Opinion
J-S46034-16 No. 802 EDA 2015
08-16-2016
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. MICHAEL ROMAIN HINTON, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 19, 2014 in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP-46-CR-0003610-2013 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OTT, and STRASSBURGER, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Michael Romain Hinton (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence entered on September 19, 2014, following his convictions for charges stemming from the March 22, 2013 shooting death of Victor Baez (Baez). We affirm.
On March 22, 2013, at approximately 1:30 a.m., Appellant and his cousin, Maurice "Reese" Andrews (Andrews) went to Brian's Café, a bar in Pottstown, Montgomery County, for the purpose of killing Baez before Baez could retaliate against Andrews for kidnapping and robbing Baez's nephew, "Chip." For his involvement in the ambush, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder, criminal conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, possession of a firearm without a license, and criminal trespass.
On September 19, 2014, Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for first-degree murder. Additionally, the trial court imposed concurrent terms of incarceration for the remaining offenses.
Appellant filed timely post-sentence motions, which were denied by the trial court on February 23, 2015. This timely-filed appeal followed. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with the mandates of Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which we have reordered for ease of disposition.
1. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's challenge to the weight and sufficiency of the evidence as to the charge of murder.Appellant's Brief at 11.
2. The trial court erred in allowing confessions given by [Appellant] to go out with the jury as an exhibit during deliberations.
3. The trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion to suppress Appellant's confessions.
In his first issue, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions for first-degree murder and criminal conspiracy. Appellant's Brief at 46-55. Specifically, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to prove an agreement between Appellant and Andrews to kill Baez, or evidence that Appellant had a specific intent to kill. Id.
Evidence presented at trial is sufficient when, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner,
the evidence and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom are sufficient to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. In the case of first-degree murder, a person is guilty when the Commonwealth proves that: (1) a human being was unlawfully killed; (2) the person accused is responsible for the killing; and (3) the accused acted with specific intent to kill. An intentional killing is a killing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. The Commonwealth may prove that a killing was intentional solely through circumstantial evidence. The finder of fact may infer that the defendant had the specific intent to kill the victim based on the defendant's use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim's body.Commonwealth v. Johnson , 985 A.2d 915, 920 (Pa. 2009) (internal citations and quotations omitted).
To prove conspiracy, the trier of fact must find that: 1) the defendant intended to commit or aid in the commission of the criminal act; 2) the defendant entered into an agreement with another to engage in the crime; and 3) the defendant or one or more of the other co-conspirators committed an overt act in furtherance of the agreed upon crime. In most cases of conspiracy, it is difficult to prove an explicit or formal agreement; hence, the agreement is generally established via circumstantial evidence, such as by the relations, conduct, or circumstances of the parties or overt acts on the part of co-conspirators. In the case of a conspiracy to commit homicide, each member of the conspiracy can be convicted of first-degree murder regardless of who inflicted the fatal wound.
In reviewing a sufficiency challenge, we must evaluate the entire trial record and consider all the evidence received. Furthermore, the trier of fact, in passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.
In its opinion, the trial court aptly summarized, at length, the evidence presented by the Commonwealth at trial. Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/2015, at 2-11. Upon review of the certified record, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to find Appellant guilty of first-degree murder and criminal conspiracy. The testimony presented by the Commonwealth at trial establishes that Appellant was not merely present at the scene of the crime, but agreed to accompany Andrews to Pottstown to "handle something." Andrews informed Appellant that he intended to kill Baez. Knowing this, Appellant obtained a firearm and went to Brian's Café with the intent of aiding Andrews in finding Baez. He and Andrews then lay in wait and ambushed Baez, resulting in Baez's death. Taken as a whole, the evidence presented was sufficient to prove that Appellant entered into an agreement with Andrews as a co-conspirator to kill Baez.
