this venerable rule, disrupting settled law. This new loophole is not required by the particular circumstances of this case nor by Rule 600 itself. I respectfully dissent.
The COVID-19 pandemic disrupted nearly every aspect of American life, from the way we shopped for groceries to the way our children attended school. Our court system was no exception. On March 16, 2020, this Court declared a "general, statewide judicial emergency … on account of COVID-19."4a Rather than impose a singular statewide protocol, we instead delegated to the president judges of each of Pennsylvania’s sixty judicial districts the responsibility to determine, and then implement, "the appropriate measures to be taken to safeguard the health and safety of court personnel, court users, and members of the public."5a To this end, we bestowed on president judges the authority to take certain actions not otherwise permitted in the normal course. We approved the use of "advanced communication technology to conduct court proceedings," and we granted leave to "suspend time calculations for the purposes of time computation relevant to court cases or other judicial business." 6a Relevant here, we also specifically authorized president judges to "suspend the operation of Rule of Criminal Procedure 600."7a The "purport of the suspension [was] that the time period of the local judicial emergency … [would] be excluded from the time computation under Rule of Criminal Procedure 600(C)."8a
That some aspects of our judicial system were temporarily suspended did not mean that all of them were. We directed president judges to "arrange for the provision of essential judicial services, including, by way of example, arraignments and bail establishment hearings, protection from abuse proceedings, where absent such proceedings there would be a threat of domestic violence, and/or injunction proceedings, where absent such proceedings there would be the threat of irreparable harm."9a
Two days later, we issued a second order declaring that our courts were "generally closed to the public."10a Closing the doors of the courthouses did not mean that the entirety of our judicial system came to a screeching halt. We continued to allow the use of "advanced communication technology" for non-essential functions, while directing that essential functions—largely those proceedings pertaining to bail, probation detainers, and juvenile detention— had to proceed, so long as those proceedings were conducted as safely as possible.
Id. at 1285-86.
More orders would follow. On April 1, 2020, we extended the emergency declaration for another thirty days. Once again, we closed all courts in order to limit in-person contact, but still recognized that the entirety of the court system could not simply cease operations. While we directed that "any in-person pretrial conference, case management conference, status conference, diversionary program, discovery motions practice, motions practice or other hearing, whether civil or criminal" be postponed, we explained that such hearings could proceed if conducted by "advanced communication technology." We also "clarifie[d]" that we "expect[ed] that non-essential matters can continue to move forward, within the sound discretion of President Judges, so long as judicial personnel, attorneys, and other individuals can and do act in conformity with orders and guidance issued by the executive branch." For "essential functions," in-person proceedings were permitted, but had to be held in "courtrooms designated by the individual courts of common pleas to minimize person-to-person contact."
In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 658 Pa. 444, 229 A.3d 229, 229 (2020) (per curiam).
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231.
Id at 230.
We again suspended Rule 600. As in our March 16, 2020 order, we explained what this meant: "[t]he purport of this directive is that the time period of the statewide judicial emergency and continuing order through April 30, 2020, SHALL BE EXCLUDED from the time calculation under Rule 600(C)."
Id. at 232 (capitalization in original).
On April 28, 2020, by order, we extended the statewide judicial emergency until June 1, 2020. We noted that our "courts have remained operational, albeit with significant limitations due to the current pandemic," and we announced that, beginning on May 4, 2020, the courts "shall be open to conduct all court business," so long as that was done using strict restrictions on in-person contact. We instructed our courts to "put forth their best efforts to accomplish the timely administration of justice."
In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 659 Pa. 27, 230 A.3d 1015, 1015 (2020) (per curiam).
Id.
Id. (capitalization modified).
Id. (capitalization modified).
We maintained our prior suspensions of the time periods for filing documents and of Rule 600. We expressly suspended all jury trials, for the time being. We identified, and prioritized, certain "critical court functions" that were of the "highest priority" and that must proceed, either via restricted in-person proceedings, or via "advanced communication technology," including hearings related to, inter alia, emergency bail matters, probation detainers, bench warrants, juvenile detention, and preliminary hearings for incarcerated persons.
Id. at 1018.
Id. at 1018.
