The judge denied the motion, concluding that the risk of unfair prejudice outweighed its probative value, especially in view of the legislative policy reflected in the rape shield statute, G.L. c. 233, § 21B, that declares inadmissible, except under certain circumstances not present here, “[e]vidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual conduct.” See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Herrick, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 291, 295, 655 N.E.2d 637 (1995) (evidence victim became pregnant six months after alleged incident properly excluded as irrelevant where defendant sought to argue victim invented rape allegations to hide fact she was sexually active from mother); Commonwealth v. Cross, 33 Mass.App.Ct. 761, 764, 605 N.E.2d 298 (1992) (evidence that male complainant in statutory rape case had thought his girl friend was pregnant properly excluded under rape shield statute). “We have recognized ... that where the rape shield statute is in conflict with a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence that might lead the jury to find that a Commonwealth witness is lying or otherwise unreliable, the statutory prohibition must give way to the constitutional right.”

The statement was thus used for a nonhearsay purpose, and was admissible to impeach the defendant's wife. Compare Commonwealth v. Herrick, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 294 (1995). The judge did not abuse her discretion in permitting the Commonwealth to conduct this inquiry.

See Commonwealth v. Harris, 443 Mass. 714, 721 (2005) (victim's past sexual conduct may be admissible if relevant to "bias or motive to fabricate"). See also Commonwealth v. Herrick, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 294 (1995). We agree with the judge's assessment that, even if the evidence of the uncle's sexual abuse of the victim had been admitted, it would not have made a difference in the judge's assessment as trier of fact as to whether the victim's reluctance to visit pertained to the defendant specifically.

We think that there was not a sufficient showing of a nexus between the excluded evidence and the defense's theory of fabrication, and that "this lack of linking evidence, together with what was in the circumstances a significant passage of time, provided sufficient grounds for the judge in his discretion to exclude [the questions] as lacking probative value."Commonwealth v. Chasson, 383 Mass. at 187. Cf. Commonwealth v. Herrick, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 295 (1995) (absent evidence or basis for inquiry, it was proper to limit cross-examination of rape victim and her friend regarding a statement allegedly made by the victim to her friend that she feared a physical examination to establish her virginity; judge was warranted in concluding that such cross-examination "would only invite the jury `to indulge in conjecture and supposition'"). There was no error.