Opinion
J-A13033-16 No. 1597 WDA 2014
06-30-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. DAVID CARL IMHOFF, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 5, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-63-CR-0000281-2013; CP-63-CR-0001497-2013 BEFORE: OLSON, STABILE and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
David Carl Imhoff ("Imhoff") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after a jury found him guilty of two counts of simple assault, and one count each of aggravated assault, recklessly endangering another person ("REAP"), unlawful restraint - serious bodily injury, terroristic threats, and persons not to possess firearms. We affirm.
The trial court thoroughly set forth the relevant factual and procedural history in its Opinion, which we incorporate herein by reference. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 1-13.
On appeal, Imhoff presents the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Motion to suppress?
2. Whether the trial court erred in denying the Motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600?Brief for Appellant at 7 (issues renumbered for clarity, some capitalization omitted).
3. Whether the trial court erred in admitting Commonwealth's Exhibits 1, 2, and 3?
4. Whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt?
5. Whether the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on self-defense?
6. Whether the evidence presented by the Commonwealth was insufficient to support each of [Imhoff's] convictions?
7. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Imhoff's] Motion to dismiss after [the] close of the Commonwealth's case?
8. Whether the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence?
9. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Imhoff's] Motion for a mistrial?
10. Whether the trial court erred in granting the Commonwealth's Motion for leave to amend information[,] on May 12, 2014[,] at Case No. CP-63-0001497-2013?
11. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Imhoff's] Post-verdict Motion?
We observe, with disapproval, that the Commonwealth neither filed a brief on appeal nor appeared at oral argument on this case.
Imhoff first argues that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to suppress the handgun that police discovered hidden inside of Imhoff's residence (hereinafter "the trailer") following his arrest, as the warrantless search was unconstitutional. See id. at 20-22.
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to our plenary review.Commonwealth v. Perel , 107 A.3d 185, 188 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation and ellipses omitted).
Imhoff points out that the victim, Brenda Worstell ("Worstell"), (1) discovered the handgun that Imhoff used in the April 26, 2013 assault when she re-entered the trailer two days after the assault; and (2) then called the police and consented to them searching the trailer, claiming that it was her residence. Brief for Appellant at 20. Imhoff contends that the suppression court erred in ruling that the police were legally authorized to conduct a warrantless search of the trailer pursuant to the consent exception to the warrant requirement - based upon Worstell's "apparent authority" to consent. Id.
The Fourth Amendment protects the people from unreasonable searches and seizures. In the Interest of D.M., 566 Pa. 445, 781 A.2d 1161, 1163 (Pa. 2001). A warrantless search or seizure is presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, subject to a few specifically established, well-delineated exceptions. Horton v. California , 496 U.S. 128, 134 n.4, 110 S. Ct. 2301, 110 L. Ed. 2d 112 (1990) (citations omitted). One such exception is a consensual search, which a third party can provide to police, [ Commonwealth v.] Hughes , [836 A.2d 893,] 900 [(Pa. 2003)], known as the apparent authority exception.Commonwealth v. Strader , 931 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2007).
A third party with apparent authority over the area to be searched may provide police with consent to search. United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 171, 94 S. Ct. 988, 39 L. Ed. 2d 242 (1974). Third party consent is valid when police reasonably believe a third party has authority to consent. Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 188-89, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990). Specifically, the apparent authority exception turns on whether the facts available to police at the moment would lead a person of reasonable caution to believe the consenting third party had authority over the premises. Id. (citations omitted). If the person asserting authority to consent did not have such authority, that mistake is constitutionally excusable if police reasonably believed the consenter had such authority and police acted "on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability." Id., at 186 (quoting Brinegar v. United States , 338 U.S. 160, 176, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).
