Opinion
No. 1038 MDA 2018
08-27-2019
COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Jerome Anthony KENNEDY, Jr., Appellant
Nicole J. Spring, Public Defender, Williamsport, for appellant. Nicole M. Ippolito, Assistant District Attorney, Williamsport, for Commonwealth, appellee.
Nicole J. Spring, Public Defender, Williamsport, for appellant.
Nicole M. Ippolito, Assistant District Attorney, Williamsport, for Commonwealth, appellee.
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:
Jerome Anthony Kennedy, Jr. appeals from the order denying his motion to dismiss, which alleged his prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. He argues the trial court abused its discretion in finding there was a manifest necessity for a mistrial during his first trial. We affirm.
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides, in relevant part, that no person shall "be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" U.S. Const. Amend. V. Similarly, Article I, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "No person shall, for the same offense, be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb[.]" Pa. Const. Art. I, § 10.
The trial court set forth the following procedural history:
The Commonwealth charged [Kennedy] with delivery of a controlled substance, three counts of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, two counts of possession of a controlled substance, two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, and one count of criminal use of a communication facility.[ ]
A jury trial began on December 7, 2017. During the course of the trial, jurors reported an incident that happened on the elevator when they were leaving for their lunch break. Before the elevator
35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(30), 780-113(a)(16), 780-113(a)(32), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7512(a), respectively. The Commonwealth also charged Kennedy with one count of persons not to possess firearms, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
doors closed, two of [Kennedy's] female supporters pushed their way onto the already full elevator. When the elevator arrived at the lobby, the taller lady (who was subsequently identified as [Kennedy's] girlfriend, Alexis Lucas) turned away from the elevator doors and toward the six or seven jurors who were on the elevator. Ms. Lucas put her arms out, blocking the jurors and other people who were on the elevator from exiting. Ms. Lucas did this for approximately 15 seconds, and then she turned around, walked out of the elevator, and slammed the outside door.
Trial Court Opinion, filed November 8, 2018, at 1-2 ("1925(a) Op.").
The court held an in camera hearing, where jurors expressed that they did not believe they would hold the incident against Kennedy, were unsure whether they would be able to fairly consider the credibility of Lucas, questioned whether Lucas would be in the courtroom, and felt that Lucas's actions were intimidating:
THE COURT: Would it – would that intimidate any of you to the point that you think it might impact your judgment for or against the defendant? One of these women – well that's the first question. Would it, and there's no right answer to this, there's just an honest one. Would any of you feel that because of that it might interfere in your ability to render a fair – a decision based on the evidence and the law? JUROR: No, I reported it solely because I deal with that every single day when I'm at school, and it's bullying, and I just – I brought it to the attention of the Court because it's unacceptable. THE COURT: Okay. Will you guys hold it against the defendant then? JUROR: No. THE COURT: Okay. JUROR: Is there something that we can do that she can't be here? THE COURT: Well that's the next question. What happens if she testifies? Are you going to be able to judge her credibility fair[ly] and impartially? I am not going to put words in your mouth, but it would be tough for me. JUROR: Yeah. THE COURT: Okay, so we have one yes[. Y]ou can judge it, or no? JUROR: If she started talking[,] I really don't know how I would feel. THE COURT: No, my point is, did what she do at this point cause you concern, or can you listen to her testimony and judge her credibility and the weight of her testimony the same way you would someone else, or would you have – would you feel like you – JUROR: I just can't answer that right now. THE COURT: Okay. JUROR: I don't know. THE COURT: Okay. JUROR: I'd have to really think about that. THE COURT: All right. How about the rest of you? JUROR: I – I think I would – I would have a tough time overlooking that, I don't know. THE COURT: Fair enough. And that's actually what I'm asking, you actually said it better than I could. Would you have – we have a couple yeses, and now we have at least three yeses. Anybody else? At least three yeses. Okay. Fair enough. That would be difficult to – I would think to overlook it under these circumstances. JUROR: It would certainly be an influence, I would have to say. One, I don't know which way, but again
THE COURT: It would be an influence one way of the other?
JUROR: Probably, yeah.
JUROR: Because I would be thinking, you know.
THE COURT: Right, this is the woman that said this and, you know – well then let's go back to question number one. Would you be thinking about it when you're in there rendering your verdict, assuming that she doesn't testify? Are you thinking, man she was a real jerk to us and you know, she's obviously with the defendant, and so that guy's guilty, or the opposite?
JUROR: I think I could put it aside.
