Opinion
J.S15040/14 No. 1168 MDA 2013
04-28-2014
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. JARVIN MALIK HUGGINS, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 10, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County
Criminal Division No(s).: CP-54-CR-0000734-2012
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and FITZGERALD, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.:
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Jarvin Malik Huggins, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Schuylkill County Court of Common Pleas following his conviction for first degree murder, robbery, burglary, and criminal trespass. Appellant, who was eighteen years, six months old at the time he committed the crimes for which he was convicted, was sentenced to a mandatory term of life in prison without parole for the first degree murder conviction. On appeal, Appellant asks this court to expand the holding in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012), to prohibit the imposition of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole on an individual with a mental age of less than eighteen. We decline Appellant's invitation and thus affirm the judgment of sentence.
Following a jury trial, Appellant was convicted on March 5, 2013, of the above crimes. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on May 10, 2013. At the hearing, Appellant presented the testimony of an expert witness, Dr. David O'Connell, a clinical psychologist. Dr. O'Connell opined that although Appellant was over eighteen, he had a mental age of eleven to twelve years and an intelligence quotient of seventy-two, placing him in the lower end of the borderline range of intellectual abilities. N.T. Sentencing Hr'g, 5/10/13, at 24, 28. Based on this testimony, Appellant's counsel argued that Appellant should not be subject to a mandatory sentence of life without parole for his first degree murder conviction. Id. at 18, 61. At the close of the hearing, the trial court applied the mandatory sentencing provision and sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder conviction.
The trial court also ordered Appellant to serve an aggregate sentence of fifteen to thirty years' imprisonment for the other offenses, to run concurrently with Appellant's life sentence without the possibility of parole.
On May 20, 2013, Appellant filed a timely post-trial motion in which he argued that Appellant's mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole for the first degree murder conviction is unconstitutional as violative of the United States Supreme Court ruling in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455. The trial court denied Appellant's motion and this timely appeal followed.
Appellant was not ordered to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and the trial court indicated that its June 24, 2013 opinion setting forth the basis for denying Appellant's post-trial motion would serve as its Rule 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant raises one issue on appeal.
It is cruel and unusual punishment to impose a mandatory life sentence upon a defendant who is 18 years, 6 months, of chronological age but has a mental age of between 11 and 12 years of age. Miller [ ] should be extended to consider factors beyond mere chronological age when imposing a statutorily mandated life sentence.Appellant's Brief at 4.
The gravamen of Appellant's argument is that the imposition of a mandatory life sentence without the possibility of parole upon a defendant who is chronologically over the age of eighteen but is mentally less than eighteen years old constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution, and is contrary to the law as established in Miller. Id. at 10. Appellant claims that, because his expert established his mental age as between eleven and twelve years old, the trial court should have sentenced him as a juvenile.
Pa. Const. art. I, § 13.
"[W]here a sentencing court is required to impose a mandatory minimum sentence, and that mandatory minimum sentence affects a trial court's traditional sentencing authority or the General Assembly's intent in fashioning punishment for criminal conduct, a defendant's challenge thereto sounds in legality of sentence. . . ." Commonwealth v. Foster, 17 A.3d 332, 345 (Pa. 2011). Furthermore, "[a] claim that a sentence violates the Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment . . . constitutes a challenge to the legality of the sentence imposed." Commonwealth v. Green, 593 A.2d 899, 900 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1991). A challenge to the legality of a sentence presents a pure question of law and, therefore, our standard of review is de novo. Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 293 (Pa. 2013).
Instantly, the trial court sentenced Appellant pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102, which provides:
§ 1102. Sentence for murder, murder of unborn child and murder of law enforcement officer.18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1).
(a) First Degree.—
(1) Except as provided under section 1102.1 (relating to sentence of persons under the age of 18 for murder, murder of an unborn child and murder of a law enforcement officer), a person who has been convicted of a murder of the first degree or of murder
of a law enforcement officer of the first degree shall be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (relating to sentencing procedure for murder of the first degree).
