Opinion
J-S19041-14 No. 1905 MDA 2013
04-29-2014
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. KAHLIL KAHREE HAMMOND, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered on October 15, 2013
in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County,
Criminal Division, No. CP-36-CR-0003944-2009
BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Kahlil Kahree Hammond ("Hammond") appeals the denial of his Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
On July 17, 2009, Hammond was arrested and charged with robbery, firearms not to be carried without a license, criminal trespass, and receiving stolen property in connection with a robbery that occurred that morning at Evy Rosa Grocery and Deli in Lancaster, Pennsylvania. On March 10, 2011, a jury convicted Hammond of the above-mentioned crimes. On August 5, 2011, the trial court sentenced Hammond to an aggregate sentence of nine and one-half years to twenty-eight years in prison. This Court affirmed Hammond's judgment of sentence, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Hammond, 48 A.3d 477 (Pa. Super. 2012) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, 62 A.3d 1244 (Pa. 2013).
On April 2, 2013, Hammond filed, pro se, a Petition to Preserve Objection for Appeal. The trial court construed the Petition as a PCRA Petition, and appointed PCRA counsel for Hammond. Thereafter, PCRA counsel filed an Amended PCRA Petition. On September 19, 2013, the PCRA court issued Notice of Intent to dismiss the Amended PCRA Petition without a hearing, and an Opinion stating the reasons for its determination. In response, Hammond filed, pro se, a second Amended PCRA Petition. The PCRA court refused to consider Hammond's pro se second Amended PCRA Petition on the basis that he was represented by PCRA counsel, who had declined to respond to the PCRA court's Notice of Intent. On October 15, 2013, the PCRA court entered an Order denying the Amended PCRA Petition. Hammond filed a timely Notice of Appeal.
Hammond thereafter filed, pro se, a Motion to remove his court-appointed PCRA counsel. The PCRA court scheduled a hearing pursuant to Comonwealth v. Grazier , 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998). However, prior to the hearing, Hammond indicated that he wished to be represented by his court-appointed PCRA counsel. Based upon Hammond's representations, the PCRA court denied Hammond's Motion and cancelled the Grazier hearing.
On appeal, Hammond raises the following issue for our review: "Did the PCRA court err by failing to find that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to object to hearsay testimony during [Hammond's] trial?" Brief for Appellant at 4.
In reviewing the denial of a PCRA Petition, we examine whether the PCRA court's determination "is supported by the record and free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Rainey, 928 A.2d 215, 223 (Pa. 2007) (citations omitted).
Here, the PCRA court set forth the relevant law and addressed Hammond's claim before determining that it lacked merit. See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/19/13, at 7-13. We adopt the PCRA court's sound reasoning for the purpose of this appeal. See id. Accordingly, we conclude that the PCRA court properly denied Hammond's Amended PCRA Petition.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. ________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF LANCASTER COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
CRIMINAL
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v. KAHLIL KAHREE HAMMOND
No. 3944 - 2009
OPINION
BY: ASHWORTH, J.
Kahlil Kahree Hamomnd has filed an amended petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. For the reasons set forth below, notice is given that this petition will be dismissed without a hearing.
Under Rule 907 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, a PCRA court may dispose of post conviction collateral relief petitions without a hearing if it is satisfied after reviewing the materials submitted that no genuine issues of material fact exist and that petitioner is not entitled to post conviction relief. Pa. R.Crim.P. 907.
I. Background
On July 17, 2009, Petitioner Hammond was arrested and charged with robbery, firearms not to be carried without a license, criminal trespass, and receiving stolen property in connection with a robbery that occurred at Evy Rosa Grocery and Deli at 640 South Queen Street in the City of Lancaster on July 17, 2009. An omnibus pre-trial motion was filed on March 1, 2011, and a supplemental motion was filed on March 10, 2011. A suppression hearing was held on these motions on March 7, 2011, immediately prior to trial. At that time, the motions were denied in their entirety. (Notes of Testimony ("N.T."), Trial at 110.) The case proceeded to trial, and concluded on March 10, 2011, with a jury verdict of guilty on all counts. Following the guilty verdict, the Court ordered a pre-sentence investigation report. The Commonwealth gave notice at that time of its intention to seek imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9712 for visibly possessing a firearm during commission of the robbery.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3701(A)(1)(ii), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(A)(1), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3503(a)(1)(i), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3925(A), respectively.
