Opinion
14-P-1587
06-08-2015
COMMONWEALTH v. DASHAUN GOLDSMITH.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After police seized crack cocaine and clothing belonging to the defendant from a trauma nurse, the defendant was charged by complaint with possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute. Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the clothing and crack cocaine. After a hearing, a judge allowed the motion. The Commonwealth now appeals. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
1. Background. We briefly summarize the findings of the motion judge, none of which are challenged by the Commonwealth, supplemented with undisputed facts adduced at the suppression hearing. Commonwealth v. Isaiah I., 448 Mass. 334, 337 (2007).
Responding to a call that a man had been shot in front of a store on Dorchester Avenue in Boston, Officer Michael Harrington arrived at the scene and observed a motor vehicle with multiple bullet holes in it and blood inside the car. Officer Harrington was informed that the victim of the shooting (the defendant) had been taken to the hospital with two gunshot wounds.
After conducting further investigation at the scene, including having the motor vehicle towed and secured, Officer Harrington proceeded to Boston Medical Center where he spoke to the defendant, who, in turn, informed Harrington that he did not want to speak to the police.
Indeed, the next day, the police applied for, and were granted, a search warrant for the motor vehicle.
Later, Officer Harrington asked Detective Kevin Doogan to return to Boston Medical Center to speak to the defendant and check on his condition.
Detective Doogan arrived at Boston Medical Center at about 8:15 P.M. Detective Doogan "responded to the hospital with the express goals of determining the [defendant's] condition" and "securing the [defendant's] clothing." After arriving at the hospital, Detective Doogan spoke to the trauma staff, including a trauma nurse, and "requested the [defendant's] property." The nurse handed the detective a white plastic hospital bag containing the defendant's clothing and other personal belongings, and a second clear plastic bag containing, based on the detective's training and experience, what appeared to be "numerous" pieces of crack cocaine.
2. Discussion. In reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, "we accept the judge's subsidiary findings of fact absent clear error 'but conduct an independent review of [the judge's] ultimate findings and conclusions of law.'" Commonwealth v. Jessup, 471 Mass. 121, 129 (2015), quoting from Commonwealth v. Scott, 440 Mass. 642, 646 (2004).
As the motion judge correctly found, this case is largely controlled by Commonwealth v. Williams, 76 Mass. App. Ct. 489, 490-493 (2010). In Williams, we affirmed the allowance of the defendant's motion to suppress, concluding that the defendant did not forfeit his possessory interest in his clothing by entering a hospital and that the Commonwealth had failed to demonstrate the existence of exigent circumstances justifying the warrantless search and seizure of the defendant's property. Ibid.
Based on the foregoing, we agree with the motion judge, who engaged in a thoughtful and comprehensive analysis, that, in the present case, the defendant retained a property interest in his personal property and that the suppression testimony reflects that Detective Doogan went to the hospital with the express purpose of investigating the shooting. Therefore, as the motion judge properly held, the detective's request to the nurse to turn over the defendant's property was sufficient, in the circumstances of this case, to constitute State action. We note that, contrary to the assertions of the Commonwealth, the motion judge specifically found that the detective's request was a broad request for property. "Thus, as the Commonwealth did not present adequate evidence of an exception to the warrant requirement, an exigency or otherwise, the seizure of the defendant's clothing was unreasonable." Id. at 493.
Indeed, the Commonwealth argues that Detective Doogan only "asked for the [defendant's] clothing." However, the motion to suppress transcript, and Detective Doogan's testimony, when read in their entirety, does not support this assertion.
Order allowing motion to suppress affirmed.
By the Court (Berry, Kafker & Cohen, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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Clerk Entered: June 8, 2015.