JUROR: What she did is –
THE COURT: All right. Fair enough.
...
[ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: The only question I would have is, I think the tipstaff indicated that somebody indicated that they felt as if they were – they were intimidated by the action.
THE COURT: Could be intimidated.
JUROR: It was intimidating.
JUROR: That's what she was – she was trying to be intimidating.
THE COURT: Okay. So she was trying to be intimidating, but all – none of you would use that one way or the other ... in reaching your verdict?
N.T., 12/7/17, at 93-99.
After the jurors left the courtroom, the court discussed the situation with counsel. Defense counsel stated there was a 75% chance that he would call Lucas as a witness. Id. at 100. The trial court noted that as the jurors were leaving, one juror asked, "[W]ell is she still going to be out there and still looking at us?" Defense counsel pointed out that the juror did not respond when the court asked if the jurors would hold the incident against Kennedy. Id. The trial court declared a mistrial. Neither party had asked it to do so. It reasoned that the jury was not capable of deciding the case fairly and impartially. Id. at 102. Kennedy did not object.
Following the mistrial, defense counsel filed a motion to withdraw. The trial court granted the motion and appointed an assistant public defender to represent Kennedy. On April 23, 2018, Kennedy filed a Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B), claiming re-prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. Kennedy argued that there was not a manifest necessity for the court to declare a mistrial sua sponte, and it should have considered less drastic measures, including waiting to see if Kennedy would call Lucas to testify. On May 31, 2018, following an argument, the court denied the motion. Kennedy filed a Notice of Appeal.
Kennedy raises the following issue on appeal: "Whether the trial court erred in denying [Kennedy's] motion to dismiss based on [Kennedy's] constitutional right against double jeopardy?" Kennedy's Br. at 7.
Before we can reach the merits of Kennedy's claim, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction over the order denying his Motion to Dismiss.
An order denying a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds may be appealable as a collateral order under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 313(b), if the trial court has determined that the motion is not frivolous. See Commonwealth v. Taylor , 120 A.3d 1017, 1021 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v. Brady , 510 Pa. 336, 508 A.2d 286, 291 (1986) ). Here, prior to the filing of the Notice of Appeal, the trial court did not make a finding as to whether Kennedy's Motion to Dismiss was frivolous. We therefore remanded to the trial court for it to make that determination. The trial court on remand concluded that it was not. Our jurisdiction is therefore proper. See Taylor , 120 A.3d at 1022-23.
We next address whether Kennedy has waived his challenge to the grant of a mistrial because he did not object when the trial court granted the mistrial. A defendant's "mere acquiescence to the sua sponte grant of a mistrial by the trial judge is not sufficient to waive his double jeopardy claims." Commonwealth v. McCord , 700 A.2d 938, 942 (Pa.Super. 1997) ; accord Commonwealth v. Rivera , 715 A.2d 1136, 1138 (Pa.Super. 1998). We therefore find that Kennedy did not waive his claim.
We will now address the merits of Kennedy's claim. Kennedy argues the trial court declared the mistrial prematurely. He notes that the jurors stated that they would not hold Lucas's behavior against Kennedy when rendering a verdict, and defense counsel was unsure whether he would call Lucas as a witness. He contends the court should have waited to see whether defense counsel called Lucas before declaring a mistrial, and if she in fact testified, the trial court could have issued a curative instruction, rather than grant a mistrial. He maintains that because the court did not take such measures, the double jeopardy doctrine bars retrial.
We review a trial court's decision to declare a mistrial due to a showing of manifest necessity for an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Walker , 954 A.2d 1249, 1254 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc ) (citing Commonwealth v. Kelly , 797 A.2d 925 (Pa.Super. 2002) ).
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 605(B) provides: "(B) When an event prejudicial to the defendant occurs during trial only the defendant may move for a mistrial; the motion shall be made when the event is disclosed. Otherwise, the trial judge may declare a mistrial only for reasons of manifest necessity." Pa.R.Crim.P. 605(B). "Where there exists manifest necessity for a trial judge to declare a mistrial sua sponte , neither the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, nor Article I, § 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution will bar retrial." Walker , 954 A.2d at 1254 (quoting Kelly , 797 A.2d at 936 ). Therefore, to determine whether double jeopardy bars a re-trial following a sua sponte grant of a mistrial, we must determine whether manifest necessity existed for the mistrial.