On August 5, 2011, Petitioner received an aggregate sentence of 9-1/2 to 28 years' incarceration in a state correctional institution. (N.T., Sentencing at 33.) Petitioner filed timely post sentence motions for a new trial, for judgment of acquittal or, alternatively, for modification of sentence. These motions were denied by Order dated August 25, 2011. A timely appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was filed on September 2, 2011.
Petitioner was sentenced to 5-1/2 to 20 years on the robbery charge. He received consecutive sentences of 3 to 7 years for the offense of firearms not to be carried without a license, and 1 to 2 years for the criminal trespass charge. For the offense of receiving stolen property, Petitioner received a concurrent sentence of 9 to 24 months.
Pursuant to this Court's directive, Petitioner furnished a statement of errors complained of on appeal which raised eight issues: (1) the imposition of an aggregate sentence of 9-1/2 to 28 years was a manifest abuse of discretion; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict of the jury finding Petitioner guilty of criminal trespass; (3) the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict of the jury finding Petitioner guilty of firearms not to be carried without a license; (4) the Court erred in overruling Petitioner's motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of an illegal and unconstitutional arrest; (5) the Court erred in denying Petitioner's motion to suppress the statement which he gave which was the fruit of his unconstitutional arrest; (6) the Court erred in denying Petitioner's motion to suppress identification; (7) the Court erred in overruling Petitioner's objection and in permitting the Commonwealth to introduce the testimony of Officer Todd Gragor concerning certain identification evidence provided to him by Hilda Diaz-Vega; and (8) the Court erred in overruling Petitioner's objection and in permitting the Commonwealth to introduce a photograph of Petitioner which was irrelevant and highly prejudicial.
On April 13, 2012, a three-judge panel of the Superior Court affirmed the judgment of sentence in an unpublished memorandum opinion. A petition for allowance of appeal was denied by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania on March 1, 2013.
On April 2, 2013, Petitioner filed a pro se "petition to preserve obdection [sic] for appeal," which was deemed to be a timely petition for post conviction collateral relief. In his filing, Petitioner claimed ineffective assistance of counsel, and a violation of his constitutional rights which so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Pursuant to Rule 904(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, Christopher Lyden, was appointed on April 2, 2013, to represent Petitioner on his collateral claims and was granted leave to file an amended petition, if appropriate, by June 3, 2013.
An amended PCRA petition was filed on April 23, 2013. In this petition, counsel claimed ineffective assistance by trial counsel for failing to object on hearsay grounds to testimony by the investigating police officer about a police dispatch. (See Amended PCRA Petition at ¶¶ 16-17, 25-28.) The Commonwealth filed a timely response on May 15, 2013, arguing that Petitioner was not entitled to relief and asking the Court to deny the amended petition without a hearing.
In the meantime, I received from Petitioner on May 13, 2013, a pro se motion seeking the removal of his court-appointed PCRA counsel. Accordingly, I scheduled a Grazier hearing for July 12, 2013. At that time, Petitioner indicated he wished to continue to be represented by counsel. PCRA counsel consulted with Petitioner after the hearing and again reviewed the record of this case for meritorious claims. On September 6, 2013, counsel filed a motion to schedule an evidentiary hearing on the one original claim presented in the amended petition. As I find that there are no disputed issues of fact, Petitioner is not entitled to post conviction collateral relief, and no purpose will be served by any further proceedings, I give notice of my intention to dismiss this amended PCRA petition without a hearing.
