Opinion
1980 EDA 2023
08-29-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. SHALINA GASS Appellant
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered March 27, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0001515-2022
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.
MEMORANDUM
SULLIVAN, J.
Shalina Gass ("Gass") appeals from the judgment of sentence following her non-jury convictions of criminal trespass, criminal mischief, conspiracy, and indirect criminal contempt for a violation of a protection from abuse ("PFA") order. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.
See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3503(a)(1)(ii), 3304(a)(5), 903, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 6114(a).
We take the underlying facts and procedural history in this matter from our review of the certified record. On February 11, 2022, Julius Butler ("the victim") was at a friend's home when he received a phone call that made him immediately return to his residence. See N.T. 1/6/23, at 11-12. The victim had previously resided with his "common law" wife, who had recently died; his stepson still lived with him. See id. at 18-19. The victim rented the home from Julius Singleton ("Singleton"). See id. at 23, 47-48.
When the victim arrived home, he observed the door had been broken, the house was in disarray, and the victim's possessions had been "bagged up" and were in the hallway. Id. 12-13. The victim saw his stepson, an unknown man, and Gass (his stepdaughter) in the home, taking his possessions from the home to a U-Haul truck. See id. at 12-16, 45. At the time of the incident there was an active PFA order barring Gass from the home. See id. at 28-29. Further, the victim had not given permission for Gass to be inside the home. See id. at 15-16.
Following a bench trial, the trial court found Gass guilty of the above-cited offenses. It later sentenced Gass to an aggregate sentence of eighteen months of probation. Gass subsequently filed a post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed.
Gass and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
On appeal, Gass raises three issues for our review:
1. Was the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt [] Gass'[s] guilt of conspiracy where the prosecution presented no evidence she entered an agreement with another person to break into a building?
2. Was the evidence insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt [] Gass'[s] guilt of criminal mischief as a summary offense, where the prosecution presented no evidence that she broke the [victim's] door, caused the door to be broken, or otherwise participated in or agreed to the act?
3. Did the [trial] court err and abuse its discretion when it denied [] Gass'[s] post sentence motion for a new trial on the ground that the guilty verdicts on criminal trespass and conspiracy were against the weight of the evidence, especially where the defense presented uncontested evidence at trial that the legal owner of the property in question - as well as a current resident - each granted [] Gass permission to enter the property and collect her belongings, and therefore the [trial] court's finding that the prosecution disproved beyond a reasonable doubt the statutory defense at 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 3503(c)(3) shocks one's sense of justice?Gass's Brief at 5 (capitalization and punctuation regularized, most statutory citations omitted).
In her first two issues, Gass challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying her convictions for conspiracy and criminal mischief. See Gass's Brief at 15-24.
Pertinently:
[w]e review claims regarding the sufficiency of the evidence by considering whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact[]finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Further, a conviction may be sustained wholly on circumstantial evidence, and the trier of fact- while passing on the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence-is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. In conducting this review, the appellate court may not weigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for the fact[]finder.Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 640 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
A person may be found guilty of conspiracy if "with the intent of promoting or facilitating its commission he: (1) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one or more of them will engage in conduct which constitutes such crime or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or (2) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime." 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 903(a).
To prove the existence of a criminal conspiracy, the Commonwealth must demonstrate the defendant: "(1) entered an agreement to commit or aid in an unlawful act with another person or persons, (2) with a shared criminal intent and, (3) an overt act was done in furtherance of the conspiracy." Commonwealth v. Chambers, 188 A.3d 400, 409-10 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted). "Once the conspiracy is established beyond a reasonable doubt, a conspirator can be convicted of both the conspiracy and the substantive offense that served as the illicit objective of the conspiracy." Id. at 410 (citations omitted). Moreover, the essence of criminal conspiracy is the agreement between co-conspirators. We have explained:
[M]ere association with the perpetrators, mere presence at the scene, or mere knowledge of the crime is insufficient to establish that a defendant was part of a conspiratorial agreement to commit the crime. There needs to be some additional proof that the defendant intended to commit the crime along with his co-conspirator. Direct evidence of the defendant's criminal intent or the conspiratorial agreement, however, is rarely available. Consequently, the defendant's intent as well as the agreement is almost always proven through circumstantial evidence, such as by the relations, conduct or circumstances of the parties or overt acts on the part of the co-conspirators. Once the trier of fact finds that there was an agreement and the defendant intentionally entered into the agreement, that defendant may be liable for the overt
acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy regardless of which co-conspirator committed the act.Commonwealth v. Golphin, 161 A.3d 1009, 1018-19 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).
