Opinion
J-S07038-17 No. 558 MDA 2016 No. 559 MDA 2016
03-17-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. FELIX FORCADES, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 1, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-06-CR-0001423-2012; CP-06-CR-0001457-2012 Appeal from the Order November 1, 2013 in the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-06-CR-0001423-2012; CP-06-CR-0001457-2012 BEFORE: BOWES, LAZARUS and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Felix Forcades ("Forcades") appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his convictions, at No. CP-06-CR-0001457-2012 (hereinafter "No. 1457-2012"), of one count each of delivery of a controlled substance, possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance ("PWID") and possession of a controlled substance, and at No. CP-06-CR-0001423-2012 (hereinafter "No. 1423-2012"), one count each of possession of a controlled substance and PWID., See 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30), (16). We affirm the convictions, vacate the judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing.
The trial court, in its Opinion, only mentions Forcades's conviction of possession of a controlled substance at No. 1423-2012. However, our review of the record reveals that Forcades was convicted of both possession of a controlled substance and PWID at that docket number. See N.T., 10/9/13, at 123 (wherein, upon reading the jury verdict, the jury foreman acknowledged that the jury found Forcades guilty of possession of a controlled substance and PWID as to the February 22, 2012 charges); see also Verdict of the Jury (regarding the February 22, 2012 charges).
The above-mentioned dockets were consolidated for trial.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual history as follows:
On January 4, 2012, Reading Police Officer John Lackner [("Officer Lackner")] met with an undercover Pennsylvania State Police Trooper, [Charity Farrell ("Trooper Farrell"),] for the purpose of arranging a controlled buy of narcotics from [Forcades]. [Officer] Lackner showed [Trooper Farrell] a photo of [Forcades] and provided [Trooper Farrell] with [$100.00 in] pre-recorded buy money. [Trooper Farrell] met with [Forcades] in the area of [4th] and Walnut Streets, in the city of Reading, and had a drug-related conversation relative to the purchase of crack cocaine. [Trooper Farrell] then exchanged the pre-recorded money for crack cocaine. Photographs of the incident were taken. After [Trooper Farrell] turned over the crack cocaine to [Officer] Lackner, a valtox test was performed on the substance from inside a randomly selected vial. The substance tested positive for cocaine. [The incident gave rise to the charges at No. 1457-2012.] This incident took place within 1,000 feet of Lauers Park Elementary School, located at 2nd and Elm Streets, Reading, Pennsylvania.
Based on the initial investigation conducted on January 4, 2012, [Officer] Lackner obtained a warrant for [Forcades's] arrest. On February 22, 2012, [Forcades] was arrested by [Officer] Lackner. In a search incident to arrest, narcotics were
recovered from [Forcades's] person and are the subject of the charges in [No. 1423-2012]. [Forcades] was in possession of a clear plastic sandwich bag containing ten (10) clear glass vials containing crack cocaine and $101.00 in [United States] currency. The arrest took place within 1,000 feet of Lauers Park Elementary School, located at 2nd and Elm Streets, Reading, Pennsylvania.Trial Court Opinion, 7/25/16, at 3.
Forcades filed an omnibus pretrial Motion, which included a Motion to suppress and a Motion to sever his two Criminal Informations. The trial court denied both Motions.
Following a jury trial, Forcades was convicted of the above-mentioned crimes. On November 1, 2013, the trial court sentenced Forcades to an aggregate term of 2½ to 10 years in prison.
Forcades filed a post-sentence Motion, which was denied on February 19, 2014. Forcades filed a timely Notice of Appeal. Forcades's trial counsel failed to file a brief, and this Court dismissed the appeal. Forcades filed an "Application to File Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc" on December 1, 2014, and the trial court conducted a hearing. Forcades subsequently filed a pro se "Motion to Vacate Illegal Sentence," which the trial court treated as a Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act. The PCRA court appointed Forcades counsel. After a hearing, and upon agreement by the Commonwealth, the PCRA court reinstated Forcades's appellate rights, nunc pro tunc. Forcades filed timely Notices of Appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement.
Forcades filed two Notices of Appeal, each of which identified both docket numbers. This Court, sua sponte, consolidated Forcades's appeals.
On appeal, Forcades raises the following questions for our review:
I. Whether the procedures used to determine the applicability of the [] School Enhancement, 204 Pa. Code [§§] 303.9[ and] 303.10, and/or the drug[-]free school zones statute, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6317, were not authorized by law and/or violated [Forcades's] due process rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution and the United States Constitution?
II. Whether 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317 and 204 Pa. Code [§§] 303.9[ and] 303.10 are unconstitutional pursuant to Alleyne v. United States , 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013) and, as such, [Forcades's] sentences under these statutes are likewise unconstitutional and illegal[?]
III. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Forcades's] Motion to sever for trial the above-listed dockets[?]
IV. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Forcades's] post-sentence Motion challenging the weight of the evidence[,] where the verdicts of guilty to all charges are contrary to the law and the weight of the evidence[,] because the trial testimony of law enforcement was fraught with lies and half-truths, rendering the verdict issued in reliance on such testimony questionable and the product of guess-work?
V. Whether the trial court erred in denying [Forcades's] omnibus pretrial Motion to suppress[,] given the reliance on an undisclosed informant, numerous errors, inconsistencies, and
lack of probable cause in the charging documents and the arrest warrants?Brief for Appellant at 6-7 (footnote added; some capitalization omitted).
In Alleyne , the Supreme Court held that "any fact that increases the mandatory minimum is an 'element' that must be submitted to the jury" and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Alleyne , 133 S. Ct. at 2155. The Supreme Court reasoned that a Sixth Amendment violation occurs where these sentence-determinative facts are not submitted to a jury. Id. at 2156.
We will address Forcades's first two claims together, as he combines the discussion of these claims in his brief. In his first claim, Forcades asserts that the procedures used to determine the applicability of the School Enhancement under 204 Pa. Code §§ 303.9 and 303.10, and the drug-free school zones statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317, were not authorized by law, and violated Forcades's due process rights. Brief for Appellant at 14. Forcades points to this Court's decision in Commonwealth v. Valentine , 101 A.3d 801 (Pa. Super. 2014), and claims that the jury was improperly permitted to make a separate determination as to whether the evidence established that Forcades was within 1,000 feet of school property at the time of the offenses. Id. at 16. In his second claim, Forcades contends that he was subjected to a mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317, in violation of Alleyne. Brief for Appellant at 14, 15.
In Valentine , this Court held that, in light of Alleyne and Commonwealth v. Newman , 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc), the trial court could not overcome the constitutional infirmity of 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9712 and 9713 by permitting the jury, on the verdict slip, to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether the appellant possessed a firearm that placed the victim in fear of immediate serious bodily injury in the course of committing a theft for purposes of the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of Section 9712(a), and whether the crime occurred in whole or in part at or near public transportation, for purposes of the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions of Section 9713(a). Valentine , 101 A.3d at 811-12.
Forcades's claims challenge the legality of his sentence. Commonwealth v. Lawrence , 99 A.3d 116, 122 (Pa. Super. 2014). "Issues relating to the legality of a sentence are questions of law. Our standard of review over such questions is de novo and our scope of review is plenary." Commonwealth v. Wolfe , 106 A.3d 800, 802 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations, brackets and ellipses omitted).
The drug-free school zones statute provides, in relevant part, the following:
§ 6317. Drug-free school zones
(a) General rule.—A person 18 years of age or older who is convicted in any court of this Commonwealth of a violation of section 13(a)(14) or (30) of ... The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, shall, if the delivery or possession with intent to deliver of the controlled substance occurred within 1,000 feet of the real property on which is located a public, private or parochial school ... be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least two years of total confinement....18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317(a), (b) (emphasis added).
(b) Proof at sentencing.—The provisions of this section shall not be an element of the crime. Notice of the applicability of this section to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing. The applicability of this section shall be determined at sentencing. The court shall consider evidence presented at trial, shall afford the Commonwealth and the defendant an opportunity to present necessary additional evidence and shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence if this section is applicable.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court specifically considered the constitutionality of Section 6317 in Commonwealth v. Hopkins , 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015). In Hopkins , the Court held that Section 6317 is unconstitutional in its entirety pursuant to Alleyne , because it requires that operative facts be determined by a judge at sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence, and the offending provisions are not severable from the remaining portions of the statute. Hopkins , 117 A.3d at 257-59, 262.
Here, the trial court's Sentencing Order indicates that, concerning Forcades's PWID conviction, the trial court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence pursuant to the drug-free school zones statute, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317. Moreover, in its Opinion, the trial court concedes that Forcades's mandatory minimum sentence is illegal pursuant to Hopkins and Alleyne , and recommends that the case be remanded for resentencing. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/25/16, at 3-5. We agree, and accordingly, we vacate Forcades's judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing, without consideration of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6317.