Courts "do not apply a mechanical formula in determining whether a trial court had a manifest need to declare a mistrial." Kelly , 797 A.2d at 937. Whether a trial court should grant a mistrial after jeopardy has attached is not a decision "to be lightly undertaken, since the defendant has a substantial interest in having his fate determined by the jury first impaneled." Walker , 954 A.2d at 1254 (quoting Kelly , 797 A.2d at 936 ). Further, prior to granting a mistrial, a trial court should consider whether less drastic measures are available. See id. We have stated that "failure to consider if there are less drastic alternatives to a mistrial creates doubt about the propriety of the exercise of the trial judge's discretion" and may be grounds "for barring retrial because it indicates that the court failed to properly consider the defendant's significant interest in whether or not to take the case from the jury." Id. at 1254-55 (quoting Kelly , 797 A.2d at 936 ). When determining whether manifest necessity exists any doubt must "be resolved in favor of the defendant." Id. at 1255 (quoting Kelly , 797 A.2d at 937 ).
"[T]he trial court is in the best position to gauge potential bias" and we defer to the trial court "when the grounds for the mistrial relate to jury prejudice." Id. at 1256 (quoting Arizona v. Washington , 434 U.S. 497, 513–14, 98 S.Ct. 824, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978) ). We defer to the trial court because it "has had the opportunity to observe the jurors, the witnesses, and the attorneys and evaluate the scope of the prejudice." Id. (quoting Washington , 434 U.S. at 513-514, 98 S.Ct. 824 ).
Kennedy relies on Kelly for his contention that the court abused its discretion when it failed to take a less drastic alternative—waiting to see if defense counsel would call Lucas as a witness. In Kelly , the trial court granted a mistrial during a jury trial because the trial court was concerned the court could not act impartially toward the Commonwealth, as it was frustrated with the Commonwealth's "bombastic" style, and feared that this frustration would impact the jury. 797 A.2d at 927. We concluded the court acted prematurely, and that "manifest necessity for a mistrial was not demonstrable at the time the court sua sponte ended the trial." Id. at 940. We stated that "less severe remedies" existed, such as threatening the assistant district attorney with contempt "should he not curb his ‘volatile’ style of litigation," or removing him as the prosecuting attorney. Id. at 942. We concluded that, although the trial court had a concern about the appearance of its bias and its effect on the jury, "there remained the real possibility that the negative impact of the court's opinion of the Commonwealth's style of prosecution could have been prevented and that the jury could have ruled impartially, in spite of the trial judge's frustration." Id. We therefore concluded that the appellants' "valued constitutional right to have their trial completed before the first jury empaneled" should not "have been subordinated to the public interest." Id.
Here, the trial court concluded:
Only one juror indicated that he or she could put the matter aside if Ms. Lucas was called as a witness. The other five or six jurors either indicated that the incident would influence their ability to judge Ms. Lucas' credibility or they did not know if they could consider Ms. Lucas' credibility fairly and impartially. The ones who said it would be an influence could not say which way it would influence their decision. Too many jurors were impacted by the incident for the court to excuse the affected jurors and continue the trial....
Furthermore, it is clear that several jurors felt unnerved and intimidated by Ms. Lucas' actions. Those jurors were not only concerned by the prospect of Ms. Lucas being called as a witness, but also by her mere presence. Therefore, waiting to see if Ms. Lucas was called as a witness was not going to solve the problem.
The incident and its impact made declaring a mistrial a manifest necessity. The ends of public justice would be defeated by proceeding in a trial with a jury whose members were unnerved and intimidated by the actions of [Kennedy's] girlfriend. It was unclear which party the incident would hurt or hinder, because most of the jurors could not overlook the incident but they did not know which way it would influence their decision. There were an insufficient number of unaffected jurors to proceed with the trial. Therefore, the court was left with no choice but to declare a mistrial.
1925(a) Op. at 4-5.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion. Here, unlike in Kelly , the court knew of the impact the incident had on the jurors. The trial court held a hearing, in which it learned that jurors felt intimidated by Lucas's actions and that they were not sure that they would be able to judge her credibility fairly and impartially. Although they stated that they would be able to fairly render a verdict, the jurors were concerned about Lucas's presence in the courtroom, and, as the trial court found, the jurors felt "unnerved and intimidated." Id. at 4-5.
Further, the court did not err in finding less drastic alternatives were not available. The jurors could not fairly and impartially judge the credibility of Lucas. Such inability would have impacted Kennedy's decision as to whether to present her as a witness in his defense. Further, although most jurors stated they could fairly and impartially render a verdict, their statements establish that they were intimidated and nervous following the encounter. Due to this intimidation and nervousness, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that they could not fairly render a verdict.