In the instant case, Imhoff argues that
Worstell's authority to consent to a search of the [trailer] was, at best, ambiguous[,] requiring the [police] to make further inquiries into [] Worstell's status as to her ability to consent. Where a situation is ambiguous, or where a reasonable person would "question the consenting party's actual authority or if the consenting party's assertions of authority appear unreasonable, a police officer should make further inquiries to determine the status of the consenting party."Brief for Appellant at 20-21 (quoting Perel , 107 A.3d at 192). Imhoff maintains that the police improperly "made no further inquiries as to [] Worstell's authority to consent to a search beyond her assertions that she lived at the [trailer]." Brief for Appellant at 21.
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court addressed Imhoff's claim, and correctly determined that the warrantless search was legal under the apparent authority doctrine. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 18-20; see also id. at 14-17 (opining that Worstell had actual authority to consent to the search). We conclude that the trial court did not err in denying Imhoff's Motion to suppress, and affirm based on the trial court's Opinion as to Imhoff's first issue. See id.
Next, Imhoff contends that the trial court erred by denying his Motion to dismiss, asserting that the Commonwealth violated his speedy trial rights under Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. See Brief for Appellant at 22-23.
We review such claims according to the following principles:
In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a trial court's decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
. . .
The proper scope of review is limited to the evidence on the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the findings of the trial court. An appellate court must view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.
Additionally, when considering the trial court's ruling, this Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally important functions: (1) the protection of the accused's speedy trial rights, and (2) the
protection of society. In determining whether an accused's right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society's right to effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.Commonwealth v. Thompson , 93 A.3d 478, 486-87 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations, brackets and ellipses omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court summarized and addressed Imhoff's claims concerning his Rule 600 challenge, set forth the relevant law, and determined that the Commonwealth had exercised due diligence in bringing Imhoff's case to trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 20-24. We affirm based on the trial court's sound rationale with regard to this issue. See id.
In his third issue, Imhoff argues that the trial court erred and caused him undue prejudice by admitting into evidence three photographs (collectively referred to as "the brace photographs") of Worstell's head and neck area, taken shortly after the April 26, 2013 assault, each of which showed her in a neck brace. Brief for Appellant at 23-24.
The brace photographs were taken at the Canonsburg Hospital Emergency Room. N.T., 6/10-12/14, at 135.
The admissibility of evidence is at the discretion of the trial court and only a showing of an abuse of that discretion, and resulting prejudice, constitutes reversible error. Evidence is relevant if it tends "to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Pa.R.E.
401. But, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Pa.R.E. 403. A determination of whether photographic evidence alleged to be inflammatory is admissible involves a two-step analysis. First, the court must decide whether a photograph is inflammatory by its very nature. If the photograph is deemed inflammatory, the court must determine whether the essential evidentiary value of the photograph outweighs the likelihood that the photograph will improperly inflame the minds and passions of the jury.Commonwealth v. Sanchez , 36 A.3d 24, 48-49 (Pa. 2011) (citations to case law and quotation marks omitted). "[I]nflammatory [] mean[s] the photo is so gruesome it would tend to cloud the jury's objective assessment of the guilt or innocence of the defendant." Commonwealth v. Funk , 29 A.3d 28, 33 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc).
Here, Imhoff contends that the brace photographs "are clearly inflammatory to the jury[,] as they show extensive detail of injuries sustained by [] Worstell, as well as [showing] Worstell in a neck brace, insinuating that she may have sustained a severe neck or back injury, which she, fortunately, did not." Brief for Appellant at 23-24; see also id. at 24 (asserting that the brace photographs "could likely have inflamed [the jury's] passions, leading them to believe that the injuries sustained were far more serious than they actually were.").
Upon review, we discern no abuse of the trial court's discretion in ruling that the brace photographs "were not so inflammatory that the prejudice would outweigh their probative value." Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 26. Our review confirms that the brace photographs were not inflammatory by their very nature. See Sanchez , supra. We cannot conclude that an objective juror would deem the brace photographs to be gruesome, as they merely depict Worstell's face and neck area, with an orange medical brace on her neck. Worstell's visible injuries, shown in the brace photographs, were not severe or graphically bloody; rather, they comprised merely redness and swelling. See Funk , supra. Moreover, though we acknowledge Imhoff's contention that the brace photographs may have given the jury the impression that Worstell sustained more severe injury than she actually suffered, the photographs were a fair and accurate depiction of her physical condition after the violent assault. Accordingly, Imhoff's third issue does not entitle him to relief.
