Opinion
18-P-722
06-03-2019
COMMONWEALTH v. RANJIT S. GREWAL.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
A jury convicted the defendant, Ranjit S. Grewal, of resisting arrest, G. L. c. 268, § 32B. On appeal, he contends that (1) the Commonwealth did not adduce sufficient evidence, and (2) the trial judge coerced a juror into rendering a verdict. We affirm.
The jury also convicted the defendant of shoplifting and disorderly conduct, and acquitted him of assault and battery on a police officer and trespass. None of the other convictions are before us.
Discussion. 1. Sufficient evidence. The defendant contends only that the Commonwealth did not prove that a reasonable person in his situation would have understood that Officer Joseph Zurheide of the Holyoke Police Department was arresting him. We disagree.
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the Commonwealth's evidence to determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). As pertinent here, "[a] person commits the crime of resisting arrest if he knowingly prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer, acting under color of his official authority, from effecting an arrest of the actor or another." G. L. c. 268, § 32B. "An arrest occurs where there is (1) 'an actual or constructive seizure or detention of the person, [2] performed with the intention to effect an arrest and [3] so understood by the person detained.'" Commonwealth v. Grandison, 433 Mass. 135, 145 (2001), quoting Commonwealth v. Cook, 419 Mass. 192, 198 (1994). "The standard for determining whether a defendant understood that he was being arrested is objective -- whether a reasonable person in the defendant's circumstances would have so understood." Commonwealth v. Grant, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 205, 208 (2008). "[C]ommunication [by words or actions] is required to satisfy the requirement that a defendant understand he is being arrested." Id. at 210.
On the facts as they developed here there can be no doubt that Officer Zurheide communicated to the defendant that he was under arrest. While Officer Zurheide initially told the defendant that he was not under arrest, that changed when the defendant shoved past Officer Zurheide and tried to leave the store. At that point, Officer Zurheide ran after the defendant, grabbed him around his midsection, and announced to the defendant that he was under arrest. Despite the warning, the defendant persisted in his struggle with the officer. Accordingly, we discern no error.
2. Juror coercion. The defendant next contends that the trial judge coerced a juror into rendering a guilty verdict. We disagree.
"When instructing the jury, a judge must avoid language that may coerce the jury into reaching a verdict." Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 291, 294 (2005). "A judge crosses the line between enlightening the jurors' understanding and coercing them when 'he overcomes the will by the weight of his authority.'" Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Diaz, 19 Mass. App. Ct. 29, 34 (1984).
Here, the judge had the following interaction with a juror after dismissing the jury after the first day of deliberations.
The court: "Do you have an issue with coming in tomorrow?"
Juror: "Yeah. I -- You know, I do home care and I've got clients that they can't be place -- they're going to need my help, --"
The court: "Mm-hmm."
Juror: " -- you know, and so I would like to be released and have the other guy go in --"
The court: "I'm sorry. Unfortunately --"
Juror: " -- and the other thing is that everybody else is in one place and I'm in another place and we're -- nobody is going to move on it. You know, --"
The court: "The -- Right. I don't want you to talk about the deliberative -- "
Juror: "Okay."
The court: " -- process."
Juror: "The other thing that bothers me is it's a mother and a son --"
The court: "So I'm not going to have you talk -- "
Juror: " -- and I'm just upset -- "
The court: "-- I'm going to have you stop talking about that."
Juror: "Okay."
The court: "You're going to back and -- "
Juror: "Okay."
The court: " -- you're going to deliberate. I'm not going to excuse you from juror service. You're going to need to be here for 9:30 and deliberate. All right? Thank you."
Juror: "Okay."
We discern no coercion. Here, the judge did not insist that the juror reach a particular verdict, contrast Commonwealth v. Cote, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 365, 369 (1977), or that she reach a verdict at all. Contrast O'Brien, 65 Mass. App. Ct. at 295. Rather, the judge merely declined to dismiss the juror, as was well within his discretion, see G. L. c. 234, § 26B, and c. 234A, § 39, and required that the juror return to court the next day to continue her deliberations with the other jurors. We perceive no error.
Judgment affirmed.
By the Court (Maldonado, McDonough & Englander, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: June 3, 2019.