Opinion
J-S19030-14 No. 1451 MDA 2013
03-31-2014
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. RENEE MICHELLE JONES, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order July 16, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-14-CR-0000910-2010.
BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON AND MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:
Appellant, Renee Michelle Jones, appeals from the order entered on July 16, 2013 denying her petition filed under the Post-Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The factual and procedural background of this case is as follows. On April 18, 2010, Appellant was pulled over in Taylor Township. On June 2, 2010 a six-count information was filed charging Appellant with driving under the influence of alcohol- incapable of safe driving, criminal mischief-tampering with property, disorderly conduct- engaging in fighting, careless driving, and two counts of harassment- subjecting another to physical contact.
On July 15, 2010, Appellant was accepted into the accelerated rehabilitative disposition program ("ARD") for a period of 12 months. On March 3, 2011, the trial court extended Appellant's participation in ARD for an additional 12 months. On June 7, 2012, Appellant's participation in ARD was terminated by the trial court. Thereafter, on September 9, 2012 Appellant pled guilty to driving under the influence of alcohol- incapable of safe driving, criminal mischief- tampering with property, and two counts of harassment- subjecting another to physical contact. She was sentenced to, inter alia, six months of intermediate punishment with 20 days of home confinement followed by six months' probation. The home confinement portion of the sentence was stayed for a period of ten days. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
We recognize that this appeal may be moot as Appellant may no longer be "serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime[.]" 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(ii). However, the record is unclear as to this fact. The stay order provided that Appellant's home confinement was "stayed for a period of 10 days pending further [o]rder of the [c]ourt." Stay Order, 12/27/12. No further order lifting the stay was filed. Thus, in an abundance of caution, we decline to dismiss the appeal and instead reach the merits of Appellant's issues.
PCRA counsel was appointed on December 27, 2012. Appellant then filed a counseled PCRA petition on January 4, 2013. On June 7, 2013, Appellant filed an amended PCRA petition. On July 12, 2013, the PCRA court held an evidentiary hearing regarding Appellant's petition. On July 16, 2013, the PCRA court issued an order denying Appellant PCRA relief. This timely appeal followed.
On August 22, 2013, the PCRA court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal ("concise statement"). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On August 27, 2013, Appellant filed her concise statement. On September 9, 2013, the PCRA court issued its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Appellant's lone issue on appeal was included in her concise statement.
Appellant presents one issue for our review:
Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to adequately explain the written guilty plea colloquy such that [Appellant] could make a knowing and intelligent waiver of her rights?Appellant's Brief at 4 (capitalization removed).
"Our standard of review of an order denying PCRA relief is whether the record supports the PCRA court's findings of fact, and whether the PCRA court's determination is free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Wantz, 84 A.3d 324, 331 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). "The scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the trial level." Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
Appellant's claims relate to the purported ineffectiveness of her trial counsel. A "defendant's right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, [Section] 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution is violated where counsel's performance so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place." Commonwealth v. Simpson, 66 A.3d 253, 260 (Pa. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "Counsel is presumed to be effective." Commonwealth v. Bennett, 57 A.3d 1185, 1195 (Pa. 2012) (citation omitted).
In order to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective, Appellant must establish that "(1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests; and (3) but for counsel's ineffectiveness, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different." Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029, 1039 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal alterations, quotation marks, and citation omitted). "The burden of proving ineffectiveness rests with the appellant," and "[t]he failure to satisfy any one of the prongs of the test for ineffective assistance of counsel requires rejection of the claim." Commonwealth v. Hill, 42 A.3d 1085, 1089-1090 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal granted on other grounds, 58 A.3d 749 (Pa. 2012) (citations omitted).
Appellant claims that she has a mental disability which affects her ability to read, write, and understand written English, and that her trial counsel was ineffective by failing to explain her written plea colloquy. As we have explained:
[A]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. Where the defendant enters h[er] plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1001-1002 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Whether a plea was entered into knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily is determined by the totality of the circumstances. Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489, 500 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted).
The PCRA court concluded that Appellant failed to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. One reason for this conclusion was the PCRA court's factual determination that Appellant was able to read and understand the written plea colloquy. See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/9/13, at 3. In particular, the PCRA court found the testimony of Appellant's trial counsel credible. At the PCRA hearing, trial counsel testified that he had also represented one of Appellant's relatives and that Appellant helped her relative review the written guilty plea colloquy. N.T., 7/12/13, at 66.
Furthermore, the PCRA court found that,
[T]hroughout the PCRA hearing [Appellant] was lucid, had no difficulty understanding all of the questions, and was capable of answering them rationally. While she expressed lack of recall when questioned by the Commonwealth, she responded quicklyPCRA Court Opinion, 9/9/13, at 5.
and unequivocally to [her] counsel's questions. She did not show any signs of mental or intellectual disability, and her testimony appeared to be consistently self-serving.
We conclude that the PCRA court's credibility determinations are supported by the record. In light of these findings, the PCRA court correctly concluded that Appellant had failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant was able to read and understand the written guilty plea colloquy and was thus apprised of her rights as required by Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 590. Furthermore, Appellant's trial counsel testified that Appellant completed the written colloquy independently, although he answered any questions that Appellant had regarding the document. N.T., 7/12/13, at 63-64, 75. Thus, the written colloquy was sufficient to show that Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered a plea of guilty.
Appellant focuses on the fact that she crossed out her original answer of "yes" when responding to the question about her ability to understand the plea proceedings. However, as noted above, the PCRA court found that Appellant was able to understand the plea proceedings. PCRA Court Opinion, 9/9/13, at 5. Furthermore, Appellant failed to present any evidence at the PCRA hearing that she was in fact unable to understand the proceedings due to a mental handicap. See Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876, 882 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 940 A.2d 365 (Pa. 2007), citing Commonwealth v. Hazen, 462 A.2d 732 (Pa. Super. 1983).
The petitioner has the burden of proof in PCRA proceedings. Hill, 42 A.3d at 1089-1090. Her failure to present any evidence regarding her mental health, along with the PCRA court's findings, leads us to conclude that Appellant was not hindered by a mental handicap.
Finally, we note that the trial court also engaged in an oral colloquy with Appellant at the plea hearing. During that colloquy, Appellant stated under oath that she: understood the offenses charged against her; committed those offenses; understood her right to a jury trial; had discussed the matter with her counsel; and that she was satisfied with her counsel's representation. N.T., 9/20/12, at 5-6. "Appellant is bound by these statements, which [s]he made in open court while under oath[.]" Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). Although the oral colloquy standing alone would not have been sufficient under Rule 590, when considered in light of the written plea colloquy it evidences that Appellant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily pled guilty to the underlying charges.
We find unconvincing Appellant's assertion that a detailed discussion of the elements of the offenses was required. Appellant was charged with offenses that are not difficult to understand, e.g., driving under the influence.
Furthermore, the PCRA court credited Appellant's trial counsel's testimony that he met with Appellant on at least three occasions and explained the charges and possible sentences. See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/9/13, at 2-3. Thus, we conclude that the trial court's findings are supported by the record and that its legal conclusions are free of error. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying Appellant's PCRA petition.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. __________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary