Statements of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed do not fall within this exception." Mass. G. Evid. § 803(3)(B)(ii). See Commonwealth v. Britt, 465 Mass. 87, 91, 987 N.E.2d 558 (2013) ; Commonwealth v. Fredette, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 219–220, 145 N.E.3d 171 (2020). Here, the judge reasoned that the only part of the defendant's statement expressing an intention to engage in "conduct" was, "I'm going to give the [d]istrict [a]ttorney a confession."
Commonwealth v. Fredette, 97 Mass.App.Ct. 206, 221-222 (2020).
Desiderio had expressed his view that he had been treated unfairly, and he had threatened the victim. See Commonwealth v. Fredette, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 210, 214-215, 145 N.E.3d 171 (2020) (motive evidence contributed to sufficiency). By Desiderio's own admission, he had known Lavin for years and indeed paid his bail.
Desiderio had expressed his view that he had been treated unfairly, and he had threatened the victim. See Commonwealth v. Fredette, 97 Mass.App.Ct. 206, 210, 214-215 (2020) (motive evidence contributed to sufficiency).
"[T]he state of mind exception applies to ‘[s]tatements, not too remote in time, which indicate an intention to engage in particular conduct.’ " Commonwealth v. Fredette, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 219 (2020), quoting Mass. G. Evid. § 803(3)(B)(ii) (2019). While this may have been a ground for admission of the statement, the judge did not have the opportunity to view the issue through this lens.
Confinement may be effectuated by actual force, but "if the victim is subdued by the display of potential force, [that] is [also] sufficient" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Fredette, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 214 (2020). The defendant argues that the Commonwealth's evidence of confinement was insufficient because it was undisputed that the victim left the apartment every day.