Then, on May 27, 2020, we announced the end of the statewide judicial emergency. We declared that all of our prior orders would "expire according to their own terms," on June 1, 2020. To reiterate, Rule 600 had been suspended in all judicial districts for the duration of the statewide emergency. This meant that all of March, April, and May of 2020 had to be excluded from tabulating the relevant time periods in a Rule 600 calculation. We never mentioned due diligence, and we never relieved the Commonwealth of its burden to act with such diligence "throughout the life of the case." To the contrary, our orders made clear that, although some aspects of the court system had to be suspended, that system, including the work of judges, prosecutors, and defendants (and their attorneys), continued to operate, albeit in a modified way. Prosecutors, integral and necessary participants in nearly every aspect of our criminal justice system, were never given leave to passively await for the pandemic to let up or to leave countless cases—and many incarcerated defendants—in a standstill position. If these cases could not proceed to jury trials, they also could not simply be shelved.
In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 660 Pa. 249, 234 A.3d 408, 408 (2020) (per curiam) (capitalization modified).
Harth, 252 A.3d at 618.
In our May 27, 2020 order, we ended the statewide emergency. We left to the president judges the decision of how to proceed going forward. It was then up to the president judges to decide whether the pandemic continued to present a local emergency, and whether to continue to "exercise emergency powers" in their individual districts after our involvement ended. The President Judge of Montgomery County ("the President Judge") did just that. It was a period during that time that gave rise to the Rule 600 dispute in this case.
In re: General Statewide Judicial Emergency, 234 A.3d at 408.
In accordance with the authority provided by our initial 2020 orders, the President Judge first declared a local judicial emergency on March 12, 2020. The President Judge issued a series of subsequent orders extending the local emergency status, keeping the courts closed to the public, and announcing and implementing an evolving series of protocols. Those orders treated Rule 600 in different ways. At first, the President Judge ordered that Rule 600 "shall be suspended in the 38th Judicial District during the period of the local judicial emergency." Two weeks later, however, the President Judge stated by separate order that "any postponement of criminal case scheduling caused by the declaration of this judicial emergency shall be considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable time for purposes of the application of [Rule 600]."
38th Jud. Dist. Declaration, 3/31/2020, at 1.
38th Jud. Dist. Declaration, 4/14/2020, at 1.
On May 28, 2020, the President Judge issued an order declaring that the local judicial emergency would extend "until further Order of Court." Then came our June 1, 2020 order ending the statewide emergency and delegating the handling of the day-to-day management of the pandemic to the president judges of each county. Two days after that, on June 3, 2020, the President Judge entered an order extending the local emergency declaration in Montgomery County and, relevant herein, prescribing the manner in which Rule 600 would operate from that point until the end of the emergency. Rather than suspend Rule 600 entirely, as had been done during the initial stages of the beginning of the pandemic, the President Judge instead announced that "any postponement of criminal case scheduling caused by the declaration of this judicial emergency, from March 12, 20202, through the expiration of the judicial emergency, shall be considered a court postponement and shall constitute excludable time for purposes of [Rule 600]." This order continued in effect until August 31, 2021, shortly after this Court rescinded our June 1, 2020 order authorizing president judges to declare local emergencies and mandated that all of Pennsylvania’s courts return to "pre-pandemic status, … fully opened and staffed by judges and other personnel."
38th Jud. Dist. Declaration, 5/28/2020, at 1.
In re: Judicial Emergency Order, 6/3/2020, at 1.
In re: Judicial Emergency Order, 8/30/2021, at 1.
In re General Statewide Judicial Emergency, No. 533 Judicial Administration Docket, 6/21/2021, at 1.
The entirety of the time period at issue in the case sub judice—June 3, 2020 to August 31, 2021—occurred under the governance of the President Judge’s June 3, 2020 order. This Court afforded the President Judge the authority—and discretion—to decide how to characterize delays under Rule 600. In exercising that authority, the President Judge could not have been more clear: this time was to be categorized as a "court postponement." This designation differs in name only from the more common term, "judicial delay." As such, the time at issue here falls squarely within the ambit of our recent decision in Harth.
Like today’s case, Harth implicated the order of operations in a Rule 600 analysis. There, we were asked to "consider whether a trial court may rely upon its own availability as justification for denying a defendant’s motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule 600], without first requiring the Commonwealth to demonstrate that it acted with due diligence in prosecuting the defendant’s case." In other words, what question must a court first ask: (1) Did the prosecutor act with due diligence?; or (2) Was the delay caused by the court? We held that it had to be the former. Today’s decision obscures, and even flouts, that clear ruling.
Harth, 252 A.3d at 603.
Id.