Appellant's arguments that he did not intend to harm Baez, that he was only present to protect Andrews, and that he cannot be held liable because Andrews fired the fatal shots, Appellant's Brief at 53, are unavailing and contrary to the evidence presented at trial. "Once there is evidence of the presence of a conspiracy, conspirators are liable for acts of co-conspirators committed in furtherance of the conspiracy." Commonwealth v. Lambert , 795 A.2d 1010, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Additionally, the jury, passing on the credibility of the testimony outlined above, was free to reject Appellant's self-serving confessions. Johnson , 985 A.2d at 920. Accordingly, he is not entitled to relief.
Appellant did not testify at trial.
Next, we address Appellant's claim that the verdicts of first-degree murder and criminal conspiracy are against the weight of the evidence. Appellant's Brief at 56-60.
The law pertaining to weight of the evidence claims is well-settled. The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.Commonwealth v. Gonzalez , 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quotation marks and citations omitted).
On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim consists of a review of the trial court's exercise of discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
Here, Appellant asks us to reweigh the evidence in his favor, arguing that his action of putting himself "in the line of fire" during the attack on Baez demonstrates that he was not an active participant in Baez's death. Appellant's Brief at 60. Our case law is clear that a jury sitting as finder of fact is "in the best position to view the demeanor of the Commonwealth's witnesses and to assess each witness' credibility." Commonwealth v. Olsen , 82 A.3d 1041, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). As noted above, the jury was free to find the Commonwealth's witnesses' testimony credible and resolve any inconsistencies in the Commonwealth's favor. See generally Commonwealth v. Horne , 89 A.3d 277, 286 (Pa. Super. 2014) (holding that Horne's weight of the evidence claim could not prevail as "the jury resolved the inconsistencies among the testimonies as it saw fit and reached a verdict"). Based on the facts elicited at trial and believed by the jury, the trial court determined that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's finding. Accordingly, Appellant's weight claim does not warrant relief.
Next, Appellant argues that the trial court violated Rule of Criminal Procedure 646 when it inadvertently allowed Appellant's written confessions to be sent out with the jury during deliberations for approximately one-and-a-half hours. Appellant's Brief at 20. Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial following the violation. Id.
Our standard of review in assessing the denial of a mistrial is as follows:
The trial court is in the best position to assess the effect of an allegedly prejudicial [incident] on the jury, and as such, the grant or denial of a mistrial will not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion. A mistrial may be granted only where the incident upon which the motion is based is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to deprive the defendant of a fair trial by preventing the jury from weighing and rendering a true verdict. Likewise, a mistrial is not necessary where cautionary instructions are adequate to overcome any possible prejudice.Commonwealth v. Rega , 933 A.2d 997, 1016 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
Ordinarily, "[w]hether an exhibit should be allowed to go out with the jury during its deliberation is within the sound discretion of the trial judge." Commonwealth v. Barnett , 50 A.3d 176, 194 (Pa. Super. 2012); Pa.R.Crim.P. 646(A). This discretion, however, is not absolute. Rule 646 provides, in relevant part, as follows.
(A) Upon retiring, the jury may take with it such exhibits as the trial judge deems proper, except as provided in paragraph (C).
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(C) During deliberations, the jury shall not be permitted to have:
Pa.R.Crim.P. 646 (A), (C)(2).
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(2) a copy of any written or otherwise recorded confession by the defendant;
As our Supreme Court has explained:
[t]he "spirit" of Rule 646(b) is to limit the jury from having transcripts of testimony and a written or otherwise recorded confession of the defendant during jury deliberations so as not to cause the jury to place undue emphasis on a confession or transcript over other evidence in the form of testimony heard from the witness stand.Commonwealth v. Mitchell , 902 A.2d 430, 454 (Pa. 2006) (citation omitted).
