Opinion
J-S48030-19 No. 3607 EDA 2018
10-16-2019
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. IN JOONG KIM Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 15, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0006335-2016 BEFORE: BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER, J. MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
In Joong Kim ("Appellant") appeals from the order denying his petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
This case arises from Appellant sexually assaulting his niece, Y.S., when she was ten years old. Y.S. moved with her parents and her brother to the United States from South Korea in April 2001; they lived in Montgomery County with Y.S.'s maternal aunt and Appellant who was maternal aunt's husband. N.T., 9/18/17, at 49-50, 51, 75, 115-116. Y.S. and her brother would stay with Appellant after school while their parents worked at Appellant's beauty supply store. Id. at 51-54, 78, 118-120, 123; N.T., 9/20/17, at 17-18. On three occasions, Appellant sexually assaulted Y.S. in Appellant's bedroom, while Y.S.'s brother was downstairs watching television. N.T., 9/18/17, at 57, 66, 80-85, 86-87, 104. On the third occasion in late February, early March 2002, Appellant threatened to kill Y.S. and her brother if she told anybody about the assaults. Id. at 85-86; N.T., 9/19/17, at 155-156.
After the third assault, Y.S. told her mother on March 3, 2002, what Appellant had been doing. N.T., 9/18/17, at 86, 107; N.T., 9/20/17, at 6-10, 26. Y.S.'s mother confronted Appellant at a Wednesday-evening church service in March 2002. N.T., 9/19/17, at 78-80; N.T., 9/20/17, at 12-13. After the confrontation between Y.S.'s mother and Appellant, Appellant flew between the United States and S. Korea several times and eventually absconded to S. Korea on June 22, 2002, where he remained until his return to the United States on July 23, 2016. N.T., 9/18/17, at 4-5; N.T., 9/19/17, at 101; N.T., 9/20/17, at 45-46, 52-55, Exhibits C-9, C-10, C-14, and C-15.
Y.S. and her parents reported the abuse on April 16, 2002, and Y.S. spoke with the police on April 24, 2002. N.T., 9/18/17, at 100, 105, 118; Exhibits D-1, C-11; N.T., 9/19/17, at 14, 29, 114-115; N.T., 9/20/17, at 16. Following an evaluation of Y.S. at Children's Hospital of Philadelphia on May 2, 2002, test results returned positive on May 6, 2002, for chlamydia trachomatis, a sexually transmitted disease. N.T., 9/19/17, at 39, 57-58, Exhibits C-4, C-7. Y.S. gave a second statement to the police on June 26, 2002. N.T., 9/19/17, at 122, 143-144, Exhibit D-2; N.T., 9/20/17, at 17, 57. Dr. Steven Shapiro examined Y.S. on July 8, 2002, and found that she was a victim of abuse. N.T., 9/19/17, at 60-61, 65.
After Y.S. gave her second statement on June 26, 2002, the police filed charges and obtained an arrest warrant, but when they attempted to serve Appellant on June 27, 2002, they could not locate him at his home or places of work. N.T., 9/18/17, at 103, 153, Exhibit D-2; N.T., 9/19/17, at 123, 126, 153-154; N.T., 9/20/17, at 56-57; N.T., 10/24/18, at 14, Exhibit D-3. The Commonwealth filed a criminal complaint on July 10, 2002. Docket Entries 1-4; N.T, 10/24/18, at 11, Exhibit D-1.
Upon his return to the United States on July 23, 2016, Appellant was arrested on the outstanding warrant and proceeded to trial on September 18, 2017. N.T., 9/18/17, at 1, 4. The jury convicted him of three counts of rape of a child, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c), and three counts of aggravated indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(7). N.T., 9/21/17, at 84-87. On January 11, 2018, the trial court sentenced Appellant to incarceration for an aggregate term of eighteen to thirty-six years. N.T., 1/11/18, at 21-22. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on February 9, 2018, which he discontinued on May 29, 2018.
Appellant filed a counseled PCRA petition on July 9, 2018, averring that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 ("Rule 600") and for failing to object to the trial court's jury instruction on the law of aggravated indecent assault. PCRA Petition, 7/9/18, at ¶¶ 10, 11. Following a hearing on October 24, 2018, the PCRA court denied Appellant's petition on November 15, 2018. This appeal followed. Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents two questions for our consideration:
I. Did the [PCRA] court err when it denied [Appellant's] motion for Post-Conviction Relief, where his trial counsel failed to file a Motion to Dismiss under Rule 600 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure on a case that was approximately 14 years old, where the police had filed the criminal complaint in 2002 without apprehending [Appellant], and had made one attempt to locate him over the 14 year period between the filing of the complaint and his apprehension?Appellant's Brief at 6-7.