Harth and a co-defendant were charged with robbery and associated crimes related to a home invasion in Philadelphia. As trial approached, the prosecutor repeatedly failed to provide Harth with all of the discovery materials necessary for Harth to prepare his defense. The case had to be postponed numerous times to allow the prosecutor more time to produce the discovery materials. After even more postponements, one of which was due to the Pope’s visit to Philadelphia, Harth filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 600. The trial court once again delayed Harth’s trial, this time in order to hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss. After the hearing, the trial court denied the motion. The court found that much of the delay in bringing Harth to trial was due to the court’s unavailability. The court stated that, while it had considered the prosecutor’s repeated failure to produce the discovery materials, it nonetheless found the court’s busy calendar to be the dispositive factor for Rule 600 purposes.
Id.
Id. at 605-06 (references to the notes of testimony omitted).
When the parties appeared the next day for trial, the prosecutor handed Harth a discovery packet filled with fifteen new, and previously undisclosed, exhibits. Harth immediately filed a second Rule 600 motion, arguing again that the prosecutor had not acted with due diligence throughout the case. The prosecutor made no attempt to demonstrate that he had acted with due diligence at any point, particularly with regard to his sustained failure to comply with his discovery obligations. Instead, the prosecutor stated, "I mean, Your Honor, frankly, you already denied the motion. There hasn’t been a change of circumstance. The last continuance was not on the Commonwealth. So it was denied." The trial court agreed, and it denied the motion. Rather than holding the prosecutor to his burden to prove his due diligence, the trial court instead blamed Harth for not presenting any evidence of the prosecutor’s lack of due diligence.
Id. at 606 (quoting Notes of Testimony ("N.T."), 11/28/2016, at 24).
See Browne, 584 A.2d at 908 ("It is the Commonwealth’s burden to prove prosecutorial due diligence by a preponderance of the evidence.’’).
Reversing the burden of proof was not the trial court’s primary basis for denying the Rule 600 motion. Even though the prosecutor repeatedly was not ready to proceed, the real culprit blamed for the delays was the court’s own packed schedule. The court refused "to hold the Commonwealth responsible." A jury trial followed, and Harth was convicted of various crimes. Harth appealed, and the Superior Court reversed the trial court’s Rule 600 ruling. The Superior Court remanded the case, instructing the trial court to hold a hearing to decide which party was responsible for each delay and to decide whether the prosecutor had acted with due diligence. Believing that the remand constituted an unwarranted second bite of the apple for the Commonwealth, Harth filed a petition for allowance of appeal with this Court.
Harth, 252 A.3d at 606 (quoting N.T., 11/29/2016, at 24).
Id. at 608-09.
We reversed, vacated the judgment of sentence, and discharged Harth. In doing so, we held that the trial court conducted its Rule 600 analysis in the incorrect se- quence. We explained that considering the impact of "judicial delay" before, over, and above the Commonwealth’s obligation to act with due diligence is not an uncommon occurrence. Drawing upon my concurrence in Commonwealth v. Mills, this Court explained that the assertion of "judicial delay" does not alter the analytical sequence mandated by the plain text of Rule 600. We held that " ‘a linear reading of [Rule 600] requires courts first to consider the Commonwealth’s role in causing the delay at issue,’ and only after the Commonwealth proves that it acted with due diligence throughout the case should a court consider other causes for delay in bringing a defendant to trial." "Although not a model of clarity," the rule requires that "periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence." Because the burden to act with due diligence exists "at all times during the pendency of a case," we held that, when analyzing a Rule 600 motion to dismiss, "a trial court must first determine whether the Commonwealth has met its obligation to act with due diligence throughout the life of the case[.]" If, and only if, the Commonwealth makes this showing can a court consider the impact of "judicial delay" on bringing a defendant to trial.
Id at 603, 622.
Id. at 616.
See Mills, 162 A.3d at 325-27 (Wecht, J., concurring).
Harth, 252 A.3d at 616 (quoting Mills, 162 A.3d at 326 (Wecht, J., concurring)). See also Mills, 162 A.3d at 326 (Wecht, J., concurring) (" ‘Judicial delay’ is not a mechanism or totem that exempts the Commonwealth from its obligations under the Rule. It may be invoked only after the Commonwealth has demonstrated that it is ready, able, and willing to proceed with the case against the defendant.’’).
Id. at 617 (quoting Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1)) (emphasis omitted).
Commonwealth v. Hawk, 528 Pa. 329, 597 A.2d 1141, 1145 (1991).
Harth, 252 A.3d at 618.
Id.
