Opinion
2086 EDA 2020
06-22-2022
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. JONATHON HAMLETTE Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered September 30, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006120-2013
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
MEMORANDUM
KING, J.
Appellant, Jonathon Hamlette, appeals pro se from the order entered in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which dismissed his first petition filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"). We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of the case are as follows. On May 2, 2018, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder and possession of an instrument of crime ("PIC"). In exchange for Appellant's plea, the Commonwealth agreed to a negotiated sentence of 15 to 30 years' incarceration for third-degree murder, and a concurrent sentence of two and a half to five years' incarceration for PIC. The court conducted an oral colloquy to confirm Appellant's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. As to the factual basis for the plea, Appellant agreed that he went to Mr. William Worthy's house on January 24, 2010, and stabbed Mr. Worthy in the chest and arm causing his death. In addition to the oral colloquy, Appellant executed a written guilty plea colloquy. The court accepted the guilty plea as knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and sentenced Appellant in accordance with the plea agreement. Appellant did not pursue a direct appeal.
For a more detailed history of this case, we refer the reader to the PCRA court opinion which discusses Appellant's first trial, this Court's decision on direct appeal vacating and remanding for a new trial, the commencement of the new trial, and Appellant's mid-trial decision to plead guilty. (See PCRA Court Opinion, 10/22/20, at 1-5).
On January 8, 2019, Appellant timely filed a pro se PCRA petition, and he filed an amended pro se PCRA petition on February 12, 2019. The court appointed counsel, who subsequently filed Turner/Finley "no-merit" letters.On August 12, 2020, the court issued notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without a hearing per Pa.R.Crim.P. 907. Appellant did not file a response. The PCRA court dismissed the petition on September 30, 2020. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on October 21, 2020. The PCRA court did not direct Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant filed none.
See Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc). Counsel filed an initial Turner/Finley letter on October 4, 2019, and supplemental no-merit letters on February 13, 2020, and March 13, 2020.
The court subsequently granted PCRA counsel's request to withdraw.
Appellant raises the following issues on appeal.
1) Was trial counsel ineffective for not appealing the ruling by the trial/motion court for the amended offense of second degree murder 2502(b) by the Commonwealth.
2) Was trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to false statement by former/fired homicide Detective Phillip Nordo stating that a robbery had taken place, but Commonwealth's witnesses testimony never mention that a robbery had taken place.
3) Did the trial court commit a due process violation when it denied [Appellant's] motion to quash amended offense of second degree murder, committing an abuse of discretion….
4) Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to object [to] the statement taken by fired homicide Detective Phillip Nordo, officer's report stated that a robbery had taken place.
5) Did the trial court abuse its discretion by allowing statement by homicide Detective Phillip Nordo to be presented to the jury in [Appellant's] second trial.
6) Was defendant pressured into inducement of a guilty plea by the granting of amended offense of second degree murder by the Commonwealth while [Appellant] always stated that he was innocent.(Appellant's Brief at 1-2).
Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the evidence of record supports the court's determination and whether its decision is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101 (Pa.Super. 2011), appeal denied, 612 Pa. 687, 29 A.3d 795 (2011). This Court grants great deference to the findings of the PCRA court if the record contains any support for those findings. Commonwealth v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513 (Pa.Super. 2007), appeal denied, 593 Pa. 754, 932 A.2d 74 (2007). We give no such deference, however, to the court's legal conclusions. Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190 (Pa.Super. 2012).
For purposes of disposition, we combine Appellant's first and third issues. In his first issue, Appellant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to quash the charge of second-degree murder. In his third issue, Appellant relatedly asserts that the court's denial of the motion to quash violated his due process rights. In both issues, Appellant claims the trial court should have quashed the charge of second-degree murder, where Appellant had not been charged with the underlying felony offense of robbery. Appellant concludes the court's denial of the motion to quash forced him to plead guilty to third-degree murder, and this Court must grant appropriate relief. We disagree.
"Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance." Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, __Pa.__, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).
[T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
As a general rule, the entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all defects and defenses except lack of jurisdiction, invalidity of the plea, and legality of the sentence. Commonwealth v. Main, 6 A.3d 1026 (Pa.Super. 2010). Defendants can also waive specific valuable rights as part of a plea bargain, including the right to appeal, in exchange for important concessions by the Commonwealth, so long as the defendant's waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnes, 687 A.2d 1163 (Pa.Super. 1996), appeal denied, 548 Pa. 613, 693 A.2d 585 (1997) (holding defendant's waiver of right to file motion for post-trial relief in exchange for Commonwealth's agreement not to seek death penalty was valid). See also Commonwealth v. Byrne, 833 A.2d 729, 736 (Pa.Super. 2003) (stating: "We are aware of no authority that provides an impediment to a defendant's express, knowing, and voluntary waiver of a statutory right if that waiver is key in obtaining a bargained-for exchange from the Commonwealth").
