Since there was no evidentiary basis to find that the GPS records were business records, they were hearsay and could not be admitted. See Wingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 385 Mass. 402, 406-407, 432 N.E.2d 474 (1982) ; Commonwealth v. Hussey, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 1015, 1016, 441 N.E.2d 783 (1982) ; Mass. G. Evid. § 901 (2021). Contrast Davis, 487 Mass. 448, 459-460, 168 N.E.3d 294 (2021) (manufacturer's product development manager testified about how GPS device worked); Andre, supra at 409, 142 N.E.3d 60.

And see also, as to "second level" hearsay, Julian v. Randazzo, 380 Mass. at 394; Wingate v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 385 Mass. at 406-407; 409-410 (concurring opinion); Kelly v. O'Neil, 1 Mass. App. Ct. at 316-317 (1973). Cf. Irwin v. Ware, 392 Mass. 745, 748-751 (1984); Commonwealth v. Hussey, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 1015, 1016 (1982). Such information is gathered in connection with social security claims.

Furthermore, the insurer made no showing that the wage statement satisfied the admissibility requirements of G.L.c. 233, § 78. Indeed, the identity of the preparer was unknown. (Tr. 64-66) See Commonwealth v. Hussey, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 1015, 1016 (1982); DiCenso v. Winchester Concrete Carpentry, 7 Mass. Workers' Company. Rep. 238, 240 (1993). There was thus inadequate foundation to give the wage statement the indicia of reliability conferred by G.L.c. 233, § 78; see Wingate, supra at 408-410 (first report of injury in workers' compensation case was inadmissible hearsay).

There was absolutely no evidence to show that the information received from the FDIC and included in the printout came from someone who had a business duty to report it to the preparer. Commonwealth v. Hussey, 14 Mass. App. Ct. 1015, 1016 (1982); Kelly v. O'Neil, 1 Mass. App. Ct. 313, 316 (1973). Apparently, the plaintiff had attempted to summons an employee of the FDIC to satisfy his burden, but the employee failed to appear at the trial.