In his fourth issue, Imhoff contends that the trial court erred by instructing the jury on consciousness of guilt. Brief for Appellant at 24-25. According to Imhoff, "there is no evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that [Imhoff] attempted to conceal himself in [the trailer] in order to evade capture from the police[.]" Id. at 24. Imhoff states that although he "did not immediately inform the Officers he was inside the trailer when they made contact with him" via phone, he failed to do so because he wanted additional time to "contact family to inform them of the situation[.]" Id. at 25. Moreover, Imhoff points out the testimony of one of the responding police officers that the officers could hear noises coming from the inside of the trailer, which, according to Imhoff, "indicat[es] that [Imhoff] in no way was attempting to conceal his presence within the [trailer]." Id.
Our standard of review concerning a challenge to a jury charge requires us to determine
whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of discretion or an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. In so doing, we must view the charge as a whole, recognizing that the trial court is free to use its own form of expression in creating the charge. [Our] key inquiry is whether the instruction on a particular issue adequately, accurately and clearly presents the law to the jury, and is sufficient to guide the jury in its deliberations. It is well-settled that the trial court has wide discretion in fashioning jury instructions.Commonwealth v. Scott , 73 A.3d 599, 602 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Imhoff's claim, set forth the challenged consciousness of guilt instruction and relevant law, and determined that the instruction was proper under the circumstances, particularly in light of Imhoff's admission that he had lied to the police concerning his whereabouts. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 30-32. We affirm based on the trial court's rationale with regard to this issue. See id.
In his fifth issue, Imhoff contends that the trial court erred by failing to give a jury instruction on self-defense. Brief for Appellant at 25-26. In claiming that "a jury could have reasonably found that he was acting in self-defense[,]" Imhoff argues as follows, citing his own trial testimony:
Imhoff's counsel requested the trial court to issue a self-defense instruction at trial, prior to the jury charge, which the court rejected. See N.T., 6/10-12/14, at 235-36.
[] Worstell provoked the incident by beginning to "freak out" at [Imhoff] while sitting on his couch, demanding heroin. She then began punching [Imhoff] rapidly in the face while he attempted to calm her down, causing his mouth to bleed[. This] demonstrate[es] that [Imhoff] was in fear of bodily injury.Id. at 26.
"Before the issue of self-defense may be submitted to a jury for consideration, a valid claim of self-defense must be made out as a matter of law, and this determination must be made by the trial judge." Commonwealth v. Chine , 40 A.3d 1239, 1244 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted); see also 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a) (setting forth the three statutory elements required to establish self-defense). "[A] trial court should not instruct the jury on legal principles which have no application to the facts presented at trial." Commonwealth v. Kendricks , 30 A.3d 499, 507 (Pa. Super. 2011); see also Scott , 73 A.3d at 602 (stating that "[t]he trial court is not required to give every charge that is requested by the parties and its refusal to give a requested charge does not require reversal unless the appellant was prejudiced by that refusal.") (citation omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Imhoff's claim and determined that no instruction on self-defense was warranted, as there was no evidence that Imhoff had acted in self-defense. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 32-33. We affirm based on the trial court's rationale with regard to this issue. See id.
In Imhoff's sixth and seventh issues, which we will address together, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain each of his convictions, and the trial court thus erred in denying his Motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the Commonwealth's case. See Brief for Appellant at 16-17, 26-32. Imhoff summarizes his sufficiency challenges as follows:
In regards to aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4), the Commonwealth failed to prove that [Imhoff] possessed the intent to cause serious bodily injury, or that [] Worstell sustained serious bodily injury as a result of the incident. Similarly[,] in regards to simple assault in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701(a)(1), the Commonwealth has not proved the necessary intent to sustain the charge[,] and [] this intent could not exist due to the mutual nature of the confrontation. For the charges of [REAP] in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, and unlawful restraint in violation of 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2902(a)(1)[,] the Commonwealth has failed to show that [] Worstell was in actual danger of serious bodily injury. The Commonwealth has further failed to show an intent to terrorize [] Worstell with comments made by [Imhoff] to sustain the charge of terroristic threats under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706, and failed to show [that Imhoff] possessed a firearm when prohibited to do so to sustain the possession of a firearm prohibited charge under 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).Id. at 16-17 (some capitalization omitted); see also id. at 27 (asserting that Imhoff "ended the altercation and openly displayed sympathy and remorse for what had occurred. Further, [] Worstell suffered only bruising and scratches as a result of the incident ....").
