Placing a suspect in handcuffs is usually considered a physical restraint on freedom tantamount to arrest. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pinney, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 392, 396-397, 148 N.E.3d 402 (2020) ; Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 827, 716 N.E.2d 1036 (1999). Conversely, the absence of handcuffs is usually cited to negate a finding of custody.
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980). It is clear that, in the hallway encounter, the defendant was subjected to "interrogation" for purposes of Miranda. Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 826, 827-28, rev. denied, 430 Mass. 1112 (1999). The more difficult question is whether the defendant was in "custody."
Here, the atmosphere surrounding the officer's questions was neither coercive nor intimidating. See Commonwealth v. Murphy, 442 Mass. 485, 492-493 (2004); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 827-828 (1999) (court held it was improper to question the defendant without Miranda warnings when police handcuffed and placed her in a cruiser). "For purposes of Miranda warnings, `[t]he crucial question is whether, considering all the circumstances, a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have believed that [he] was in custody.'"
Id. {31} Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Gordon, 716 N.E.2d 1036, 1037-38 (Mass.App.Ct. 1999), the court held that a defendant who had been chased, forcibly restrained, handcuffed, and put in the back seat of a police vehicle was in custody. The court stated that even though the restraint was reasonable under a Terry stop, "the combined indicia of handcuffs and restraint in the back of a police cruiser attain the level of custody associated with formal arrest" under the reasonable person test required by Miranda.
Torres was arrested right after she made the incriminating statement and could not leave. In Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 825 (1999), the court held that a defendant who had been chased, forcibly restrained, handcuffed, and put in the back seat of a police vehicle was in custody. Even though the restraint was reasonable pursuant to a Terry stop, "the combined indicia of handcuffs and restraint in the back of a police cruiser attain the level of custody associated with formal arrest" under the reasonable person test required by Miranda. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. at 827.
"The criteria of forcible detention and restriction of movement do not serve to distinguish an arrest from an investigatory stop." Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 826 (1999). Not unlike an arrest, "a complete restriction on liberty of movement [also] occurs in a typical investigatory stop."
Restricting the movement of a suspect by the use of handcuffs, in order to secure the suspect for a showup identification, may be reasonable to effectuate the goal of identification. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 826-827 (1999). 'The resolution of this question depends on the particular facts of the case.' Williams, supra at 118.
However, the cases do not stand for such a principle. In Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 828 (1997), the question was not, as here, whether the defendant was in custody at the time of interrogation, but whether the questions put to the defendant, who was in custody (she had been handcuffed), constituted interrogation. The questions put to the defendant in that case, which were designed to elicit an incriminating response, were held to be interrogation that should have been preceded by Miranda warnings.
This holding is in accord with decisions from several other states which, under varying other circumstances, have concluded that a suspect was "in custody" for purposes of the Miranda rule after being placed in handcuffs and secured in a police patrol car. See State v. Frank, 986 P.2d 1030, 1036 (Idaho Ct. App. 1999); Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 953 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 716 N.E.2d 1036, 1038 (Mass.App.Ct. 1999); State v. Johnston, 572 S.E.2d 438, 441 (N.C.Ct.App. 2002). The decisions of these courts, and our holding today, reflect the observation in Berkemer that although the determination whether a suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda is not an "easily administered" rule, the rule serves well to protect both the constitutional rights of detained citizens and the legitimate interests of law enforcement.
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Justifiable safety precautions, such as handcuffing a suspect and approaching with drawn weapons, may create a level of coercion equivalent to formal custody without transforming the Terry stop itself into an arrest. See Commonwealth v. Gordon, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 825, 827 (1999). Thus, our conclusion that the restraints imposed on the defendant were permissible as part of a Terry stop does not contradict our assumption that Lieutenant Reilly's question to the defendant constituted custodial interrogation.