Opinion
No. 11–P–1217.
2012-11-2
COMMONWEALTH v. Dion HALL.
Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211–212 (2001). See Bryant, supra.
By the Court (WOLOHOJIAN, BROWN & CARHART, JJ.).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The Commonwealth appeals, pursuant to Mass.R.Crim.P. 15(a)(2), as appearing in 422 Mass. 1501 (1996), an order allowing the defendant's motion to supress statements he made during a police interrogation. The Commonwealth argues that the interrogation was not “custodial,” and that therefore the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), did not apply. We affirm.
A single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court allowed the Commonwealth's petition for leave to pursue this interlocutory appeal.
“In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error ‘but conduct an independent review of his ultimate findings and conclusions of law.’ “ Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004), quoting from Commonwealth v. Jimenez, 438 Mass. 213, 218 (2002). “[O]ur duty is to make an independent determination of the correctness of the judge's application of constitutional principles to the facts as found.” Commonwealth v. Scott, supra, quoting from Commonwealth v. Mercado, 422 Mass. 367, 369 (1996). Only statements made during custodial interrogations are subject to exclusion. Whether an interrogation is custodial in the Constitutional sense does not depend on the subjective beliefs of either the officer or the defendant. See Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 324 (1994). Rather, we apply an objective test; namely, whether “a reasonable person in the suspect's shoes” would have believed he was not free to leave. Commonwealth v. Clemente, 452 Mass. 295, 327 (2008), quoting from Commonwealth v. Morse, 427 Mass. 117, 123 (1998). The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that he was in custody. Commonwealth v. Kirwan, 448 Mass. 304, 309 (2007).
We see no error in the motion judge's denial of the Commonwealth's motion for written findings. The motion judge dictated extensive and detailed findings on the record, as well as his legal analysis. A transcript of the judge's findings and rulings was available.
We consider several factors to determine whether an interrogation was custodial, and “[r]arely is any single factor conclusive.” Commonwealth v. Bryant, 390 Mass. 729, 737 (1984). These factors are:
“(1) the place of the interrogation; (2) whether the officers have conveyed to the person being questioned any belief or opinion that that person is a suspect; (3) the nature of the interrogation, including whether the interview was aggressive or, instead, informal and influenced in its contours by the person being interviewed; and (4) whether, at the time the incriminating statement was made, the person was free to end the interview by leaving the locus of the interrogation or by asking the interrogator to leave, as evidenced by whether the interview terminated with an arrest.”
Commonwealth v. Groome, 435 Mass. 201, 211–212 (2001). See Bryant, supra.
Police officers interrogated the defendant in an interview room at the station after he had been pressured by them to come there. , Compare Commonwealth v. Murphy, 442 Mass. 485, 493 (2004) (among other factors, when defendant freely volunteered to go to police station, interview was not custodial). Although the fact that the interrogation took place at the station is not dispositive on its own, it “intimates a degree of coercion.” Commonwealth v. Bookman, 386 Mass. 657, 660 (1982).
The motion judge's finding that the police told the defendant that they would “go out and find him” if he did not come to the station was well supported by the record. A recording of the interview of the defendant's uncle shows that police asked him to tell the defendant that “if he doesn't come talk to us, we're going to have to go find him and bring him in.” Although the uncle did not relay that message, it could readily be inferred that police did so when they called the defendant immediately thereafter and he agreed to come to the station.
Oral argument revealed that the parties were relying on two different versions of the transcript of the motion hearing. At our request, the parties submitted a postargument explanation of the discrepancy. We have reviewed that submission, including the audio recording. For purposes of our decision, we have accepted that the door of the interview room was not locked.
During the interrogation, the police expressed their view that the defendant was a suspect, and at various points forcefully stated that they believed the defendant was not telling them the truth and that his story was implausible. Furthermore, even before the interview, the defendant was aware through his uncle that the police suspected him (the defendant) of lying and that the uncle had unwittingly been “caught in a lie” because of the defendant's deception.
The interrogation was confrontational rather than conversational. The officers repeatedly accused the defendant of lying to them during the interview. See Commonwealth v. Gallati, 40 Mass.App.Ct. 111, 114 (1996) (questioning indicative of finding custody when suspect cried and was accused of lying). They confronted the defendant with inconsistencies in his story. See Commonwealth v. Osachuk, 418 Mass. 229, 232–233 (1994). His denials were “scorned and overridden,” Commonwealth v. Coleman, 49 Mass.App.Ct. 150, 155 (2000), and at one point the police audibly laughed at his version of events. Compare Commonwealth v. Bly, 448 Mass. 473, 493 (2007) (interview noncustodial where, among other indicia, “tenor ... was cordial and conversational”). The officers threatened the defendant that he would be committing a crime—filing a false police report—if he did not tell the truth about his “stolen” car.
Finally, the judge did not err in finding that a reasonable person in the defendant's shoes would not have felt free to leave, or to end the interrogation by leaving or by asking the police to end the interview. The Commonwealth argues that because the police did not arrest the defendant at the conclusion of the interview, a reasonable person in the defendant's situation would have felt free to leave. However, the fact that the defendant was not at that time arrested is not to be viewed in isolation. See Gallati, supra at 115. We note in this connection that the defendant did in fact at one point ask to leave the interview, and rather than telling him he was free to go, the police sought to persuade him to stay. Compare Bly, supra (interview not custodial in part because suspect never asked to leave).
For these reasons, we conclude that the judge's subsidiary findings were all well supported and that his application of the Groome factors was correct. See Groome, 435 Mass. at 211–212. We accordingly affirm the allowance of the defendant's motion to suppress.
So ordered.