"[D]espite the mandate in Rule 904 [that a judge must appoint counsel for an indigent defendant to represent the defendant on his first petition for post conviction collateral relief], a defendant still retains the right to waive the appointment of counsel and proceed pro se." Commonwealth v. Powell, 787 A.2d 1017, 1019-20 (Pa. Super. 2001). However, "[w]hen a waiver of the right to counsel is sought at the post-conviction and appellate stages, an on-the-record determination should be made that the waiver is a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary one." Commonwealth v. Grazier, 552 Pa. 9, 713 A.2d 81, 82 (1998). If a PCRA defendant indicates a desire to represent himself, it is incumbent upon the PCRA court to elicit information from the defendant that he understands the items outlined in Pa. R.Crim.P. 121(A)(2)(a), (d), (e) and (f): (1) his right to be represented by counsel; (2) that if he waives this right, he will still be bound by all normal procedural rules; (3) that many rights and potential claims may be permanently lost if not timely asserted; and (4) that "there are possible defenses to these charges that counsel might be aware of, and if these defenses are not raised [in a PCRA petition], they may be lost permanently." Commonwealth v. Robinson, 970 A.2d 455, 460 (Pa. Super. 2009). In sum, "when a first-time petitioner indicates in his pro se petition that he does not wish to be represented by an attorney, the PCRA court must still conduct a Grazier hearing, eliciting information in accordance with Rule 121 and Robinson, before permitting the petitioner to proceed pro se." Commonwealth v. Stossel, 17 A.3d 1286, 1290 (Pa. Super. 2011).
II. Eligibility for PCRA Relief
A petitioner seeking relief pursuant to the PCRA is eligible only if he pleads and proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that (1) he has been convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth and is currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole for the crime, (2) his conviction has resulted from one or more of the enumerated errors or defects found in § 9543(a)(2) of the PCRA, (3) he has not waived or previously litigated the issues he raises, and (4) the failure to litigate the issue prior to and during trial, or on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic, or tactical decision by counsel. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2), (3), (4).
A petitioner has previously litigated an issue if (1) the highest appellate court in which a petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue, Commonwealth v. Spotz, 47 A.3d 63, 76 (Pa. 2012), or (2) the issue has been raised and decided in a proceeding collaterally attacking the conviction or sentence. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9544(a); Commonwealth v. Phillips, 31 A.3d 317, 320 (Pa Super. 2011). A petitioner has waived an issue if the petitioner could have raised the issue but failed to do so before trial, on appeal, or in a prior state post conviction proceeding. 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9544(b); Spotz, 47 A.3d at 76. However, waiver will be excused under the PCRA if petitioner can meet the conditions of 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3)(ii) or (iii) or by making a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. Commonwealth v. Morales, 549 Pa. 400, 409, 701 A.2d 516, 520 (1997). Petitioner has raised a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
Section 9543(a)(3) provides:
[T]hat the allegation of error has not been previously litigated and one of the following applies:42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9543(a)(3).
. . .
(ii) If the allegation of error has been waived, the alleged error has resulted in the conviction or affirmance of sentence of an innocent individual.
(iii) If the allegation of error has been waived, the waiver of the allegation of error during pretrial, trial, post-trial or direct appeal proceedings does not constitute a State procedural default barring Federal habeas corpus relief.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made in the post conviction context, a petitioner must overcome the presumption that counsel is effective by establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) trial counsel had no reasonable basis for proceeding as he did; and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice. See 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii); Spotz, 47 A.3d at 76 (citing Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 158-59, 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 (1987)). With respect to whether counsel's acts or omissions were reasonable, defense counsel is accorded broad discretion to determine tactics and strategy. Commonwealth v. Fowler, 447 Pa. Super. 534, 540, 670 A.2d 153, 155 (1996). The appellate courts will conclude that counsel's chosen strategy lacked a reasonable basis only if the petitioner proves that "an alternative not chosen offered a potential for success substantially greater than the course actually pursued." Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612 Pa. 333, 361-62, 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 587 Pa. 304, 312, 899 A.2d 1060, 1064 (2006)).
To establish the prejudice prong, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel's ineffectiveness. Chimel, 612 Pa. at 362, 30 A.3d at 1127-28. "We stress that boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner's burden to prove that counsel was ineffective." Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Paddy, 609 Pa. 272, 292, 15 A.3d 431, 443 (2011)).
