Commonwealth v. Gomes

23 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Odgren

    483 Mass. 41 (Mass. 2019)   Cited 24 times   1 Legal Analyses

    We clarified in Commonwealth v. Hart, 455 Mass. 230, 244 n.13, 914 N.E.2d 904 (2009), that our reasoning in Grand Jury Subpoena applies equally to a trial subpoena. In Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 206, 944 N.E.2d 1007 (2011), we rejected the argument that such recordings could be used "to further the legitimate penological and security interests of the sheriff" only, and "not for the prosecutorial purposes of the district attorney." Id. at 206–207, 944 N.E.2d 1007 (dissemination of detainee's recorded telephone conversation did not violate detainee's constitutional rights).

  2. Semedo v. Medeiros

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 15-12937-GAO (D. Mass. Apr. 9, 2019)

    Id. "[W]hat is seen on the view may be used by the jury in reaching their verdict," Commonwealth v. Corliss, 23 N.E.3d 92, 97 (Mass. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gomes, 944 N.E.2d 1007, 1012 (Mass. 2011)), and, because there was evidence presented that the petitioner was both in Boston and Brockton on the day of the murder, the jury could properly have used its understanding of such a trip to evaluate the Commonwealth's timeline of events. Next, the petitioner argues that the two instances in which the SJC concluded that the prosecutor's comments were improper but also that those statements could not have substantially swayed the jury were in fact highly prejudicial and resulted in a violation of his due process rights.

  3. Hyatt v. Gelb

    142 F. Supp. 3d 198 (D. Mass. 2015)   Cited 4 times

    First, it noted that even if exclusion from a jury view were capable of constituting a due process violation, Hyatt had failed to make the required showing that that violation had caused him “substantial harm.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 199, 944 N.E.2d 1007 (2011)). Second, the Appeals Court said without further explanation that it was unpersuaded by Hyatt's attempt to analogize Justice Brady's refusal to allow him to attend the view to a judge's permitting a defendant to be seen by the jury in prison garb or shackles, a practice that (according to a distinct line of precedent) requires a judge to make particularized findings.

  4. Commonwealth v. Alemany

    488 Mass. 499 (Mass. 2021)   Cited 20 times

    See Rutherford, 476 Mass. at 646, 71 N.E.3d 481 (improper to ask jury to imagine victim's final thoughts). The Commonwealth argues that, by telling the jury that they walked Lord's last walk and stood in the spot where she was killed, the prosecutor properly referenced the view, see Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 201, 944 N.E.2d 1007 (2011), and reminded the jury of the sequence of events leading to her death. Even if the statements were close to the line or if the jury did not understand them as a reference to the view, they did not create a substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice for the reasons discussed supra.

  5. Garcia v. Commonwealth

    486 Mass. 341 (Mass. 2020)   Cited 9 times
    Affirming stay of sentence after requiring bail, GPS monitoring, and home confinement with exceptions for work and legal and medical appointments

    We have held that a governmental action within a prison does not constitute a search when two conditions are present: the prison policy at issue furthers legitimate penological security interests, and prisoners are warned of the policy. See Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 206–207, 944 N.E.2d 1007 (2011), citing Matter of a Grand Jury Subpoena, 454 Mass. at 687-689 & n.6, 912 N.E.2d 970. See also Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (no Fourth Amendment privacy rights in prison cell).

  6. Commonwealth v. Loya

    484 Mass. 98 (Mass. 2020)   Cited 2 times

    Where there is no error, this court need not reach the question of prejudice. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 207, 944 N.E.2d 1007 (2011) (analysis stops at determination there was no error). By way of illustration, the defendant suggested the following language:

  7. Commonwealth v. Buttimer

    482 Mass. 754 (Mass. 2019)   Cited 21 times
    In Commonwealth v. Buttimer, 482 Mass. 754, 756, 128 N.E.3d 74 (2019), in which the defendant was convicted of armed assault with intent to murder, the jury erroneously were instructed that, to convict the defendant, the weapon used to assault the victim had to be "operational."

    As discussed supra, the Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant shot the victim. "[T]he Commonwealth does not have the burden of proving no one else may have committed the murder," but rather its "burden is to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the murder" -- a burden that it satisfied. Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 208, 944 N.E.2d 1007 (2011). See Commonwealth v. Hoose, 467 Mass. 395, 412, 5 N.E.3d 843 (2014) ("Commonwealth does not have the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that some third party is not guilty of the charged crime").

  8. Commonwealth v. Barbosa

    477 Mass. 658 (Mass. 2017)   Cited 66 times
    Concluding defendant's flight from scene and subsequent calls to coventurers allowed reasonable inference of participation and shared intent

    The prosecutor properly encouraged the jury to use their observations from the view to evaluate the evidence and aid in reaching their verdict. See Commonwealth v. Corliss , 470 Mass. 443, 448, 23 N.E.3d 92 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Gomes , 459 Mass. 194, 199, 944 N.E.2d 1007 (2011) ("[a]lthough what is seen on the view may be used by the jury in reaching their verdict, in a ‘strict and narrow sense a view may be thought not to be evidence’ "). Similarly, the prosecutor's forceful rhetoric was based on the evidence without focusing on any unnecessarily emotional or inflammatory aspects of the evidence.

  9. Commonwealth v. Brescia

    471 Mass. 381 (Mass. 2015)   Cited 44 times
    Affirming grant of new trial where "defendant's then-undetected stroke had affected the course of his testimony in a manner that well might have damaged his credibility in the jury's eyes"

    Moreover, they could have “believe [d] all, some, or none of the testimony of any witness,” including the defendant. See Commonwealth v. Ortiz, 470 Mass. 163, 167, 20 N.E.3d 251 (2014), quoting Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 203, 944 N.E.2d 1007 (2011). Under these circumstances, the likelihood that “[a] defense could be established” by the defendant, see Lombardi, 378 Mass. at 616, 393 N.E.2d 346, turned on whether the jury would believe the defendant's testimony that he had not asked Foxworth to kill the victim.

  10. Commonwealth v. Corliss

    470 Mass. 443 (Mass. 2015)   Cited 25 times

    Morganti, 455 Mass. at 402–403, 917 N.E.2d 191, quoting Commonwealth v. Gordon, 422 Mass. 816, 849, 666 N.E.2d 122 (1996). This is so because a “view is not part of the trial,” Commonwealth v. Gomes, 459 Mass. 194, 199, 944 N.E.2d 1007 (2011), due to the fact that, “[a]lthough what is seen on the view may be used by the jury in reaching their verdict, in a ‘strict and narrow sense a view may be thought not to be evidence.’ ” Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Curry, 368 Mass. 195, 198, 330 N.E.2d 819 (1975).