Commonwealth v. Jansen

26 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Miranda

    474 Mass. 1008 (Mass. 2016)   Cited 18 times

    “[T]he only prospective application of the principles announced in our Zanetti decision pertains to our recommended jury instruction.” Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 28 n. 20, 942 N.E.2d 959 (2011). Moreover, our decision in Zanetti “d[id] not enlarge or diminish the scope of existing joint venture liability,” but was intended simply “to provide clearer

  2. Commonwealth v. Benitez

    464 Mass. 686 (Mass. 2013)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that armed assault with intent to rob is a lesser included offense of armed robbery, suggesting in light of Starks that armed assault with intent to rob is not a violent felony

    See id. at 468, 910 N.E.2d 869. See also Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 28 n. 20, 942 N.E.2d 959 (2011), and cases cited. We disagree with the defendant that the evidence only showed that the defendant shared, at most, Santos's intent to purchase drugs from the victim, not his intent to rob the victim.

  3. Commonwealth v. Norris

    462 Mass. 131 (Mass. 2012)   Cited 55 times

    Zanetti, supra at 468, 910 N.E.2d 869. See Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 28–29 n. 20, 942 N.E.2d 959 (2011). In addition, to prove a defendant guilty of deliberately premeditated murder in the first degree on a joint venture theory where the other person used a gun, the Commonwealth was required to “establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew [the other person] had a gun with him.”

  4. Commonwealth v. Pena

    96 Mass. App. Ct. 655 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 5 times

    See Commonwealth v. Cifizzari, 397 Mass. 560, 577, 492 N.E.2d 357 (1986) ("rape committed by unnatural sexual intercourse encompasses penetration by the use of inanimate objects," here, mop handle); Commonwealth v. Nuby, 32 Mass. App. Ct. 360, 362, 589 N.E.2d 331 (1992) (defendant forced third party to penetrate victim's vagina with his tongue and fingers). See also Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 29, 942 N.E.2d 959 (2011) (penetration could be inferred from evidence of hair tie found in victim's vagina because hair tie tested positive for defendant's deoxyribonucleic acid); Commonwealth v. Guy, 24 Mass. App. Ct. 783, 785-787, 513 N.E.2d 701 (1987) (defendants guilty of rape for forcing victim to perform cunnilingus on two consenting women). Here, the evidence was that during the course of a sexual assault the defendant caused his ejaculate to enter Alice's mouth.

  5. Commonwealth v. Halstrom

    84 Mass. App. Ct. 372 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013)   Cited 11 times

    Although the present case was tried in April and May of 2009, Zanetti, decided in August of 2009, applies with respect to sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Zanetti, supra at 468, 910 N.E.2d 869;Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 28 n. 20, 942 N.E.2d 959 (2011). Here, the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth was sufficient to permit a jury to infer Gorgoglione's knowledge, intent, and influence “from his knowledge of the circumstances and participation in the crime.”

  6. Commonwealth v. Basey

    82 Mass. App. Ct. 278 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012)   Cited 5 times
    Rejecting argument that joint enterprise and joint venture require different proof

    The relevance of this is not that proof beyond a reasonable doubt of joint enterprise requires something more in the way of evidence than proof beyond a reasonable doubt of joint venture. Cf., e.g., Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 28 n. 20, 942 N.E.2d 959 (2011) (essentially equating the substantive elements of liability for rape on a theory of joint venture with those of aggravated rape on a theory of joint enterprise). It means only that inconsistent verdicts that might be permissible when two individuals are charged with a single crime on a joint venture theory are not permissible when two individuals are charged with rape aggravated by commission as a joint enterprise.

  7. Campbell v. Commonwealth

    494 Mass. 750 (Mass. 2024)

    In the more than 150 years since Burke was decided, this court has consistently cited this proposition with approval. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gibson, 488 Mass. 854, 857 (2022) (“In situations where a victim lacks the capacity to consent, the Commonwealth ‘has no obligation to prove the use of force by the defendant beyond what is required for the act of penetration’ ” [citation omitted]); Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 29 (2011) (where victim is incapable of consenting, only force required is such force necessary to effect penetration). Our recognition of the myriad ways in which an assailant may deprive a victim of his or her consent does not diminish the undeniable presence of physical force in rape.

  8. Commonwealth v. Tavares

    482 Mass. 694 (Mass. 2019)   Cited 24 times   1 Legal Analyses

    The defendant may be retried only if the untainted evidence admitted at trial, when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, was sufficient to support his conviction. See Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 27, 942 N.E.2d 959 (2011) ; Berry v. Commonwealth, 393 Mass. 793, 798, 473 N.E.2d 1115 (1985). See also Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677, 393 N.E.2d 370 (1979).

  9. Forlizzi v. Commonwealth

    471 Mass. 1011 (Mass. 2015)   Cited 5 times

    In such a case, the single justice may decide the issues presented, report the matter to the full court, Ventresco, supra, or authorize an interlocutory appeal to be taken to the Appeals Court for a decision on the merits. Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 23, 942 N.E.2d 959 (2011) ; Fadden v. Commonwealth, 376 Mass. 604, 382 N.E.2d 1054 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 1505, 59 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979). Here, we affirm the single justice's denial of the petition on the ground that the petitioners failed to demonstrate irremediable error, the second Morrissette factor, which coincides with the petitioners' obligations under rule 2:21.

  10. Commonwealth v. Almonte

    465 Mass. 224 (Mass. 2013)   Cited 17 times
    In Commonwealth v. Almonte, 465 Mass. 224, 241, 988 N.E.2d 415 (2013), we noted that "under the Fed. R. Evid. 608(b), a party on cross-examination of a witness may inquire into the details of prior instances of misconduct if probative of the witness's character for veracity."

    Evidence may be primarily or entirely circumstantial provided that the evidence presented is sufficient to persuade “minds of ordinary intelligence and sagacity to the persuasion of [guilt] beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Jansen, 459 Mass. 21, 27, 942 N.E.2d 959 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, supra. The evidence in this case clearly was sufficient to meet the Latimore standard.