III. Discussion
The sole issue before the Court is whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object on hearsay grounds to certain testimony by Officer Todd Grager which Petitioner claims prejudiced his case. Officer Grager took the initial complaint from the victim in this case, Hilda Diaz-Vega, who was robbed at gunpoint. (N.T., Trial at 156, 158, 187.) At trial, Officer Grager testified that, as he was returning to the police station to write a report, he received a "call for a trespassing in progress at 606 Queen Street." (Id. at 190.) Further, he stated "an anonymous caller called in to alert police that the possible suspects from the robbery that had just occurred on South Queen Street had just ran [sic] into the basement of 606 South Queen Street, which was a vacant house." (Id.) Officer Grager also testified that the lot is located "approximately a half a block north" of the Evy Rosa Grocery and Deli where the robbery occurred. (Id. at 191.) Petitioner was arrested at the 606 South Queen Street residence. (Id. at 208.)
Petitioner contends the testimony by Officer Grager regarding the anonymous caller's conversation with police dispatch about the potential whereabouts of the "possible suspects from the robbery" was "double hearsay" and should not have been admitted at trial. (See Amended PCRA Petition at ¶ 16.) Petitioner argues this "inadmissible hearsay testimony was prejudicial because it allowed the jury to consider, as substantive evidence of guilt, that an eyewitness saw petitioner commit the robbery, flee from the robbery and enter the 606 Queen Street residence in order to hide." (Id. at ¶ 17.)
In Pennsylvania, hearsay is defined as an out-of-court statement offered at trial to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Pa.R.E. 801.
As a general rule, hearsay is inadmissible, because such evidence lacks guarantees of trustworthiness fundamental to our system of jurisprudence. The rule against admitting hearsay evidence stems from its presumed unreliability, because the declarant cannot be challenged regarding the accuracy of the statement. However, certain exceptions have been fashioned to accommodate certain classes of hearsay that are substantially more trustworthy than hearsay in general, and thus merit exception to the hearsay rule.Commonwealth v. Kuder, 62 A.3d 1038, 1055 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted; internal quotations omitted). Petitioner contends that Officer Grager's testimony regarding the police dispatch was double hearsay. (See Amended PCRA Petition at ¶ 16.)
An out-of-court declaration containing another out-of-court declaration is double hearsay. In order for double hearsay to be admissible, the reliability and trustworthiness of each declarant must be independently established. This requirement is satisfied when each statement comes within an exception to the hearsay rule.Commonwealth v. Laich, 566 Pa. 19, 25, 777 A.2d 1057, 1060 (2001) (citations omitted; internal quotations omitted). See Pa.R.E. 805 (double hearsay is admissible if each part conforms to a hearsay exception).
Here, Officer Todd Grager testified at trial that he received a call from police dispatch that an anonymous caller just told them that "the possible suspects from the robbery" that had just occurred on South Queen Street had been seen running into the basement of 606 South Queen Street. (N.T., Trial at 190.) This is not hearsay on hearsay, as argued by Petitioner. Rather, the anonymous caller made a firsthand observation of the individuals running into the vacant building and reported it to the police.
Officer Grager's trial testimony regarding the dispatch he received about the possible whereabouts of the robbery suspects could arguably be hearsay. However, an out-of-court statement offered to explain a witness's course of conduct is not hearsay and is admissible without first satisfying any of the hearsay exceptions. Commonwealth v. Rega, 593 Pa. 659, 693-94, 933 A.2d 997, 1017 (2007). It is well-settled, "[t]here is no hearsay if the contents of police radio calls are offered not for their truth but to explain the officer's course of conduct." Commonwealth v. McLean, 387 Pa. Super. 354, 365, 564 A.2d 216, 221 (1989). See Commonwealth v. Sneed, 514 Pa. 597, 606-07, 526 A.2d 749, 754 (1987) (holding that where a police officer related the contents of a radio call that prompted his trip to the crime scene, such testimony was not hearsay because it was introduced solely to explain how the officer came to be at the scene); Commonwealth v. Carelli, 377 Pa. Super. 117, 143, 546 A.2d 1185, 1198 (1988) (allowing testimony regarding police radio report announcing theft and content of anonymous tip as part of police investigation).