II. Did the [PCRA] court err where it refused to grant [Appellant's] motion for Post Conviction Relief where trial counsel had failed to object to the court's instruction on the law, and where the court's instruction did not inform the jury on the law regarding the overlap between Rape of a Person Less than 13 years under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3121 §§ A6 (F1) and Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Person Less than 13 years under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125 §§ 7 (F2)? Specifically if a defendant is convicted of the Rape, he cannot also be convicted of the Aggravated [Indecent] Assault for the same conduct. In this case, he was convicted of both, and without the proper instruction, the record is not clear as to whether the jury intended to convict him of Rape and Aggravated Indecent Assault for the same action, or for different actions.
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we consider the record "in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level." Commonwealth v. Stultz , 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel , 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Robinson , 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa. 2016). We will not disturb the PCRA court's findings unless there is no support for them in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Lippert , 85 A.3d 1095, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2014).
Both of Appellant's issues challenge the trial counsel's representation as ineffective. Our Supreme Court has explained the essential elements of an IAC claim as follows:
To prevail in a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must overcome the presumption that counsel is effective by establishing all of the following three elements, as set forth in Commonwealth v. Pierce , 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (1987): (1) the underlying legal claim has arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice because of counsel's ineffectiveness.Commonwealth v. Paddy , 15 A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011).
A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if accepted as true, could establish a cause for relief. Commonwealth v. Stewart , 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013). With regard to the reasonable-basis prong, "we do not question whether there were other more logical courses of action which counsel could have pursued; rather, we must examine whether counsel's decisions had any reasonable basis." Commonwealth v. Washington , 927 A.2d 586, 594 (Pa. 2007). We will conclude that counsel's chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis only if Appellant proves that "an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued." Commonwealth v. Williams , 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (Pa. 2006). "In order to meet the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness standard, a defendant must show that there is a 'reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Commonwealth v. Reed , 42 A.3d 314, 319 (Pa. Super. 2012).
"The burden of proving ineffectiveness rests with Appellant." Commonwealth v. Rega , 933 A.2d 997, 1018 (Pa. 2007). A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will fail if the petitioner does not meet any of the three prongs. Commonwealth v. Williams , 863 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2004). "Counsel is presumed to be effective; accordingly, to succeed on a claim of ineffectiveness the petitioner must advance sufficient evidence to overcome this presumption." Commonwealth v. Johnson , 139 A.3d 1257, 1272 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted). Finally, we will not deem counsel ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Id. (citation omitted).
Appellant first complains that trial counsel did not file a Rule 600 motion for dismissal of the charges. Appellant's Brief at 15. Specifically, Appellant argues that "the period of delay between the filing of the complaint in 2002 and the apprehension of [Appellant] in 2016 count[s] toward the calculation of the Commonwealth's time for the purposes of Rule 600" because the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in locating and serving Appellant with an arrest warrant during that period. Id. at 16. According to Appellant, the Commonwealth's lack of due diligence resulted in a violation of Rule 600, i.e., the failure to bring Appellant's case to trial within 365 days from the filing of the complaint. Id. at 21-22. Appellant concludes that: (1) his "Rule 600 argument certainly has arguable merit" because the Commonwealth was required to exercise due diligence; (2) trial counsel could have "no reasonable basis for failing to file the motion . . . [which] could have—and should have—resulted in a full dismissal of all charges[;]" and (3) if defense counsel "had filed the motion . . . full dismissal . . . would certainly be a different outcome than the lengthy state sentence that he is now serving." Id. at 22-23. Appellant requests we remand for "a hearing to determine whether the Commonwealth can establish due diligence for the period of time between the filing of the complaint and the arrest." Id. at 28.
In response, the Commonwealth contends that we need "not reach the merits of the Rule 600 analysis because [Appellant] failed to satisfy his burden of proof." Commonwealth's Brief at 17. According to the Commonwealth:
[Appellant] failed to meet his burden with respect to establishing the full extent of law enforcement's efforts to locate and apprehend him prior to his leaving the country and during his absence. Without that evidence, . . . no court could fairly conclude that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence on this record.
* * *
In this case, [Appellant] failed to offer any such proof at his PCRA hearing, offering only the testimony of [trial] counsel who testified by identifying a police report from [June] 27, 2002, discussing an
attempt to serve an arrest warrant. N.T. 10/24/18 at 14[, Exhibit D-3]. Counsel simply stated that he was unaware of any additional reports showing any other attempts at service. Id. at 15. . . .Id. at 17-19 (emphasis in original).
Conspicuously absent from the evidence [Appellant] offered at the PCRA hearing was any testimony from the investigating officer, or any law enforcement personnel, to detail the extent of their attempts at apprehending [Appellant] at any time on, before or after [June] 27, 2002.
* * *
[Appellant's] request for a Rule 600 hearing [as a form of PCRA relief] was effectively a concession that he did not meet his burden of proving that his claim is meritorious at the PCRA hearing.
