Opinion
16-P-543
06-21-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. JAY J., a juvenile.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The juvenile was charged in the Juvenile Court with indecent assault and battery on a person fourteen or over in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13H. The Commonwealth filed a nolle prosequi five months later stating that the victim had left the State and did not wish to return to testify. As a result, the case was dismissed. Two months after the dismissal, the juvenile filed a petition to seal the record of the proceeding pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100C, arguing that the existence of the record would interfere with his future educational and employment opportunities. The judge denied the petition in a comprehensive written decision, concluding that petitions to seal criminal records in juvenile delinquency cases are governed by a separate statute, G. L. c. 276, § 100B, which requires a three-year waiting period before the allowance of a petition to seal. On appeal, the juvenile claims error in the judge's determination that he lacked the authority to seal the record prior to the expiration of the three-year period. The juvenile also claims that the three-year waiting period prescribed by G. L. c. 276, § 100B, denies juveniles equal protection of the law because similarly situated adults may seek to have their records sealed immediately pursuant to G. L. c. 276, § 100C. We affirm.
Discussion. a. Authority to seal. In determining the judge's authority to seal the juvenile's record immediately, we examine the language of the statute. "It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, ... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 437 Mass. 470, 477 (2002), quoting from James J. Welch & Co. v. Deputy Commr. of Capital Planning & Operations, 387 Mass. 662, 666 (1982).
If a nolle prosequi has entered in a criminal case against an adult, a judge may seal the record upon determining that doing so would best serve substantial justice. See G. L. c. 276, § 100C. No waiting period is required. See ibid. By contrast, there is a three-year waiting period for a juvenile seeking to seal a record in a delinquency case, regardless of the outcome. See G. L. c. 276, § 100B. Here, the juvenile moved to seal his record pursuant to the statute related to adults, § 100C, presumably to avoid the time constraints applicable in sealing records of delinquency, § 100B. Relying on Gavin G., supra, the judge concluded that he lacked the authority to seal the juvenile's record prior to the expiration of three years. We agree.
In Gavin G., the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that a Juvenile Court judge did not have the authority to immediately expunge the record of a juvenile whose case has been dismissed. The court based its decision on the detailed statutory scheme protecting the confidentiality of Juvenile Court proceedings, including the mechanism for sealing juvenile records under § 100B. Id. at 471, 482.
While there is a technical difference between the expungement or destruction of records, and the sealing of records, the distinction is not relevant for our analysis.
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"Given that juvenile records already enjoy considerable confidentiality in comparison to the public nature of adult criminal records, it is not surprising that the Legislature allowed some adults an avenue for immediate sealing while imposing a waiting period for juveniles.... We thus reject the suggestion that the absence of any immediate sealing provisions for juveniles represents an unintended void in the legislative scheme...."
Id. at 482. The juvenile's argument that judges "should" have the inherent power to seal records of delinquency cites the dissent in Gavin G. for support. The majority opinion, however, remains the law. Thus, the judge properly concluded that he lacked the authority to seal the juvenile's record of delinquency before the expiration of the three-year waiting period.
b. Equal protection. The juvenile also claims that the three-year waiting period denied him equal protection of the law. We disagree. "All people in the Commonwealth are guaranteed the right to equal protection of the laws by the United States Constitution and the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights." Commonwealth v. Weston W., 455 Mass. 24, 30 (2009). "Where a statute implicates a fundamental right or uses a suspect classification, we employ 'strict judicial scrutiny.' " Goodridge v. Deptartment of Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 330 (2003), quoting from Lowell v. Kowalski, 380 Mass. 663, 666 (1880). "For all other statutes, we employ the 'rational basis' test." Ibid., quoting from English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 405 Mass. 423, 428 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990). Because the juvenile does not contend that a fundamental right is implicated and "[a]ge is not a suspect classification," Weston W., supra, we use the rational basis test.
Under the rational basis test we consider whether "an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class." Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Authy., 459 Mass. 655, 669 (2011), quoting from English, supra at 429. For the reasons that follow, we conclude there is a legitimate public purpose in allowing the immediate sealing of adult records, but imposing a waiting period for juveniles.
Adult criminal proceedings are a matter of public record, but juvenile proceedings are confidential as a matter of law. See Gavin G., 437 Mass. at 481. An adult acquitted of a crime can reply 'no record' to an inquiry about prior arrests only after his or her record has been sealed. See ibid; G. L. c. 276, §§ 100A, 100C. By contrast, "[a] juvenile ... may reply 'no record' without waiting for sealing." Id. at 481-482.
"Put simply, the substantial protections that already pertain to all juvenile records, without regard to whether the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent, make sealing of the juvenile records less urgent, and a waiting period may be imposed on all juveniles without inflicting on them the harm that would be inflicted on an innocent adult during that same time period."
Id. at 482. Moreover, after the expiration of three years, juvenile delinquency records are automatically sealed as long as the juvenile has not been adjudicated delinquent or found guilty of a criminal offense within the three-year period. See § 100B. In contrast, the sealing of an adult record following a nolle prosequi and dismissal always requires a judicial determination that "substantial justice would best be served" by the sealing. § 100C. The substantial protections regarding juvenile records provide a rational basis for the different statutes governing the sealing of adult and juvenile records, such that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the difference serves a legitimate public purpose. Accordingly, we discern no error in the judge's rejection of the juvenile's equal protection claim.
Order denying petition to seal affirmed.