Here, Officer Grager testified regarding the substance of the police radio dispatch to explain his investigation and subsequent arrest of this particular defendant and his seizure of certain evidence belonging to the defendant. Since the evidence was introduced for course of conduct, and not for its truth, it was not hearsay, and trial counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to object to its admission.
Petitioner nonetheless argues, "[i]t cannot be said that every out-of-court statement having bearing upon subsequent police conduct is to be admitted, for there is great risk that, despite cautionary jury instructions, certain types of statements will be considered by the jury as substantive evidence of guilt." Commonwealth v. Palsa, 521 Pa. 113, 118, 555 A.2d 808, 810 (1989). Where the challenged statements contain "specific assertions of criminal conduct," they can be "highly incriminating" and likely to be "understood by the jury as providing substantive evidence of guilt." Commonwealth v. Yates, 531 Pa. 373, 376-77, 613 A.2d 542, 543-44 (1992).
Relying on Yates, Petitioner contends that the challenged statement in the instant case contained a specific assertion of criminal conduct and, therefore, should not have been admitted as course-of-conduct evidence. (See Amended Petition at ¶ 23.) I believe Yates is distinguishable from the instant case. The facts in Yates were summarized by the Superior Court as follows:
On September 12, 1988, a police officer in the City of Pittsburgh received a phone call from a confidential informant. The informant told the officer that a black male in his early 20's, 6' 4" tall, weighing 270 lbs., and wearing a black and red Adidas sweatshirt and pants and white tennis shoes was selling drugs in the 600 block of Brushton Avenue. The 600 block of Brushton Avenue is known to be a concentrated drug trafficking area. The officer quickly notified undercover officers in the vicinity of Brushton Avenue and made arrangements for himself and three other officers to immediately converge upon the scene. Upon arriving there, they noticed a black male who met the exact description given by the informant. The suspect was carrying a brown paper bag and began to run when he saw an unmarked police car arrive at the scene.531 Pa. at 374-75, 613 A.2d at 542-43. Under the circumstances of the case, the Superior Court found the testimony by the police officers regarding the out-of-court statements by the confidential informant to be "highly incriminating" and "likely to have been understood by the jury as providing substantive evidence of guilt." Id. at 376, 613 A.2d at 543. "Inasmuch as [the defendant] was charged with possession of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to deliver, the informant's statement to police that [the defendant] was 'dealing drugs' would unavoidably have had a prejudicial impact." Id. The appellate court "balancefd] the prejudice arising from statements regarding [the defendant's] drug dealing against the prosecution's need to introduce such statements to explain police conduct" and ruled the hearsay statements inadmissible. Id. at 377, 613 A.2d at 544.
The suspect, to wit, appellant, was stopped and searched. Inside the brown paper bag that appellant had been carrying were seventy-four packets of white powder containing cocaine and
$105.00 in cash. An additional fourteen packets of this substance and $86.00 in cash were in appellant's pocket.
The instant case is distinguishable from Yates in the first instance by the fact that the source of the hearsay was anonymous and not a confidential informant as in Yates. Our Superior Court recognized in Commonwealth v. Thomas, 396 Pa. Super. 92, 578 A.2d 422 (1990), that where the source of the hearsay is anonymous, the potential prejudicial impact of the hearsay statements during course of conduct testimony is minimal. The Court explained:
In Commonwealth v. Underwood, [347 Pa. Super. 256, 261, 500 A.2d 820, 822 (1985)], the Commonwealth was permitted to explain the course of conduct by the police by disclosing that an unidentified bystander had implicated the defendant. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Carelli, 377 Pa. Super. 117, 132, 546 A.2d 1185, 1198 (1988), the Commonwealth was permitted to explain the course of conduct by the police by disclosing that an anonymous tip had implicated theId. at 103-04, 427-28 (emphasis in original). Unlike Thomas and Yates, in the instant case, there was no direct identification of Petitioner by the anonymous caller. Rather, the caller merely referred to individuals as "possible suspects from the robbery," without reference to gender, race, age, height or weight. (N.T., Trial at 190 (emphasis added).) Contrary to Petitioner's assertion, there was no substantive testimony that "an eyewitness saw petitioner commit the robbery, flee from the robbery and enter the 606 Queen Street residence in order to hide." (See Amended PCRA Petition at ¶ 17.) The out-of-court statement by Officer Grager did not directly incriminate Petitioner; nor did it buttress the Commonwealth's case by identifying Petitioner as the perpetrator of the offense.