Because there is no meaningful, substantive difference between a "court postponement" and "judicial delay," consideration of the "court postponement" at issue presently in the context of a Rule 600 challenge must proceed along the same analytical progression that we mandated in Harth. First, the court must assess whether the Commonwealth acted with due diligence at all times throughout the life of the case. Then, and only then, can the court assess the impact of "court postponements," a.k.a. "judicial delay." This is precisely what the Superior Court held below. That court ordered that the case be remanded for the Commonwealth to demonstrate that it was diligent throughout the life of Lear’s case. Under Harth, the Superior Court was correct to do so. The Majority sidesteps this seemingly unavoidable result. It does so by recasting the relevant time period as "other periods of delay" under Rule 600. Because of this mischaracterization, prosecutors now are relieved of their burden to prove due diligence in all pandemic-related cases, as well as in every case that can be said to involve "other periods of delay." To achieve this result, the Majority has to reclassify the time period at issue, circumvent Rule 600’s order of operations, and disregard the plain meaning of our recent decision in Harth.
Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 720 (Pa. Super. 2023).
The Superior Court was faced with a jurisprudential conflict. On the one hand, considering the fact that the delay here specifically was deemed by the President Judge to be a "court postponement," Harth required a demonstration of due diligence. On the other hand, a different panel of the Superior Court previously had held in Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 751 (Pa. Super. 2022), that such pandemic-related time, even when designated as a "court postponement," had to be excluded from a Rule 600 calculation without any consideration of the Commonwealth's due diligence. The Superior Court was correct to apply Harth instead of Carl. I would overrule Carl, and any other cases holding the same, forthwith.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1) ("For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the computation of the time within which trial must commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the computation.").
See Maj. Op. at 563.
The Majority’s characterization of the relevant time period in question obviously differs from the President Judge’s designation of that period. We gave the President Judge the authority and discretion to designate the pandemic-related delays as he saw fit. The President Judge chose to deem those periods "court postponements." Even though the choice was authorized (and reasonable) by reason of both this Court’s order and Rule 600, the Majority now declares that the President Judge somehow was wrong. But, the President Judge was not asked to choose between right or wrong options. The President Judge was given sole authority to decide. He decided that the time would constitute judicial delay. The Majority makes no meaningful effort to explain why it is necessary or appropriate for this Court now to second-guess the President Judge’s choice. But, the reason is obvious to anyone who reads today’s opinion. Today’s Court disagrees with its own recent decision in Harth. It uses this unique, pandemic-related case to limit that decision.
The Majority asserts repeatedly that Harth created a limited exception to Rule 600’s mandate. This erroneous claim emanates from the Majority’s fundamental misunderstanding of both Harth and the order of operations in a Rule 600 analysis. As I explained in my concurrence in Mills, which a majority of this Court adopted in Harth "[s]ubsection (C)(1) of the Rule provides the computational methodology that courts must utilize to determine whether there was a violation of the defendant’s speedy trial right." "[A] linear reading of the provisions requires courts first to consider the Commonwealth’s role in causing the delay at issue." The first thing that the Rule instructs courts to do, when determining whether time is excludable, is to consider whether the Commonwealth caused any delay "at any stage of the proceedings when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence." When we held in Harth that any time attributable to "judicial delay" could occur only after an assessment of the Commonwealth’s diligence, we were not creating some limited exception to the rule. To the contrary, we held that courts must follow the path expressly prescribed by the rule. This order of operations is mandated not only by the text of the rule, but also by the long-standing axiom that prosecutors are duty-bound to act with due diligence at every stage of a criminal case, and throughout its duration.
Id. at 558, 560–61, 561-63, 561 n.8 and 563 n.9.
Today’s Majority seeks to avoid Harth by calling that decision "sharply divided." See Maj. Op. at 561. Whether sharp or dull, the majority rules. Harth is binding precedent that today’s Majority wishes to ignore.
Mills, 162 A.3d at 326 (Wecht, J., concurring).
Id.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).
Because it misconstrues Rule 600’s analytical sequencing, the Majority asserts that Harth’s mandate is limited to cases involving periods of "judicial delay." This is incorrect. The computation of time sequencing is the same in every case, regardless of the facial nature of the delay.
Maj. Op. at 561–62.
The Majority maneuvers around the due diligence inquiry, and proceeds directly to the "other periods of delay" categorization, by ignoring yet another critical aspect of the rule. The Majority insists that the Commonwealth is not required to demonstrate due diligence because the delay here was not caused by the Commonwealth. In the Majority’s view of Rule 600, a court in such a situation would never have to consider whether the Commonwealth has acted with due diligence. The Majority wholly disregards the possibility that it will be the Commonwealth’s lack of due diligence that caused the delay. That is why Rule 600 requires consideration of the Commonwealth’s actions first, and that is why we held in Harth that "judicial delay" comes after an assessment of the Commonwealth’s due diligence. Under the Majority’s reconfigured version of Rule 600, courts will never even get to the question of due diligence if the delay facially appears attributable to some outside factor. To not require all prosecutors to prove due diligence means that some prosecutors will not act with due diligence.
The Majority and I agree that the "pertinent computational provision" begins with consideration of whether any delays in bringing a defendant to trial were "caused by the Commonwealth." Id. at 560–61 n.7. But we differ as to the manner in which a court must proceed in making this initial assessment. The Majority asserts that the plain text of the rule requires that a court first assess causation, and, if the delay was caused by the Commonwealth, then, and only then, a court should consider due diligence. Id Contrary to the Majority’s insistence, the rule requires that a court consider, not ignore, due diligence as part of the initial causation inquiry. This inquiry is necessary because the failure to do so as part of the initial causation analysis precludes entirely the possibility that it was the Commonwealth’s lack of due diligence that caused the delay. In such a circumstance, that delay would be attributable to the Commonwealth. However, a court proceeding under the Majority's interpretation of Rule 600 would never unearth those types of delays, because the Majority does not require a court to look for them. Turning a blind eye to these prosecutorial delays undermines both the text of the rule and the long-standing principle that prosecutors must act with due diligence at all times.
Underpinning our decision in Harth is the concern that, if prosecutors are not required to demonstrate due diligence in every criminal case, and for the life of the case, it would be all too easy for a prosecutor to let a case linger, and to let a defendant needlessly languish in jail without consequence if the delay outwardly appears to have been caused by an external factor. To avoid this abdication of a prosecutor’s duty, the rule requires consideration of the actions of the prosecutor first. A prosecutor must be "ready, able, and willing to proceed with the case against the defendant. Otherwise, the due diligence component of Rule 600 would have little, if any, meaningful import." The Majority not only breathes life back into the pre-Harth problem; it makes matters worse. By the Majority’s doing, the next time there is a public health crisis, a prolonged weather emergency, or some other extended natural occurrence that delays court proceedings, prosecutors can feel free to forget about their cases, put their feet up, and do nothing to advance the case as they await resumption of the normal state of affairs. Prosecutors can rest assured that this Court will not require them to prove that they met the standard that this Court, through our rule making authority, previously had expected of them.
Mills, 162 A.3d at 326-27 (Wecht, J., concurring).
Prosecutors should proceed with caution. The Majority offers no advice to prosecutors on how one can determine in advance whether a circumstance is an "other period[] of delay." The prosecutor that relies upon today’s Majority takes a substantial risk. That prosecutor will find out whether the period that he or she took off legally constituted an "other period of delay" only after the defendant files a motion to dismiss on Rule 600 grounds. The prosecutor cannot, and should not, depend upon the trial court’s designation, as the Majority makes clear that such a designation cannot be trusted and is susceptible to our correction. If the prosecutor guesses wrong, and is deemed to have failed today’s newly elasticized due diligence test, the case will be dismissed. The Majority not only allows this gamble, it encourages it. Prosecutors should avoid this wager by acting with, and being prepared to demonstrate, due diligence at all times.
Assume an alternate universe in which today’s Majority is correct, and that what the President Judge here declared to be "court postponements" were instead "other periods of delay." Even under such a scenario it is not clear that such classification relieves prosecutors of their burden to prove due diligence. With regard to such periods, the explanatory comment to Rule 600 states that, "[i]f the delay occurred as the result of circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control and despite its due diligence, the time is excluded." The term "despite its due diligence" in conjunction with "circumstances beyond the control of the Commonwealth" indicates that exclusion of time related to "other periods of delay" can occur only after proof of due diligence.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 cmt.
The Superior Court in this case did not order the charges against Lear to be dismissed. Rather, it held that the Commonwealth was required to demonstrate that it had acted with due diligence. This is not a particularly onerous burden, especially in a case such as this one. The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic created barriers to many of the tasks that normally are accomplished easily under ordinary circumstances. Interviewing witnesses, gathering evidence, supplying discovery, participating in pre-trial hearings, and engaging in other necessary pre-trial duties likely were significantly hindered, if not rendered impossible, by the pandemic. The prosecutor was required merely to appear in court and explain his or her attempts and efforts under these circumstances to keep this case moving forward. Pandemic or not, the prosecutor’s duty to act with due diligence lasts "throughout the life of the case." That is all the law asks.
Harth, 252 A.3d at 618.
I would affirm the Superior Court’s ruling.
Justice Donohue joins this dissenting opinion.