Instantly, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder and PIC on May 2, 2018. By entering the plea agreement, Appellant waived his right to appeal the trial court's ruling on his motion to quash. See id.; Barnes, supra. See also (Written Guilty Plea Colloquy, 5/2/18, at 2-3; N.T., 5/2/18, at 151) (discussing rights Appellant gave up by pleading guilty). Further, counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to pursue a meritless claim. See Sandusky, supra. Therefore, Appellant's first and third issues merit no relief.
We next combine Appellant's second, fourth, and fifth issues. In his second and fourth issues, Appellant argues counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of Detective Phillip Nordo at Appellant's re-trial. In his fifth issue, Appellant claims the trial court abused its discretion by allowing a statement by Detective Nordo to be presented to the jury at the re-trial. For similar reasons as discussed in relation to Appellant's first and third issues, Appellant is not entitled to relief on these claims.
Here, Appellant's second, fourth, and fifth issues concern trial testimony that took place before Appellant entered his guilty plea. During the guilty plea colloquy, the court had the following exchange with Appellant:
THE COURT: But, also, since you already had most of the trial here today, you can no longer complain, once you plead guilty, about any rulings that I made during this trial that you think were wrong or any other instances that happened during this trial that you think were not fair or were wrong. Once you plead guilty you waive all of that, you give it up and you can't argue it later. Do you understand that?
[APPELLANT]: Yes, ma'am.(N.T., 5/2/18, at 152). We reiterate that when Appellant pled guilty, he waived all claims except lack of jurisdiction, invalidity of the plea, and legality of the sentence. See Main, supra. Therefore, Appellant's entry of the guilty plea precludes his challenge to admission of Detective Nordo's testimony, and Appellant's related ineffectiveness claim fails. See id. See also Sandusky, supra.
In his final issue, Appellant argues the Commonwealth "overcharged him" with second-degree murder. Appellant contends this overcharging induced him into entering the guilty plea to third-degree murder. Appellant concludes his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.
Initially, we observe that Appellant did not raise any challenge to the validity of his guilty plea before the trial court. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1), (B)(1)(a)(i) (discussing post-sentence motion challenging validity of guilty plea); Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606, 609-10 (Pa.Super. 2013) (explaining that defendant wishing to challenge validity of guilty plea must object during plea colloquy or file motion to withdraw plea within 10 days of sentencing). Nevertheless, to the extent Appellant argues the deficiencies with his guilty plea arose from the ineffectiveness of counsel, we will address this issue.
Under the PCRA, a petitioner is eligible for relief if he pleads and proves by a preponderance of the evidence that his guilty plea was "unlawfully induced where the circumstances make it likely that the inducement caused the petitioner to plead guilty and the petitioner is innocent." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). Pennsylvania law presumes a defendant who entered a guilty plea was aware of what he was doing, and the defendant bears the burden of proving otherwise. Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517 (Pa.Super. 2003). A defendant who decides to plead guilty is bound by the statements he makes while under oath, "and he may not later assert grounds for withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea colloquy." Id. at 523. "Our law does not require that a defendant be totally pleased with the outcome of his decision to plead guilty, only that his decision be voluntary, knowing and intelligent." Id. at 524. Further, "[a]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea." Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 136, 141 (Pa.Super. 2002).
Here, the PCRA court reasoned that because the Commonwealth had sufficient probable cause to charge Appellant with second-degree murder, the charges against him could not have unlawfully induced him to plead guilty to third-degree murder. (PCRA Court Opinion at 9-10). The court explained there is no requirement that a defendant be charged with an underlying felony to prove that he committed second-degree murder in the perpetration of that felony. The PCRA court stated: "The Commonwealth presented credible, constitutionally sound evidence that [Appellant] stole the decedent's remaining crack cocaine from his person after stabbing him"; therefore, it had "sufficient probable cause to charge [Appellant] with second-degree murder." (Id. at 10). Because Appellant was lawfully charged with second-degree murder, the PCRA court found that such charge could not have unlawfully induced Appellant to plead guilty.
"Where a murder is alleged to have been committed in the perpetration of a felony, there is no requirement that the defendant actually be charged with the underlying felony." Commonwealth v. Passmore, 857 A.2d 697, 706 (Pa.Super. 2004) (internal citation omitted).
We agree with the PCRA court that Appellant's claim lacks merit. At the guilty plea hearing, the court explained to Appellant that he had been charged with both second-degree murder and third-degree murder. (See N.T. at 152-154). The court further explained that in exchange for Appellant's plea to third-degree murder, the Commonwealth would not proceed on the second-degree murder charge. Appellant said he understood the terms of the plea and confirmed his plea was voluntary. The record supports the PCRA court's analysis that the lawful charge of second-degree murder did not induce Appellant to plead guilty to a crime for which he was actually innocent. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(iii). Counsel was not ineffective in connection with Appellant's guilty plea under these circumstances. See Hickman, supra. Therefore, Appellant's sixth issue merits no relief, and the court properly denied PCRA relief. Accordingly, we affirm.
Notably, Appellant does not claim that he is innocent of third-degree murder.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.