With respect to criminal mischief, the Commonwealth must show that the defendant "intentionally" damaged "real or personal property of another[.]" 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(5). A person intentionally causes damage when "it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result[.]" Id. at § 302(b)(1)(i). The element of intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence. See Commonwealth v. Sulpizio, 281 A.3d 352, 358 (Pa. Super. 2022) (concluding the circumstantial evidence supported the conclusion the defendant struck the victim's vehicle with the intent to cause damage); see also Commonwealth v. Zambelli, 695 A.2d 848, 851 (Pa. Super. 1997) (the presence of the defendant walking alongside a van with an object in his hand at the same time a loud screeching sound was heard by witnesses, followed by the discovery of scratches on the van, was deemed sufficient circumstantial evidence to establish damage caused by the defendant's actions).
Gass claims the Commonwealth did not present any evidence she entered into an agreement to commit a crime, only that she was present at the scene. See Gass's Brief at 17-18. Gass further notes she was not in possession of any of the victim's belongings, did not have burglar's tools, and the Commonwealth did not present any fingerprint or DNA evidence. See id. at 19-20. Lastly Gass avers there was no evidence she damaged the victim's property. See id. at 21-23.
The trial court disagreed, explaining the following evidence was sufficient to sustain Gass's convictions for both conspiracy and criminal mischief:
The [c]ourt convicted [Gass] of criminal trespass ─ break into a structure, a felony in the second degree. This conviction was not appealed by [Gass]. There was an active [PFA] order which prohibited [Gass] from being on the subject property. Despite this order, [Gass] was on the property with two other people.
When the [victim] left his house, his front door was intact, and his house was in order. He returned to his house because he got a call about what was going on at his house. When he arrived the front door of the premises was busted in, and the [victim] saw things bagged up, and saw the bags being taken to a U-Haul truck. [The victim's] house was ransacked. One of the items taken was the ashes of [Gass's] recently deceased mother, [the victim's] "common law" wife. Although [the victim] did not see the door being busted in, he did see the contents of his house being taken by [Gass] and the two people. The logical inference to be drawn is that there was a clear agreement between [Gass] and the two other people. They were working in concert with each other with a mutual specific intent to carry out a particular criminal objective or common purpose to enter [the victim's] house and take his property. The overt acts were the broken door, ransacked house and the emptying of the contents of house into a rented U-Haul truck. "[T]he fact that the evidence establishing a defendant's participation in a crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence." Commonwealth v. Davenport, 452 A.2d 1058, 1060 (Pa. Super. 1982). See also Commonwealth v. Lanager, 521 A.2d 53[, 58-59] (Pa. Super. 1987) (evidence sufficient to sustain conviction for conspiracy to deliver controlled substances,
even though appellant did not physically handle drugs, when appellant arranged for drug dealer to meet with agent, dealer sold and delivered drugs to the agent and, at the conclusion of the sale, appellant requested compensation from agent for his role in arranging the sale); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 372 A.2d 904, 906 (Pa. Super. 1977) (where appellant took agent to dealer and agent purchased drugs directly from dealer, jury could properly infer existence of a single agreement to deliver drugs based upon appellant's participation in that specific act). The "overt act need not be committed by the defendant; it need only be committed by a co-conspirator." Commonwealth v. Hennigan, 753 A.2d 245, 253 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/23, at 6-7 (some citation formats regularized, emphasis added).