In order to determine whether the Rule was violated, we must evaluate whether Appellant's statements to police constituted "confessions." "Confession" is defined as "[a] criminal suspect's oral or written acknowledgment of guilt, often including details about the crime." Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
Here, Appellant made a number of statements to the police following this incident. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/6/2015, at 6-10. Contrary to the Commonwealth's argument, Commonwealth's Brief at 25-26, the statements given by Appellant to Officer Richard, particularly statements two through five, are confessions subject to the mandates of Rule 646. In those statements, Appellant admitted to possessing a firearm and lying in wait to ambush Baez. Although he attempts to deflect blame to Andrews, his statements to Detective Richard admitting his role as an active participant in the conspiracy to kill Baez are clearly incriminating and admissible as proof of the four crimes of which he was convicted. Accordingly, because the statements constitute confessions, the trial court erred in permitting them to go out with the jury during deliberations.
This Court has held that, due to the inherent prejudice involved, violation of Rule 646 cannot be deemed to be harmless error. See Commonwealth v. Young , 767 A.2d 1072, 1076 (Pa. Super. 2001); see also Barnett , 50 A.3d at 194 (reversing appellant's conviction where the trial court violated Rule 646 by allowing jury to have a note that was the functional equivalent of a confession). However, "[p]rompt and adequate cautionary instructions can cure what might otherwise be reversible error. It is a matter of judicial discretion, subject to appellate court review, to determine whether curative instructions can remove the harm inflicted upon defendant." Commonwealth v. Melvin , 548 A.2d 275, 277-78 (Pa. Super. 1988) (citation omitted).
Instantly, the trial court gave the following curative instruction after the confessions were retrieved from the jury room.
To the extent that the jury desires to refresh your recollection as to what is contained within those documents, or what was said in open court, you will recall that the detective read verbatim the questions and answers that were given by the defendant. Again, to the extent that you desire to review them, I will not permit you to review them in the jury deliberation room, but should you so desire I will permit you to come back in court and review them in open court.N.T., 4/17/2014, at 110-11.
The statements, exhibits, that I am making reference to are just one piece or pieces, a small segment of the evidence that was presented to you in this case, and the jury is not to give undue weight to any particular piece of evidence, including the exhibits that comprise the statements that were made by the defendant in this case[.]
It's the jury's function to consider not only the statements, should you find them relevant, to your decision and material to your decision herein but to consider all of the evidence that was presented during the trial of this case.
We conclude that this instruction is sufficient to cure the prejudice that resulted from the Rule 646 violation herein. Juries are presumed to follow the court's instructions. Commonwealth v. Mollett , 5 A.3d 291 (Pa. Super. 2010). Further, the record indicates that Appellant did not object to the curative instruction. By conceding the adequacy of the instruction, Appellant cannot now argue against it. Commonwealth v. Edmondson , 718 A.2d 751, 752 (1998) (holding that failure to object to an instruction when the court issued it waived any challenge to the content of the instruction).
Thus, although we are cognizant that an error occurred, we cannot agree with Appellant that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial where the underlying issue was cured at the time the above instruction was given. Accordingly, we conclude that Appellant's third issue does not entitle him to relief.
Finally, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Our scope and standard for reviewing an order denying a motion to suppress is as follows:
[An appellate court's] standard of review in addressing a challenge to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those] findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where ... the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if
the suppression court properly applied the law to the facts. Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject to [ ] plenary review.Commonwealth v. Jones , 121 A.3d 524, 526-27 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted).
Following our review of the certified record, the parties' briefs, and the relevant law, we conclude that pages 13 through 16 of the opinion of the Honorable William J. Furber, P.J. state findings of fact that are supported by the record, evidence no abuse of discretion or errors of law, and thoroughly and correctly address and dispose of Appellant's suppression issue and supporting arguments. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court's opinion, filed on October 6, 2015, as well as those portions of the March 17, 2014, notes of testimony cited by the trial court therein, as our own, and affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence on the basis of that opinion. The parties shall attach a copy of the trial court's October 6, 2015 opinion and pages 92 through 106 of the March 17, 2014, suppression hearing transcript, in the event of further proceedings.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence. The parties shall attach a copy of the trial court's October 6, 2015 opinion and pages 92 through 106 of the March 17, 2014, suppression hearing transcript, in the event of further proceedings.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 8/16/2016
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