“The crime of perjury in a judicial proceeding occurs whenever one ‘willfully swears or affirms falsely in a matter material to the issue or point in question.’ ” Commonwealth v. Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 63, 255 N.E.2d 737 (1970), quoting G.L. c. 268, § 1. The question whether a statement is false is subjective, “i.e., what the defendant in good faith and in fact did mean,” and it is up to the jury to determine what the defendant meant when a statement alleged to be false is open to multiple interpretations. Geromini, supra at 64, 255 N.E.2d 737. Materiality with respect to perjury “means relevance in the sense that the answer might tend in reasonable degree to affect some aspect or result of the inquiry,” Commonwealth v. Borans, 379 Mass. 117, 135, 393 N.E.2d 911 (1979), quoting Commonwealth v. Cerveny, 373 Mass. 345, 352, 367 N.E.2d 802 (1977), and is also a question of fact for the jury to decide.

The defendant also stipulated that the preliminary elements required to prove perjury were present. See Commonwealth v. Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 63-64 (1970). The case was tried on the issues whether the four statements were false, and whether any falsity was wilful and intentional.

' G.L.c. 268, § 1." Commonwealth v. Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 63 (1970). On the other hand, perjury alone does not constitute criminal contempt; there must be the further element of obstruction of the court in the performance of its duty. Blankenburg v. Commonwealth, 272 Mass. 25, 31-34 (1930), cert. denied 283 U.S. 819 (1931).

2. G. L. c. 268, § 1. “The crime of perjury in a judicial proceeding occurs whenever one ‘willfully swears or affirms falsely in a matter material to the issue or point in question.’ ” Commonwealth v. Walters, 472 Mass. 680, 702 (2015), quoting Commonwealth v. Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 63 (1970). See G. L. c. 268, § 1.

Discussion. "The crime of perjury in a judicial proceeding occurs whenever one 'wil[]fully swears or affirms falsely in a matter material to the issue or point in question.'" Commonwealth v. Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 63 (1970), quoting from G. L. c. 268, § 1. The defendant does not dispute that his statements to the grand jury were false. However, he claims that his motion for required findings of not guilty should have been allowed because his false statements could not have been material to a first-degree murder indictment that had not yet issued. The defendant contends that his statements may have been material to the grand jury's investigation, but that the Commonwealth's failure to include "investigation" in the indictment renders the proof at trial insufficient.

"The test [to determine perjury] is subjective, i.e., what the defendant in good faith and in fact did mean, as reasonably inferred by the trier of fact from all the circumstances, including subsequent disclosures." Commonwealth v. Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 64 (1970). While statements alleged to be perjurious are entitled to be considered "in the light of [the defendant's] later utterances," id. at 65, the consistent evidence from every witness was that the defendant testified unambiguously that the car was driven at him.

Commonwealth v. Giles, 353 Mass. 1, 15-16 (1967) (answer shown ambiguous by later answers may not be basis for perjury prosecution). Commonwealth v. Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 64-65 (1970) (same). Here, however, the statement alleged to be perjured was the denial of the confession at the suppression hearing.

The elements of perjury are that the defendant made a statement under oath in a judicial proceeding, the statement was false, the defendant made the statement willfully and knew the statement was false when she made it, and the statement was material to the issue or point in question. Commonwealth v. Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 63-64, 255 N.E.2d 737 (1970); Commonwealth v. White, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 71, 76, 872 N.E.2d 833 (2007). In assessing the sufficiency of the indictment, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.

Similarly, while Dr. Korgaonkar's testimony was false, it cannot be said, on the record and materials presented, that there was perjured testimony which influenced the judgment of this Court. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Geromini, 357 Mass. 61, 64 (1970). There are, thus, other reasons why Rule 60(b)(3) is inapplicable.

Commonwealthv. Giles, 350 Mass. 102, 110-111 (1966); G.L.c. 268, § 1; seeCommonwealth v. McDuffee, 379 Mass. 353, 360-361 (1979);Commonwealth v. Geromini, 350 Mass. 61, 63-66 (1970). The test of materiality is objective, but the test of willfulness is subjective, and depends on whether the witness in good faith knew the statement to be false.