Opinion
14-P-483
04-15-2015
COMMONWEALTH v. ELIJAH JACOBS.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant, Elijah Jacobs, was convicted of multiple firearms charges after police observed two handguns, later found to be loaded, in plain view in the passenger seat of his car. On appeal, he argues that insufficient evidence existed to prove that he exercised constructive possession over the firearms. We affirm.
Sufficiency of evidence. On August 7, 2009, around 11:00 P.M., police officers arrived at a house at 41 Lindsay Street in Framingham as part of an investigation into a shooting in Ashland. Sergeant Brown arrived first and saw several people in the yard as he drove past in an unmarked car. He heard the defendant say to the group of people, "[W]e have to change our whip quick." Sergeant Brown later testified that "whip" referred to the car. He saw the defendant standing next to the driver's side front door of his car. The front of the car faced the house. Multiple cars were in the driveway, and the defendant's car was closest to the street.
At one point the defendant leaned into the car through the open driver's door while his feet remained in the driveway. An officer approached to speak to him. Lieutenant Tersoni, who arrived later, walked to the side of the defendant's car, shined his flashlight inside the window of the front passenger door, and saw two handguns in plain view. The car windows were up and the passenger door was closed. The defendant was arrested.
On December 9, 2009, the defendant was indicted on two counts of possession of a firearm, two counts of possession of a loaded firearm, and one count of removal or mutilation of a firearm serial number. On August 23, 2011, a jury found the defendant guilty of all charges except the defaced serial number charge. His motion to set aside the verdicts was denied on August 26, 2011. He was sentenced, and this appeal followed.
The defendant was also indicted on two counts of being an armed career criminal that were ultimately dismissed.
The defendant was tried with a codefendant, Christopher Cardona. On August 23, 2011, the court allowed Cardona's motion for required findings of not guilty.
Review of a motion for required findings of not guilty is limited to examining whether sufficient evidence existed for the case to go a jury, and whether any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 400 (2003). "Constructive possession requires proof that the defendant had knowledge coupled with the ability and intention to exercise dominion and control." Commonwealth v. Sann Than, 442 Mass. 748, 751 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Commonwealth may prove knowledge of the firearms, and ability and intention to exercise control, by circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences. Ibid. The inferences drawn by a fact finder need only be reasonable and possible, not necessary or inescapable. Commonwealth v. Batista, 53 Mass. App. Ct. 642, 646 (2002).
Here, a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge of the guns because an officer testified that the guns were in plain view in the passenger seat of the defendant's car, and an officer saw the defendant leaning into the car. See Commonwealth v. Sann Than, supra at 751. An officer also testified that he heard the defendant say to the people around him that they needed to change cars quickly, which supports an inference that the defendant knew of contraband in his vehicle. The jury could also draw a reasonable inference that the defendant had the ability and intention to control the guns because they were in his vehicle, the front passenger door was closed and the window was up, and the defendant was leaning into the driver's side. See ibid. The evidence showed that the defendant had control over his car and its contents.
The defendant also lied to police by saying that the car was not registered to him, when in fact it was. The defendant's misstatement supports a reasonable inference that the defendant knew of the presence of contraband in the vehicle and was attempting to obscure the fact that he had control over the vehicle's contents. The defendant also told police that he had arrived at the house moments before they arrived. Combined with the fact that the guns were on the passenger seat and the passenger side window was up, the defendant's nearly simultaneous arrival supports the inference that he had knowledge and control over the vehicle's contents.
The inferences were all reasonable, see Commonwealth v. Batista, supra, and a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had constructive possession of the firearms inside his car. See Commonwealth v. Platt, supra at 401. See also Commonwealth v. Cullity, 470 Mass. 1022, 1023-1024 (2015).
For these reasons, and for substantially those in the brief of the Commonwealth, we affirm.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Kantrowitz, Blake & Massing, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: April 15, 2015.