Opinion
J-S37043-15 No. 3174 EDA 2014
08-05-2015
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. DARREN JOHNSON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 4, 2014
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0113961-1993
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, J., and LAZARUS, J. MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:
Darren Johnson appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County that dismissed his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act and his supplemental petition for a writ of habeas corpus. After careful review, we affirm.
On June 30, 1993, following a nonjury trial, the Honorable Lisa Richette found Johnson guilty of first-degree murder and possessing an instrument of crime (PIC). The court imposed a mandatory life sentence for murder and a concurrent term of two and one-half to five years' incarceration for PIC. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence, and on August 22, 1995, our Supreme Court denied Johnson's petition for allowance of appeal.
Over the following years, Johnson filed several PCRA petitions, all of which were dismissed. On April 9, 2014, Johnson filed the instant petition and on September 12, 2014, he filed a supplemental petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On August 21, 2014, the court informed Johnson of its intention to deny relief pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Johnson filed a reply and a supplemental reply to the Rule 907 notice. The court dismissed the petition as untimely on November 4, 2014, and this appeal followed, in which Johnson raises the following issues for our review.
In his notice of appeal, Johnson refers to an appeal from the order dated January 17, 2013. However, the order on appeal, as reflected by the trial court docket sheet, is dated November 4, 2014. On his docketing statement filed with this Court, Johnson indicated that he was appealing a PCRA petition decided on November 4, 2014. Throughout his brief, Johnson refers to the November 4, 2014 order. "We may address the merits of this appeal despite the inadequacy of the notice of appeal." Commonwealth v. Robinson , 781 A.2d 152, 154 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted).
1. Whether the PCRA court had jurisdiction to apply the relation back exception to the claims in the PCRA petition filed on April 9, 2014.Appellant's Brief, at vi.
2. Whether the PCRA court erred in applying the PCRA statute to [Johnson's] supplemental habeas petition.
3. Whether the Superior Court has jurisdiction and authority to vacate a void judgment.
4. Whether the PCRA court erred in applying the PCRA statute to [Johnson's] habeas petition and turning it into a PCRA petition?
"Our standard of review regarding a PCRA court's order is whether the determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA court's findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record." Commonwealth v. Garcia , 23 A.3d 1059, 1061 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citations omitted).
Section 9545(b)(1) of the PCRA provides that "any petition under this subchapter, including a subsequent petition shall be filed within one year of the date the judgment becomes final." Section 9545(b)(3) provides that "a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review."
On August 22, 1995, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Johnson's petition for allowance of appeal from this Court's order affirming his judgment of sentence. Because Johnson did not seek further review in the United States Supreme Court, his judgment of sentence became final on November 20, 1996, the date on which his time to file a petition for writ of certiorari expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); United States Supreme Court Rule 13. Johnson filed the instant petition on April 9, 2014, more than seventeen years beyond the date his judgment of sentence became final. Therefore, his petition is patently untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1).
Section 9545(b)(1) provides for limited exceptions to the one-year time limitation, where the petitioner alleges and proves that:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of interference by government officials with the presentation of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
However, a petition raising any of the exceptions enumerated in section 9545(b)(1), "shall be filed within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented." 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
"The PCRA's time restrictions are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this Court nor the trial court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the substantive claims." Commonwealth v. Chester , 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa. 2006) (quotations and citations omitted).
Johnson's petition fails to address, or even recognize, the time bar of the PCRA. Because Johnson has not met his burden of pleading and proving that his untimely petition falls within one of the exceptions set forth in section 9545(b)(1), the court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed his petition. See Commonwealth v. Williams , 105 A.3d 1234, 1239 (Pa. 2014).
Order affirmed. Application to vacate is denied. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/5/2015