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the standards of review and relevant law, addressed Imhoff's sufficiency claim and challenge to the denial of his Motion for judgment of acquittal, and determined that the issues lack merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 26-30; see also id. at 25-26 (addressing the conviction of aggravated assault). We affirm based on the trial court's rationale with regard to these two issues. See id. at 25-30.
In his eighth issue, Imhoff contends that his convictions were against the weight of the evidence. Brief for Appellant at 32-33. Imhoff advances scant substantive argument in support of this claim, aside from his assertion that "it is clear that the Commonwealth only produced tenuous, vague, and uncertain evidence that would shock a reasonable sense of justice." Id. at 33.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the standard of review and relevant law, addressed Imhoff's challenge to the weight of the evidence, and determined that the claim is waived, and, in any event, lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 33-35. We agree with the trial court's rationale and determination, and affirm on this basis as to this issue. See id.
In his ninth issue, Imhoff argues that the trial court erred by denying his Motion for a mistrial. Brief for Appellant at 33-34. Specifically, Imhoff contends that the Commonwealth committed a discovery violation by failing to provide the defense with Commonwealth Exhibits 6, 7, and 8 (three photographs that the police had taken of Worstell's injuries after she had been released from the hospital). Id. According to Imhoff, this failure to disclose the photographs prejudiced him and impacted the defense's trial strategy and presentation of its case. Id. at 34. However, Imhoff concedes that his defense counsel stated at trial that these photographs would not have affected her trial strategy had they been disclosed. Id.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed Imhoff's claim, and determined that the court properly denied the Motion for a mistrial, as Imhoff suffered no prejudice by any alleged discovery violation. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 35-39. We agree with the trial court's rationale and determination, and affirm on this basis as to Imhoff's ninth issue. See id.
In his tenth issue, Imhoff asserts that the trial court erred by granting the Commonwealth's Motion for leave to amend the criminal information, permitting the Commonwealth to amend the grading of the aggravated assault charge against Imhoff from a second-degree felony ( see 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(4)) to a first-degree felony ( see id. § 2702(a)(1)). Brief for Appellant at 34-35. According to Imhoff,
the allowance of the amendment by the trial court was in error, as the amendment added new charges and prejudiced [Imhoff] in the preparation of his case. [Imhoff] had already been preparing his defense on this matter for over a year at the time that the affidavit [of probable cause] and complaint were amended. Further, ... for over a year[,] the Commonwealth was aware that they were in possession of the firearm allegedly used in the assault, yet the fact of this was not disclosed until a month before the trial began[,] when the charges were amended. ... Further, [Imhoff] chose to waive his preliminary hearing, a decision that may have been made differently had this evidence been known at the time.Id. at 35 (some capitalization omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed Imhoff's claim, and determined that it does not entitle him to relief. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 40-43. We agree with the trial court's rationale and determination, and affirm on this basis as to Imhoff's tenth issue. See id.
In his eleventh and final issue, Imhoff baldly argues that the trial court erred by denying his post-trial Motions. Brief for Appellant at 36.
In its Opinion, the trial court summarized the claims raised in Imhoff's counseled and pro se post-trial Motions, and determined that the court properly denied all of the Motions (which raised several of the issues that we have discussed above). See Trial Court Opinion, 7/16/15, at 39-40. We agree with the trial court's rationale and determination, and affirm on this basis as to Imhoff's final issue. See id.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 6/30/2016
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