Commonwealth v. Subilosky, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 860 (1978). See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 554, 557 (1975). We affirm the denial of the motion.
Commonwealth v. Zion, 359 Mass. 559, 563 (1971). Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 554, 558 (1975). It is clear from the transcript, from the briefs and from the arguments before us that the judge had no idea what his functions and duties were in the circumstances and that defense counsel had no conception of the risks to which he was exposing his client.
On March 19, 1974, the defendant and his two codefendants moved for a new trial, alleging that they were unaware when the pleas were offered that they were waiving their rights to appeal from the denial of their motions to suppress evidence. The new trial motions were denied by the trial judge, and the denials were affirmed on appeal. Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 554 (1975). On August 21, 1980, the defendant filed, pro se, a second motion for a new trial, alleging, among other things, that his plea was involuntary and that he had been deprived of effective assistance of counsel.
Any argument that that confession had been coerced is precluded by the defendant's failure to appeal from the denial of his 1970 motion for a new trial, if not by the denial of his 1956 motion to suppress the confession. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 554, 556-559 (1975). We concur in the reasoning and conclusions set out in the comprehensive findings and rulings filed by the motion judge on April 24, 1979.
We agree with the judge who heard the motion for a new trial that the defendant's account given at that hearing did not accurately reflect what transpired at the time of sentencing. See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 3 Mass. App. Ct. 554, 557 (1975). We decline to accept the defendant's suggestion that Durant v. United States, 410 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1969), be followed.