Following our thorough review of the record and the law, we conclude both support the trial court's determination the evidence was sufficient to sustain Gass's convictions for conspiracy and criminal mischief. Gass views the evidence in the light most favorable to herself, ignores the victim's testimony he saw Gass and her co-conspirators, one of whom was her brother, inside the victim's home and moving the victim's belongings from his home to a rented truck. See N.T., 1/6/23, at 12-16. This evidence is sufficient to sustain Gass's convictions. See Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2019) (holding it was reasonable for the finder-of-fact to infer the defendant broke into a shed where the lock had previously been intact, was now broken, and the defendant was observed inside the shed); Zambelli, 695 A.2d at 851 (holding the evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction for criminal mischief where the defendant was next a van, there was an object in his hand, witnesses heard a noise, and scratches were later discovered on the van); Commonwealth v. Gibson, 668 A.2d 552, 555 (Pa. Super. 1995) (holding the appellant's presence with co-conspirator during the entire criminal episode proved conspiracy); Commonwealth v. Cooke, 492 A.2d 63, 68 (Pa. Super. 1985) (holding evidence sufficient to sustain conviction of conspiracy where the appellant was present at scene, strongly associated with a co-conspirator, and personally participated in crime).
In her third issue, Gass challenges the weight of the evidence. See Gass's Brief at 24-32.
Our standard of review for a weight of the evidence claim is well-settled:
The essence of appellate review for a weight claim appears to lie in ensuring that the trial court's decision has record support. Where the record adequately supports the trial court, the trial court has acted within the limits of its discretion.
** * * *
A motion for a new trial based on a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. A new trial should not be granted because of a mere conflict in the testimony or because the judge on the same facts would have arrived at a different conclusion. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice.
** * * *
An appellate court's standard of review when presented with a weight of the evidence claim is distinct from the standard of review applied by the trial court. Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the underlying
question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Mucci, 143 A.3d 399, 410-11 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quotation marks and citations omitted). To prevail on a weight of the evidence challenge, the evidence must be so tenuous, vague, and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the trial court. See Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 820 A.2d 795, 806 (Pa. Super. 2003).
Gass claims the verdict shocks the conscience because she presented evidence that Singleton, the owner of the property, licensed her to enter it, which is a complete defense to criminal trespass. See Gass's Brief at 25. She further contends her brother, a lawful resident at the property was present at the time, giving her a reasonable belief that she was licensed to be present. See id. at 26.
The trial court stated it found the victim's testimony credible, but did not credit Singleton's testimony, in particular his testimony he had given Gass permission to enter the residence and his testimony regarding Gass's good character. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/9/23, at 9-11. The court stated:
There was an active [PFA] order prohibiting Gass from being at the property so [] Singleton could not give her permission to be there. [Gass] had no reasonable belief that [] Singleton could give her permission to violate a court order. [Gass] had no reasonable belief that she was allowed to be on the premises. Further, if [Gass] had valid permission from [] Singleton to be in the house, the [trial] court doubts he would have given her permission to break the door down. More likely [Gass] would have asked [] Singleton to let her into the premises or she would have advised him that she had no way to get into the house and asked
for his assistance. [] Singleton's testimony in regard to permission was simply not credible.
* * * * *
The evidence presented at trial was more than enough for [the trial] court to find that the Commonwealth met its burden of proof. Furthermore, [the trial] court's verdict is not so contrary that it shocked the consci[ence] of the court.Id. at 10-11 (capitalization regularized).
We discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in reaching its determination the verdict did not shock its conscience. The Commonwealth presented evidence that Gass committed criminal trespass and conspiracy. That the trial court, sitting as finder of fact, chose to believe the testimony provided by the victim and not credit Singleton's testimony which was entirely within its province. Gass essentially requests we re-weigh the evidence and assess the credibility of the witnesses presented at trial. This we cannot do, as it is a task that is beyond our scope of review. The trial court, as finder of fact, had the duty to determine the credibility of the witnesses and evidence presented at trial. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 70 A.3d 1245, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2013) (stating that "[a]n appellate court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the finder of fact"). Although Gass challenged the victim's testimony regarding the incident, she did not so undermine the Commonwealth's evidence as to render it completely unbelievable. Ultimately, the trial court found the evidence demonstrated Gass committed criminal trespass and conspiracy. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the trial court's rejection of Gass's challenge to the weight of the evidence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.