defendant. Because the source of the oblique narrative type hearsay was anonymous in both cases, the juries in those cases would be unlikely to accord inappropriate weight to the hearsay statements derived from those anonymous persons related during course of conduct testimony. In both cases, the out of court identification was essentially harmless, and was offered merely to fill a gap in the narrative, rather than to buttress the proof of one of the critical elements of the offense.
In Thomas the appellate court was asked to determine whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to raise and preserve an objection to a portion of police "course of conduct" hearsay testimony which indicated a third party who did not testify at trial, knew the defendant, was present when the offense occurred, and identified the defendant as the perpetrator. There were no fingerprints or other demonstrative evidence tying the defendant to the crime of auto theft but only an in court identification of the defendant by the victim at trial. The Superior Court ruled that "[t]he prosecution sought to buttress the in court identification of [the defendant] made by the victim (who had never seen [the defendant] before the incident in question) with another, far more reliable out of court identification made by a person who knew the name of the individual, with whom the person had been with when they happened upon the victim's disabled car, which the individual fixed and then promptly stole." 396 Pa. Super, at 103, 578 A.2d at 427. Because the Court found the challenged hearsay evidence "emphasized the reliability of an out of court identification of a witness who was not presented to testify and to be cross-examined in this case," the hearsay had a prejudicial impact and, therefore, was inadmissible and should have been excluded.
Yates is further distinguishable in that the anonymous caller in the instant action did not actually describe the criminal conduct that constituted the robbery; whereas, in Yates, the inadmissible statement contained allegations that a specific person was "dealing drugs." Yates, supra at 376, 613 A.2d at 543. The statements here could not be viewed as substantive evidence of Petitioner's guilt as the anonymous caller neither stated that he saw Petitioner commit the robbery nor that he saw Petitioner flee from the scene of the robbery. The challenged statements did not go beyond what was reasonably necessary to explain police conduct in the case.
Alternately, I find no reasonable probability that but for the admission of those statements or the absence of a limiting instruction regarding those statements, the outcome of the trial would have been more favorable to Petitioner; consequently, Petitioner's ineffectiveness claims must fail.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, Petitioner Kahlil K. Hammond's amended petition for post conviction collateral relief will be dismissed in 20 days without further proceedings, unless Petitioner files an amended petition or otherwise responds to this Opinion and Notice.
Accordingly, I enter the following: COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA
v. KAHLIL KAHREE HAMMOND
No. 3944 - 2009
NOTICE PURSUANT TO PA. R.CRIM.P. 907
AND NOW, this 19th day of September, 2013, it is hereby ORDERED that, after a review of the amended Post Conviction Relief Act petition and the matters of record relating to the claim, Kahlil Kahree Hammond's request for post-conviction relief will be denied without further proceedings, in 20 days from the date of this Notice, for the following reasons:
1. There are no genuine issues concerning any material fact;
2. Petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief; and
3. No purpose would be served by any further proceedings.
If Petitioner wishes to file an amended petition or to otherwise respond to this Notice, he must do so within 20 days of the date of this Notice.
BY THE COURT:
DAVID L. ASHWORTH
JUDGE
I certify this document to be filed In the Lancaster County Office of the Clerk of the Courts.
Joshua Q. Parsons
Clerk ot the Courts
Copies to: Maria A. Cusick, Assistant District Attorney
Christopher Lyden, Esquire
Kahlil K. Hammond, #KC-9993, SCI-Greene, 175 Progress Drive, Waynesburg,
PA 15370