Opinion
1098 MDA 2022 J-S24004-23
09-05-2023
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. BRENDON JOHN HASARA Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 12, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-54-CR-0001913-2021
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E. [*]
MEMORANDUM
BENDER, P.J.E.
Appellant, Brendon John Hasara, appeals from the aggregate judgment of sentence of 112 to 228 months' incarceration, imposed after he was convicted of one count each of arson - endangering property (18 Pa.C.S. § 3301(c)(1)), criminal mischief (18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(1)), and defiant trespass (18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(b)(1)(ii)), as well as five counts of recklessly endangering another person (REAP) (18 Pa.C.S. § 2705). Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. After careful review, we affirm.
Briefly, Appellant was convicted of the above-stated offenses based on evidence that he set fire to cushions and pillows inside a row home that had been posted as unfit for human habitation. The fire quickly spread, causing extensive property damage to that row home, as well as multiple other residences on the street. The fire also endangered multiple individuals who were inside those homes at the time of the blaze, and a firefighter suffered a broken ankle while responding to the emergency.
After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of the offenses set forth supra. On July 12, 2022, he was sentenced to the aggregate term mentioned above. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on August 3, 2022. He also timely complied with the trial court's order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and the court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on September 27, 2022. Herein, Appellant states the following four issues for our review:
1. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to establish [Appellant] acted recklessly in using fire to endanger the property of another?
2. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to establish [Appellant] acted negligently or recklessly in the use of fire to establish criminal mischief?
3. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence to establish [Appellant] recklessly engaged in conduct which placed or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury?
4. Did the Commonwealth fail to present sufficient evidence that … [A]ppellant entered or remained in any place to which notice of trespass was given by posting in a manner prescribed by law or reasonably likely to come to the attention of … [A]ppellant?Appellant's Brief at 5-6.
To begin, we note our standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence:
In reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, as well as all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, are sufficient to support all elements of the offense. Commonwealth v. Moreno, 14 A.3d 133[, 136] (Pa. Super. 2011). Additionally, we may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our own judgment for that of the fact finder. Commonwealth v. Hartzell, 988 A.2d 141[, 143] (Pa. Super. 2009). The evidence may be entirely circumstantial as long as it links the accused to the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreno, supra at 136.Commonwealth v. Koch, 39 A.3d 996, 1001 (Pa. Super. 2011).
In assessing Appellant's arguments, we have reviewed his appellate brief, the certified record, and the applicable law. We have also considered the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Jacqueline L. Russell, President Judge of the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County. We conclude that P.J. Russell's opinion adequately and accurately disposes of the claims that Appellant preserved in his Rule 1925(b) statement. Appellant's arguments on appeal do not demonstrate that he is entitled to relief. Accordingly, we adopt P.J. Russell's opinion as our own, and affirm Appellant's judgment of sentence for the reasons set forth therein.
The Commonwealth did not file an appellee's brief in this case.
We note that P.J. Russell does not address Appellant's argument, in his fourth issue on appeal, that the evidence established an affirmative defense under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(c)(3) to his defiant trespass charge. P.J. Russell did not discuss this claim because Appellant did not present it in his Rule 1925(b) statement, thereby waiving it for our review. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) ("Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived."); Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) Order, 8/4/22, at 1 (single page) (warning that "[a]ny issue not properly included in the statement and timely filed and served as required by this order and Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), shall be deemed waived"); see also Greater Erie Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) ("[I]n determining whether an appellant has waived his issues on appeal based on non-compliance with [Rule] 1925, it is the trial court's order that triggers an appellant's obligation[. T]herefore, we look first to the language of that order.") (citations omitted; some brackets added). In any event, even had Appellant preserved this claim, we would deem it meritless. Section 3503(c)(3) provides that "[i]t is a defense to prosecution under this section that … the actor reasonably believed that the owner of the premises, or other person empowered to license access thereto, would have licensed him to enter or remain." According to Appellant, the property was owned by Angela Miller, and "[s]he permitted … [A]ppellant to live there," thus proving the defense in section 3503(c)(3). Appellant's Brief at 26. However, Appellant admitted at trial that Ms. Miller told him on the day of the fire that "[s]he wanted [him] to leave and not stay there…." N.T. Trial, 4/5/22, at 150. Nevertheless, he remained in the house and then set the blaze. Thus, Appellant would not be able to demonstrate that the defense in section 3503(c)(3) applied in this case.
We point out that, in support of Appellant's first three issues, his entire argument focuses solely on his own trial testimony that the fire was accidentally set as he attempted "to cook a hamburger in a pot over a candle in the living[]room of his house…." Appellant's Brief at 18. Appellant contends that his testimony shows he did not recklessly or negligently start the fire. Even if we accepted, for argument sake, that Appellant's version of events did not demonstrate that he acted recklessly or negligently, the other evidence presented at trial was sufficient to prove that the fire was not accidental. For instance, eyewitness David Bickowski testified that he saw Appellant, through the open door of the condemned home, repeatedly striking a lighter next to a large pile of cushions and pillows until they ignited. See N.T. Trial at 25-29. Appellant's relying on his own, self-serving testimony to argue that the fire was accidental, and that he did not act recklessly or negligently, is unconvincing in light of the other evidence presented at trial.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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[*] Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.