Order affirmed.
Judge Pellegrini joins the Opinion.
Judge Olson files a Concurring Opinion.
CONCURRING OPINION BY OLSON, J.:
I agree with the learned majority that the trial court's order denying Appellant's motion to dismiss on the basis of double jeopardy should be affirmed. I write separately, however, to address a procedural issue that arose in this case that I believe is problematic.
As the majority notes, "[a]n order denying a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds may be appealable as a collateral order under Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure 313(b), if the trial court has determined that the motion is not frivolous." Majority Opinion at *6. As also noted by the learned majority, the trial court in this case failed to make a frivolousness determination; therefore, pursuant to Commonwealth v. Taylor , 120 A.3d 1017 (Pa. Super. 2015), we remanded the case to the trial court to make such a determination. Moreover, in accordance with Taylor , we were constrained to retain panel jurisdiction while the case was before the trial court on remand. I write separately because – as to the issue of retaining panel jurisdiction – I believe that Taylor was incorrectly decided. In my view, but for the Taylor decision which is binding on this panel , we should have relinquished jurisdiction upon remand.
It is well established that one three-judge Superior Court panel cannot overrule another. Commonwealth v. Taggart , 997 A.2d 1189, 1201 n.16 (Pa. Super. 2010). This action must come, if at all, from an en banc panel of this Court or the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Commonwealth v. Shaffer , 177 A.3d 241, 246 (Pa. Super. 2017).
In this Court's memorandum decision in which this case was remanded to the trial court, the majority noted:
When denying [a defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 587(B) [ ]] requires that the trial judge make a finding as to whether the defendant's motion is frivolous. If the trial court [does not find the motion frivolous] ..., the order is appealable as
Specifically, Rule 587 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in pertinent part:
(4) In a case in which the judge denies the motion [to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds], the findings of fact shall include a specific finding as to frivolousness.
(5) If the judge makes a finding that the motion is frivolous, the judge shall advise the defendant on the record that a defendant has the right to file a petition for review of that determination pursuant to Rule of Appellate Procedure 1573 within 30 days of the order denying the motion.
(6) If the judge denies the motion but does not find it frivolous, the judge shall advise the defendant on the record that the denial is immediately appealable as a collateral order.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B)(4)-(6).
a collateral order. If, however, the court finds the motion is frivolous, we have jurisdiction only if the defendant files, and we grant, a petition for review under Rule 1573 and thus allow the appeal. Therefore, if a trial court does not make a finding as to frivolousness, this Court cannot determine whether we have jurisdiction.
Majority Memorandum, 5/2/19, at *4 (citations omitted; emphasis added).
In both Taylor and the case at bar, the trial court failed to make a "specific finding as to frivolousness." See Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B)(4). Therefore, in both cases, this Court remanded to the trial court, so that the trial court could make that additional determination and pronouncement. Further, in Taylor , this Court retained panel jurisdiction over the case; and, since we were bound by Taylor , this panel did the same. However, I do not believe that the Taylor Court was correct to retain panel jurisdiction over the case.
Since the trial court did not make an express finding under Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B)(4) as to whether Appellant's motion to dismiss was frivolous, we did not know at the time that we remanded it whether this Court had appellate jurisdiction. See Majority Memorandum, 5/2/19, at *4 "( [I]f a trial court does not make a finding as to frivolousness, this Court cannot determine whether we have jurisdiction."). Under Pa.R.CrimP. 587(B)(5), if the trial court found that the motion was frivolous, the order would have been interlocutory and not immediately appealable. Instead, Appellant would have been required to petition this Court for review under Rule 1573 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. On the other hand, if the trial court concluded that the motion to dismiss was not frivolous, then it would be a collateral order and Appellant would have the right to an immediate appeal under Rule 313 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Here, after remand, the trial court found that Appellant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds was not frivolous. Thus, as the majority notes, this Court now has jurisdiction in this case under Rule 313 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, in my view, by retaining panel jurisdiction in instances such as this, we are creating uncertainty for the litigants once the trial court renders a decision regarding frivolousness. If, on remand, the trial court determines that a defendant's motion to dismiss was frivolous, this Court would be required to quash the appeal on the basis that the order was interlocutory. However, by telling the parties that we are retaining panel jurisdiction over the appeal, we are potentially sowing great confusion. Certainly, a defendant might incorrectly believe that he or she does not need to file a petition for review of the frivolousness determination as we specifically told him or her that we were retaining panel jurisdiction over the entire appeal. However, if the defendant does not file a petition for review in accordance with Pa.R.A.P. 1573 within 30 days of the trial court's new order after remand, he or she will have missed the opportunity for this Court to consider the frivolousness issue before he or she is subjected to a second trial. I believe that it is much more appropriate in cases such as this for us to vacate the trial court's order denying a defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds, remand for the trial court to enter a new order in compliance with Pa.R.Crim.P. 587, and relinquish jurisdiction. Thus, after the trial court renders a new order after remand, a defendant may either file a petition for review (if the trial court finds the motion was frivolous), or file an immediate appeal under Pa.R.A.P. 313 (if the trial court finds that the motion was not frivolous). This procedure is cleaner and leaves no room for doubt.