This Court has previously addressed the constitutionality of mandatory life sentences for the crime of first-degree murder. In Commonwealth v. Waters, 483 A.2d 855 (Pa. Super. 1984), this Court opined:
A mandatory life sentence, as established by the legislature, is clearly not cruel and unusual punishment for the crime of first-degree murder. Indeed, this issue has already been decided in Commonwealth v. Sourbeer, [422 A.2d 116, 123 (Pa. 1980),] in which the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court stated that a mandatory life sentence:Id. at 861.
is not cruel and unusual punishment for it is not an excessive and unnecessary punishment disproportionate to the crime and does not shock the moral conscience of the community.
However, the United States Supreme Court recently held unconstitutional the application of mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole to individuals who were under eighteen at the time they committed the crime for which they received the life sentence. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455. Although the Miller Court acknowledged the developmental differences between juveniles and adults, the Court considered chronological age as the determinative factor in assessing the constitutionality of such sentences. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464-65 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005) and Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010)). In short, Miller 's holding is limited to a "bright-line rule" based on age.
In recognition of the narrow holding in Miller, the General Assembly has established a bright-line, age-based measure to determine when an individual convicted of first degree murder is subject to a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102; 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1. It bears noting that our Supreme Court has stated, "in the arena of federal constitutional standards, we have expressed a reluctance to 'go further than what is affirmatively demanded by the High Court' without a 'common law history or a policy directive from our Legislature.'" Batts, 66 A.3d at 296.
Enacted in response to Miller, and effective October 25, 2012, Section 1102.1(a) created new mandatory minimum provisions with individualized sentencing determinations for juveniles who commit first degree murder. It provides as follows:
§ 1102.1. Sentence of persons under the age of 18 for murder, murder of unborn child and murder of law enforcement officer.18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(a), (d).
(a) First degree murder.—A person who has been convicted after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the first degree, first degree murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement officer of the first degree and who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced as follows:
(1) A person who at the time of the commission of the offense was 15 years of age or older shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be at least 35 years to life.
(2) A person who at the time of the commission of the offense was under 15 years of age shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be at least 25 years to life.
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(d) Findings.—In determining whether to impose a sentence of life without parole under subsection (a), the court shall consider and make findings on the record regarding the following:
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(7) Age-related characteristics of the defendant, including:
(i) Age.
(ii) Mental capacity.
(iii) Maturity.
(iv) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the defendant.
(v) The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or criminal history, including the success or failure of any previous attempts by the court to rehabilitate the defendant.
(vi) Probation or institutional reports.
(vii) Other relevant factors.
In the instant case, Appellant was convicted of committing first degree murder as an adult and sentenced pursuant to the mandatory sentence provision established by the legislature at 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102. Our current jurisprudence holds that mandatory life sentences without the possibility of parole for individuals over the age of eighteen convicted of first degree murder do not violate United States and Pennsylvania constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment. See Waters, 483 A.2d at 861; see also Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464. It is, therefore, clear from our review of the current law that the sentencing court lacked authority to impose a sentence less severe than that mandated by the legislature. Moreover, Appellant has not provided this Court with citation to any binding authority that would permit us to conclude otherwise.
"Citations of authorities must set forth the principle for which they are cited." Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b).
In light of the precedent established in Miller, Batts, and Waters, as well as our legislature's response to Miller by way of 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102.1(a), we conclude the application of Section 1102 to Appellant did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
To the extent Appellant has argued in his brief that the mandatory life sentence set forth in Section 1102 violates the equal protection clause of the Pennsylvania constitution and his procedural due process rights, we find this issue waived as Appellant raised these issues for the first time on appeal. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 80 A.3d 806, 811 (Pa. Super. 2013) (holding claim raised for first time in appellate brief is waived).
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. __________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary