Ibid . For instance, "authentication" is required to admit testimony about "the substance of a telephone conversation." Commonwealth v. Howard , 42 Mass.App.Ct. 322, 324, 677 N.E.2d 233 (1997). See Mass. G. Evid. § 901(b)(6).

She asks for a reduction of her sentence. While it is prohibited for a judge to sentence a defendant for conduct for which she was not convicted, see Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 370 Mass. 217, 221 (1976); Commonwealth v. Howard, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 326-328 (1997), there is no evidence that the judge did so in this case. To the contrary, at the sentencing hearing, he explicitly stated that the defendant was being sentenced for the six crimes of which she was convicted.

The Beck court thus declared that it would consider the question of due process "on a clean slate." Id. at 224-25 ; accord id. at 226 ("[W]e do not believe existing United States Supreme Court jurisprudence prevents us from holding that reliance on acquitted conduct at sentencing is barred by the Fourteenth Amendment."); see also Commonwealth v. Howard, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 322, 677 N.E.2d 233, 236 (1997) (noting that Watts applied the federal sentencing guidelines and that its holding as to acquitted conduct did not affect application of Massachusetts's sentencing scheme). We agree with the Michigan Supreme Court that Watts is not dispositive of the due process challenge presently before this Court.

A judge's discretion to consider external factors, however, is not unlimited. Indeed, "[i]t is of paramount importance that justice be administered impartially, based solely on relevant criteria for sentencing." See Mills, 436 Mass. at 401, 764 N.E.2d 854. For example, a sentencing judge may not punish a defendant for an untried criminal offense, Commonwealth v. Souza, 390 Mass. 813, 817, 461 N.E.2d 166 (1984) ; rely on inaccurate or misleading information in sentencing, Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 370 Mass. 217, 221, 346 N.E.2d 874 (1976) ; or punish a defendant to direct a personal message of deterrence to a particular community, Commonwealth v. Howard, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 327-328, 677 N.E.2d 233 (1997). The judge here expressed no personal or private beliefs regarding the defendant's history that appeared to "interfere with his judicial role and transform it from that of impartial arbiter."

Commonwealth v. Hartford, 346 Mass. 482, 488 (1963). See also Commonwealth v. Howard, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 324 (1997). Here, while the foundational testimony established that the messages were sent by someone with access to Williams's MySpace Web page, it did not identify the person who actually sent the communication.

However, a judge's discretion is not unlimited. He may not punish a defendant for an untried criminal offense, see Commonwealth v. Souza, 390 Mass. 813, 817 (1984), punish a defendant in order to send a personal philosophical message, see Commonwealth v. Howard, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 327-328 n. 3 (1997), or rely on information that is inaccurate or misleading, see Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 370 Mass. 217, 221 (1976). Furthermore, a judge may not punish a defendant for refusing to confess before sentencing.

Although "[a] sentencing judge is given great discretion in determining a proper sentence," Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 461 Mass. 256, 259 (2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Lykus, 406 Mass. 135, 145 (1989), a judge "may not undertake to punish [a] defendant for any conduct other than that for which [he] stands convicted in the particular case." Commonwealth v. Howard, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 322, 328 (1997), quoting Commonwealth v. LeBlanc, 370 Mass. 217, 221 (1976).

See Commonwealth v. Alden, 93 Mass. App. Ct. 438, 440-441 (2018) ("pattern of conduct" from same contact number and content of messages sufficient to authenticate text messages). Compare Commonwealth v. Howard, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 325 (1997) (insufficient evidence to authenticate call where "the caller did not reveal any special knowledge about the events under investigation"). The trial judge therefore did not abuse his discretion in admitting Officer Lloyd's testimony regarding the call.

All right? He was part of that problem, a big part of it, in my view."The judge's statements outlining the specific charges of which the defendant was convicted, combined with the remark that he was "part" of a larger problem, reflect the judge's awareness that the defendant could be punished only for his own actions. Contrast Commonwealth v. Howard, 42 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 326–327 (1997). Viewed in context, the discussion of the opioid crisis demonstrated the judge's desire to protect the public, not an effort to blame the defendant for the crisis as a whole.

Third, it is fundamentally unfair to single out one defendant for especially harsh treatment in order to serve the utilitarian purpose of sending a message to the community. See Beno v. State, 581 N.E.2d 922, 924 (Ind.1991) (trial judge's desire to "send a message" to other drug dealers was not a proper reason to aggravate a sentence); Commonwealth v. Howard, 42 Mass.App.Ct. 322, 677 N.E.2d 233, 237 (1997) (a sentencing judge may not punish a defendant for any conduct other than that for which he stands convicted in a particular case). Fourth, when judges rely on factors not enumerated in the CPC to impose long sentences, they undermine the express legislative directive "to maximize the finite capacities of state and local correctional facilities." § 921.002(1)(i).