Opinion
16-P-481
05-11-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Peter R. HURLEY.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
In 2013, after having been indicted for a subsequent offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), the defendant, Peter R. Hurley, filed a motion for a new trial in order to vacate his 1992 guilty pleas to two counts of OUI. The motion judge denied the defendant's motion after a nonevidentiary hearing. The defendant appealed. We affirm.
The defendant was charged with OUI on October 9, 1991, and OUI, subsequent offense, on May 29, 1992. The Commonwealth declined to prosecute the subsequent offense portion of the defendant's charge. The defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of OUI in 1992.
Discussion. A defendant's motion for a new trial is made pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 30(b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). Commonwealth v. Pingaro, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 41, 47-48 (1997). "The judge's disposition of the motion will not be reversed unless it is shown to be an abuse of discretion that produces a manifestly unjust result." Id. at 48.
The defendant contends that his pleas were not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, because at the time he pleaded guilty, he could not have anticipated that these convictions would carry collateral consequences more than six years later. General Laws c. 90, § 24, as in effect at the time of the 1992 pleas, provided a six-year "look-back" period to determine whether a defendant had committed a subsequent offense of OUI. Time-limiting provisions were eliminated in 2002. See St. 2002, c. 302, §§ 1-4. "Accordingly, all prior convictions, without limitation in time, may be counted as prior offenses." Breslin v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liab. Policies & Bonds, 70 Mass. App. Ct. 131, 133 (2007).
The defendant takes issue with the lack of records available from his 1992 guilty pleas; however, his bare assertion that his pleas were constitutionally infirm "does not automatically thrust upon the Commonwealth the burden of proving the existence of a contemporaneous record establishing that the plea[s] [were] entered knowingly and voluntarily." Commonwealth v. Pingaro, 44 Mass. App. Ct. at 49.
A "plea is valid only when the defendant offers it voluntarily, with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances, ... and with the advice of competent counsel." Commonwealth v. Fernandes, 390 Mass. 714, 715 (1984). "The constitutional adequacy of a plea, however, does not require that a defendant be advised of consequences that are contingent or collateral to the plea." Commonwealth v. Albert A., 49 Mass. App. Ct. 269, 271 (2000). Because the later amendment to G. L. c. 90, § 24, affected only the collateral consequences of the defendant's prior OUI convictions on any subsequent prosecutions for the same offense, the change in the law did not render the defendant's prior pleas constitutionally infirm. See generally Commonwealth v. McMullin, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 904, 904 n.1 (2010).
Nevertheless, the defendant contends that the Commonwealth, in effect, "breached [its] contract" with him by prosecuting him as a subsequent offender based on his 1992 convictions. While the defendant correctly asserts that "[w]e will enforce a prosecutor's promise where the defendant has reasonably relied on that promise to his detriment," Commonwealth v. Smith, 384 Mass. 519, 521 (1981), there is no evidence that the Commonwealth made any promise to the defendant that his conviction would not carry collateral consequences. Nor was there a promise that those consequences would be limited in time. Accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the judge's denial of the defendant's new trial motion.
To the extent that we have not addressed the defendant's other contentions, they "have not been overlooked. We find nothing in them that requires discussion." Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
Order denying motion for new trial affirmed.