Since the trial court made an express finding in this case that Appellant's motion to dismiss based on double jeopardy grounds was not frivolous, thereby creating a collateral order that is immediately appealable under Pa. R.A.P. 313, an argument may be made that this issue is now moot. However, as I believe that it was improper to retain jurisdiction at the time the case was remanded for a frivolousness determination, I conclude that it is also improper for this particular panel to render a decision on the merits of Appellant's appeal. Instead, we should have relinquished jurisdiction upon remand and, once the trial court entered the order finding Appellant's motion was not frivolous, Appellant should have been required to file a new notice of appeal which would have resulted in this case going to a different panel.
I would note that, even if a petition for review is not filed or, if filed not granted, a defendant does not waive his or her argument that the criminal case should be dismissed on the grounds of double jeopardy. As the note to Rule 587 provides:
Although the judge is required to advise the defendant of his or her appellate rights in paragraphs (B)(5) and (B)(6) [of Pa.R.Crim.P. 587 ] upon dismissing the motion, nothing in the rule is intended to preclude the defendant from proceeding to trial without first appealing the double jeopardy question. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Lee , 490 Pa. 346, 416 A.2d 503, 504 (1980) ("Unquestionably, appellant could have sought immediate appellate review of the questions involved. For whatever reason, however, appellant proceeded to trial without first appealing the double jeopardy question. We believe that a defendant may choose to proceed to trial and if convicted, still challenge the propriety of the pretrial motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds on appeal").
Pa.R.Crim.P. 587, Note.
Second, it is illogical for us to retain jurisdiction over cases such as this. Pursuant to Taylor , unless a trial court makes an express finding under Pa.R.Crim.P. 587(B) as to whether a defendant's motion to dismiss was frivolous, we do not know if this Court has jurisdiction over the case. Since we do not know whether we, in fact, have jurisdiction over the case, our jurisdiction has not yet been perfected and we have no jurisdiction to "retain."
Finally, I also believe that Superior Court Internal Operating Procedure 447(B) demands that we relinquish panel jurisdiction over appeals when a case is remanded for a frivolousness determination. In relevant part, I.O.P. 447(B) declares:
1. If a remand is made solely on procedural grounds, i.e. , for the filing of an opinion, the submission of a missing part of the record, etc., jurisdiction should be retained by the panel. This will allow the appeal to retain the same appeal and journal numbers in the Superior Court and will enable the same panel which heard argument to render an ultimate decision without the necessity of reargument. In such cases, the panel ordering a remand shall fix the time within which the trial court shall act and return the case to the panel. In no event shall panel jurisdiction be relinquished but Superior Court jurisdiction be retained.
2. If, however, the remand requires that the trial court conduct an evidentiary hearing, appoint new counsel for further proceedings in the trial court, or render a new or additional decision or pronouncement , etc., thus giving the trial court an opportunity to reconsider its prior decision or make a new decision, this will result in a new, appealable order. In that event, jurisdiction should be relinquished to the trial court .
I.O.P. 447(B) (emphasis added).
In cases such as this, we have remanded the case and ordered that the trial court "render a new or additional ... pronouncement." Id. Therefore, I believe that the trial court's order, on remand, constitutes "a new, appealable order" and that, pursuant to I.O.P. 447(B), we must relinquish jurisdiction over the appeal. See id.
In conclusion, I believe clarity, logic, and I.O.P. 447(B) require that we simply relinquish jurisdiction in cases in which this Court remands a matter to the trial court to make a determination as to frivolousness under Rule 587(B) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure. Then, if the trial court determines on remand that the motion was not frivolous, the defendant may file a notice of appeal from that true collateral order; and, if the trial court determines that the motion was frivolous, the defendant may file a petition for review of the frivolousness determination.