Upon review of Appellant's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement, we observe that he did not properly preserve his first issue. "Any issues not raised in a 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived." Commonwealth v. Lord , 719 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. 1998). In his concise statement, Appellant raised a Rule 600 challenge in the context of trial court error, not ineffective assistance of counsel ("IAC"):
1. The trial court erred in failing to grant [Appellant's] Motion for Post Conviction Relief in which he sought a hearing to determine whether the Commonwealth violated his speedy trial rights protected by Rule 600 of the PA Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defense met its burden by a preponderance of the evidence, and the court should have scheduled a hearing to determine whether the Commonwealth had performed due diligence in locating [Appellant] prior to his apprehension. The apprehension took place more than 10 years after the charges were filed, which was beyond 365 days after excludable time.Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal, 1/3/19, at ¶ 1. Because Appellant's Rule 1925(b) statement does not present the Rule 600 issue as raised on appeal, i.e., in the context of counsel's ineffectiveness, we should find Appellant's first issue waived. Lord , 719 A.2d at 309. We note, however, that the claim raised in Appellant's first issue is the same as that raised in his PCRA petition, wherein he explained the basis for his Rule 600 claim as a matter of counsel's ineffectiveness. PCRA Petition, 7/9/18, at ¶ 10. Moreover, Appellant presented his Rule 600 issue as an IAC claim at the PCRA hearing. N.T., 10/24/18, at 4. Also, the PCRA court and the Commonwealth understood and addressed Appellant's first issue in the context of counsel's ineffectiveness. PCRA Court Opinion, 1/18/19, at 7; Commonwealth's Brief at 12.
Assuming Appellant's first issue is not waived, we conclude it would not warrant relief. In reaching this conclusion, we would rely on the PCRA's January 18, 2019 opinion, which comprehensively and correctly disposed of Appellant's first IAC claim. Specifically, the PCRA court determined—and the record confirms—that Appellant failed to prove prejudice by demonstrating at the PCRA hearing that the Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence in locating and apprehending him during his fourteen-year absence from the United States. PCRA Court Opinion, 1/18/19, at 7-11. Thus, we would agree with the PCRA court that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to file a Rule 600 motion because it would have been meritless.
In his second issue, Appellant complains that trial counsel failed to challenge the trial court's jury instruction on aggravated indecent assault. Appellant's Brief at 23. According to Appellant, because "conduct cannot be both Aggravated Indecent Assault and Rape at the same time, and if someone is convicted of Rape for a given act, he or she cannot also be convicted of the Aggravated Indecent Assault for the same act." Id. at 25-26. Thus, Appellant asserts, he was wrongfully convicted of both aggravated indecent assault and rape because "the jury was not instructed about this provision of the law prior to delivering their verdict, and [trial] counsel did not object to the instruction as it was read on the record." Id. at 26 (citation omitted). Specifically, Appellant contends:
What is not clear is whether the jury convicted [Appellant] for Aggravated Indecent Assault based on the penetration with his penis, or based on other evidence of digital penetration brought forward at trial. . . .Id. at 26-27. Appellant concludes that "the claim is of arguable merit[;]" there was no reasonable basis for not challenging "the faulty" jury instruction; "and the prejudice is obvious [because] he is currently serving consecutive time on the counts of Rape and Aggravated Indecent Assault." Id. at 28.
* * *
If the jury had been properly instructed on the law, and had been made aware of the provisions in the statutory language that prevent a Rape from also being an Aggravated Indecent Assault, then we could be totally confident in the integrity of the verdict.
The Commonwealth counters that Appellant's second issue fails to satisfy the arguable-merit and rational-basis prongs of an IAC claim because the trial court instructed the jury in accordance with the Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury Instructions ("PSSJI"). Commonwealth's Brief at 23. According to the Commonwealth, "the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has already demonstrated that our appellate courts should reject a claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to object" where the trial court charged members of the jury using the PSSJI. Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Trivigno , 750 A.2d 243, 253 (Pa. 2000)).
Additionally, the Commonwealth contends that Appellant cannot prove prejudice because the jury heard independent evidence supporting each charge: Appellant touched the victim's vagina with his hand, which supported the conviction for aggravated indecent assault, and Appellant penetrated her vagina with his penis, which supported the rape conviction. Commonwealth's Brief at 24-25. Thus, the Commonwealth concludes, there was "no room for confusion on the part of the jury over the Commonwealth's charge[s]." Id. at 25.
Upon review of Appellant's second issue, the certified record in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the prevailing party, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable legal authority, we conclude that the PCRA court's thorough and well-crafted opinion entered on January 18, 2019, comprehensively and correctly disposes of Appellant's second IAC claim. Specifically, the PCRA court determined—and our review of the record confirms—that Appellant failed to demonstrate arguable merit and prejudice because the jury instruction on aggravated indecent assault conformed to the standard jury instructions. Id. at 14 (citing Commonwealth v. Hunzer , 868 A.2d 498, 516 (Pa. Super. 2005). Thus, we agree with the PCRA court that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the aggravated indecent assault jury instruction, which this court has upheld and was supported by evidence of digital penetration.
Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court's order dismissing Appellant's PCRA petition, and we do so based on the PCRA court's January 18, 2019 opinion. We direct the parties to attach a copy of that opinion to this decision in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 10/16/19
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