Opinion
18-P-379
03-01-2019
COMMONWEALTH v. GERARD E. FRANCIS.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The Commonwealth appeals from a suppression order issued by a judge of the District Court who excluded evidence found subsequent to the defendant's seizure. The defendant, Gerard Francis, a twenty-eight year old man, was operating a vehicle that was pulled over based on information that the car's owner, a seventy year old man, possessed a license that was in "revoked status." Once the officer learned that the defendant was in fact not the owner of the car, and after the defendant presented a facially valid license, the defendant was further detained in order for the officer to run a check on his license information. The Commonwealth argues that this detention was lawful. We affirm.
Background. The facts are undisputed. On November 7, 2016, Officer William Milner of the Arlington Police Department was conducting routine traffic control at a three-way intersection in Arlington. Milner performed a random Registry of Motor Vehicles (RMV) check of the number of the license plate on the car driven by the defendant. Milner learned that the car's registered owner was Denis Leary, a seventy year old man, and that Leary's license had been revoked. A picture of Leary was included with the search result. Based on this information, Milner turned on his lights and siren and pulled the defendant over.
The defendant was the only person in the car, and he was operating the car in accordance with the rules of the road.
When Milner approached the vehicle, the defendant had his driver's license in his hand. Milner quickly observed that the defendant was not Leary, since the defendant "was only [twenty-eight] years old in both appearance and according to his license." The defendant's license was facially valid and the defendant informed Milner that his license was in good standing. Milner requested the registration for the car. The defendant, in turn, reached to the glove compartment and produced a valid registration document. In the course of this exchange, the defendant was nervous and shaking, and asked Milner if he could smoke a cigarette to calm down. Milner told the defendant that he had nothing to worry about but still wanted to check the status of his license.
Milner stood at the rear of the defendant's car to conduct an RMV check of the defendant's license over the phone. While doing so Milner observed the defendant move forward, reach behind him, and place an unidentified object in the center console. At that point, out of a fear for his safety, Milner decided to abandon the RMV check and called for back-up. Before the back-up officer arrived, Milner watched the defendant reach under the front of his seat, although Milner did not recall whether the defendant removed anything. The defendant was ordered to exit the car once the back-up officer arrived. Milner and the second officer told the defendant he was not under arrest, but that they were going to conduct a patfrisk of his person. In the course of the patfrisk the officers discovered a spoon in one of the defendant's pockets and a hypodermic needle in another. Milner asked the defendant if he had drugs on his person, and the defendant responded that drugs were in the center console of the car.
The defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and read his Miranda rights. Upon searching the center console of the car Milner found a bag of what appeared to be heroin and a cigarette box containing what appeared to be cocaine and marijuana. After the defendant was transported to the police station for booking, and during the course of a vehicle inventory search, police also discovered a loaded firearm near the driver's seat of the car.
A complaint issued from the District Court charging the defendant with possession of a class A substance (heroin), possession of a class E substance (trazodone), possession of a class B substance (cocaine), carrying a firearm without a license, and carrying a loaded firearm without a license. The defendant pleaded not guilty to all charges, and filed a motion to suppress the seized items and his statement.
The motion was allowed after a hearing. The judge determined that the initial stop was justified on the likelihood that the driver of the car was also its registered owner, whose license had been revoked. However, the judge continued, any reasonable suspicion regarding the lawful operation of the vehicle evaporated once it was clear that the defendant was not the registered owner. As such, taking the defendant's license in order to conduct a search of police records was an improper seizure because the defendant, despite having done nothing wrong, was not free to leave and was unduly detained.
The Commonwealth filed a motion to reconsider, which the judge denied. The Commonwealth then filed a supplemental motion to reconsider, upon which the judge did not take action. The Commonwealth subsequently filed a notice of appeal.
Discussion. In reviewing a motion to suppress evidence, we adopt the judge's factual findings absent clear error. We also "show substantial deference to the judge's legal conclusions . . . but independently review the application of constitutional principles to the facts." Commonwealth v. Cruz, 459 Mass. 459, 464 (2011), quoting Commonwealth v. Torres, 433 Mass. 669, 671-672 (2001).
"Like a Terry stop, the tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure's 'mission' -- to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop . . . ." Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015). "Police authority to seize an individual ends 'when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are -- or reasonably should have been -- completed.'" Commonwealth v. Cordero, 477 Mass. 237, 242 (2017), quoting Rodriguez, supra. "Where an officer conducts an uneventful threshold inquiry giving rise to no further suspicion of criminal activity, he may not prolong the detention or expand the inquiry." Commonwealth v. Feyenord, 445 Mass. 72, 78 n.5 (2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1187 (2006).
On this record, we see no error in the judge's determination that the defendant was unlawfully seized when Milner continued to detain him in order to conduct an RMV check on his license. As Rodriguez teaches, the reasonableness of the initial stop is limited to the specific grounds that gave rise to the suspicion in the first place. Here, reasonable suspicion was grounded in the possibility that the driver of the car was its registered owner, Leary, and that he was operating the vehicle with a revoked license. See Commonwealth v. Deramo, 436 Mass. 40, 43 (2002) ("in the absence of any contrary evidence, . . . a vehicle is likely being driven by its registered owner"). Once Milner discovered that Leary was not driving the car, an incontrovertible reality given the age disparity between Leary and the defendant, reasonable suspicion ceased. See Commonwealth v. Garden, 451 Mass. 43, 46 (2008). Standing alone, the fact that the defendant became nervous when retrieving the registration document from the glove box cannot substantiate a reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred or was about to occur. See Cordero, 477 Mass. at 243-244.
The defendant's furtive movements occurred after he was detained and well after the initial reasonable suspicion for the stop had evaporated.
The Commonwealth asserts that when an initial traffic stop is lawful, the officer is entitled to briefly detain a driver to verify a license's validity. In support of that proposition, however, the Commonwealth relies on two community caretaking cases where the purpose of the stop was considerably different from the one at bar. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 436 Mass. 369, 374 (2002); Commonwealth v. King, 389 Mass. 233, 235 (1983). For the reasons discussed supra, the argument is unavailing. As such, we find no error in the order issued by the judge of the District Court.
Order allowing motion to suppress affirmed.
By the Court (Kinder, Neyman & Desmond, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: March 1, 2019.