Opinion
No. 15–P–1634.
11-18-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. Freddy GONZALES.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After a jury trial in 1986, the defendant was convicted of rape of a child with force and of aggravated rape. In this, the appeal from his third motion for new trial, he raises two arguments. First, he contends that the trial judge erred in failing to conduct sua sponte an evidentiary hearing into his competency to stand trial. Second, he argues that newly-discovered evidence bearing on his mental health casts doubt on the pretrial competency evaluations. We affirm.
A defendant is entitled to a competency hearing "where there exists doubt as to whether the defendant satisfies" the test set out in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960). Commonwealth v. Crowley, 393 Mass. 393, 398 (1984) (quotation omitted). "The judge, moreover, must raise the question sua sponte if sufficient reason exists to doubt the defendant's competency. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 385 (1966). Commonwealth v. Hill, 375 Mass. 50, 54 (1978)." Id. at 398–399.
Here, the record shows that, whatever mental health issues the defendant had previously or then had, at the time of trial the unanimous view of the expert psychiatrists was that he was competent to stand trial. Dr. Veliz (the Commonwealth's psychiatrist), having examined the defendant, concluded that although he presented a danger to himself and others and thus should remain at Bridgewater State hospital, the defendant "has a factual as well as rational understanding of the proceedings against him and is able to consult with his lawyer with [sic] a reasonable fashion." Dr. Veliz also noted that the defendant demonstrated a good understanding of the charges against him, and of the roles of various court personnel and attorneys. Accordingly, Dr. Veliz concluded the defendant was competent to stand trial and recommended that he be returned to court for disposition of his case. Dr. Moore (the defendant's independent psychiatrist) made similar observations and concluded that the defendant "appreciate[s] the nature of the charges against him and the possible penalties, and that he understands the workings of the courtroom, and that he is able to assist his attorney in his defense." Dr. Moore concluded that he had "no doubt" that the defendant "has the capability of assisting his attorney and behaving appropriately in court" (although he could not guarantee that the defendant might not say shocking or flippant things).
Both psychiatrists' reports were before the trial judge, and the transcript reveals that the judge carefully read and considered the materials from both psychiatrists. There was nothing before the trial judge to raise a question about the defendant's competence to stand trial, and the motion judge therefore did not abuse her discretion in rejecting the defendant's claim that he was entitled to a new trial because the trial judge did not sua sponte conduct an evidentiary hearing into his competence.
Nor did the motion judge abuse her discretion in denying the defendant's motion for new trial based on claimed "newly discovered" evidence concerning his competence. The results of a neuropsychological test conducted in 2002, sixteen years after trial, were not "newly discovered" evidence as our law has defined that term. "A defendant seeking a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must establish that the evidence was unknown to the defendant or trial counsel and not reasonably discoverable at the time of trial." Commonwealth v. Shuman, 445 Mass. 268, 271 (2005). To the extent the 2002 report refers to the defendant's mental and psychological issues predating trial, those issues were obviously known to the defendant, or at least reasonably discoverable by his counsel then. To the extent that the 2002 report contains information pertaining to the defendant's mental and psychological issues that emerged after trial, there is nothing to connect them to the question of the defendant's competence to stand trial in 1986.
For these reasons, we affirm the order dated October 19, 2015, denying the motion for new trial.
So ordered.