Opinion
No. 11–P–1148.
2012-10-24
COMMONWEALTH v. Deshawn HODGE.
By the Court (BERRY, GREEN & MEADE, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The admissibility of the certificate of registration, including the information contained on it, is established by G.L. c. 90, § 30.
The defendant's separate contention that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failure to object to Officer Aguier's testimony that Monique Nance accompanied the defendant when he came to the police station is without support in the record. The basis for any such objection at trial would presumably have been a lack of foundation.
The last sentence of the first paragraph (which otherwise specifies the duty of the registrar to maintain certain records) provides that “[c]ertified copies of such records of the registrar, attested by the registrar or his authorized agent, shall be admissible as evidence in any court of the commonwealth to prove the facts contained therein.” G.L. c. 90, § 30, as amended by St.1956, c. 351.
However, since the defendant did not object to the testimony at trial, and did not pursue his claim of ineffective assistance in the first instance by means of a motion for a new trial, see Commonwealth v. Zinser, 446 Mass. 807, 810–811 (2006), there is no way to determine whether Officer Aguier was able to identify Nance based on his personal knowledge (and not, as the defendant suggests, based on hearsay). Accordingly, it is speculative to assume that better work by counsel might have accomplished something material for the defense. See Commonwealth v. Satterfield, 373 Mass. 109, 115 (1977).
The defendant describes the testimony as “hearsay,” but the testimony by its terms relates no out-of-court statement, and the defendant's argument makes plain that his concern is that Aguier's familiarity with Nance necessarily rested on hearsay grounds.
Judgments affirmed.