The School Enhancement compels a trial court to consider heightened guideline ranges "[w]hen the court determines that the offender manufactured, delivered or possessed with intent to deliver a controlled substance within 250 feet of the real property on which is located a public or private elementary or secondary school, [in violation of 75 P.S. § 780-113(a)(14) and/or (a)(30)]." 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(b)(2), (4) (emphasis added). Section 303.9(c) directs the sentencing court to add 12 months to the lower limit of the standard range and 24 months to the upper limit of the standard range when applying the School Enhancement. See 204 Pa. Code § 303.9(c). In Commonwealth v. Ali , 112 A.3d 1210 (Pa. Super. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 149 A.3d 29 (Pa. 2016), this Court held that the Youth and School Enhancements are not illegal pursuant to Alleyne because "the enhancements only direct a sentencing court to consider a different range of potential minimum sentences, while preserving a trial court's discretion to fashion an individual sentence." Ali , 112 A.3d at 1226 (emphasis in original). However, our review of the record in the instant case reveals that the trial court did not specifically consider whether the offenses occurred within 250 feet of Lauers Park Elementary School, as is required to impose the School Enhancement at 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(b)(2). See N.T., 10/9/13, at 133, 136 (wherein Detective Nicholas Bolognese testified that the straight line distance between the location of the controlled buy and school property is 765 feet, and the straight line distance between the location of Forcades's arrest and school property is 603 feet); see also Commonwealth's Exhibits 17-20.
In his third claim, Forcades argues that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to sever the Criminal Informations against him. Brief for Appellant at 16. Forcades asserts that "the evidence of each offense would not have been admissible in a separate trial for the other[,]" because the incidents occurred on different days and in different areas; the acts were not similar because one involved delivery of a controlled substance, and the other involved possession of a controlled substance; the cocaine was packaged in a different manner; and each incident involved different witnesses. Id. at 19. Forcades also claims that he suffered "extreme prejudice" due to the consolidation of his cases, and the prejudice outweighed the utility of the evidence. Id. at 17, 20.
A motion for severance is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and ... its decision will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of discretion. The critical consideration is whether appellant was prejudiced by the trial court's decision not to sever. Appellant bears the burden of establishing such prejudice.Commonwealth v. Melendez-Rodriguez , 856 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (internal citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 582 governs the joinder of offenses, and provides, in relevant part, as follows:
(1) Offenses charged in separate indictments or informations may be tried together if:
Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1). However, "[t]he court may order separate trials of offenses or defendants ... if it appears that any party may be prejudiced by offenses or defendants being tried together." Pa.R.Crim.P. 583; see also Commonwealth v. Ferguson , 107 A.3d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. 2015) (stating that "[t]he prejudice of which Rule [583] speaks is, rather, that which would occur if the evidence tended to convict [the] appellant only by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid cumulating the evidence.").(a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury so that there is no danger of confusion; or
(b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction.
Where the defendant moves to sever offenses not based on the same act or transaction that have been consolidated in a single indictment or information, or opposes joinder of separate indictments or informations, the [trial] court must ... determine: [1] whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a separate trial for the other; [2] whether such evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger of confusion; and, if the answers to these inquiries are in the affirmative, [3] whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced by the consolidation of offenses.Commonwealth v. Serrano , 61 A.3d 279, 285 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Instantly, Forcades was charged with two felony drug offenses, which occurred within approximately 50 days of each other. Both incidents occurred in the area of 4th and Walnut Streets. See N.T., 11/5/12, at 12-14, 18. Additionally, in both instances, the recovered cocaine was contained in similar glass vials. See id. at 14-15, 19. Moreover, Forcades's January 4, 2012 offenses at No. 1457-2012 gave rise to the arrest warrant, the execution of which ultimately led to the February 22, 2012 offenses at No. 1423-2012. Thus, evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a prosecution for the other, as the evidence constitutes a "chain or sequence of events that formed the history of the case, [and] is part of the natural development of the case." Commonwealth v. Drumheller , 808 A.2d 893, 905 (Pa. 2002); see also Commonwealth v. Boyle , 733 A.2d 633, 637 (Pa. Super. 1999) (affirming the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to sever the trial of four drug offenses, where "multiple drug deliveries ... revealed a common plan through which [the defendant] could and did ... deliver cocaine whenever money was offered.").
Additionally, the evidence was easily separable by the jury, as the crimes occurred on different dates, and the cocaine was packaged in a similar but distinct nature (i.e., the vials obtained during the January 4, 2012 controlled buy had yellow tops, and the vials confiscated incident to Forcades's arrest on February 22, 2012 had blue tops). Moreover, the jury's completion of separate verdict sheets for the January 4, 2012 and February 22, 2012 offenses indicates that it was able to separate the evidence regarding each set of offenses. See Ferguson , 107 A.3d at 211 (stating that "[w]here a trial concerns distinct criminal offenses that are distinguishable in time, space and the characters involved, a jury is capable of separating the evidence.") (citation omitted).
Finally, Forcades has not established undue prejudice resulting from the consolidation of his charges for trial. See Commonwealth v. Collins , 703 A.2d 418, 423 (Pa. 1997) (concluding that "[t]here was no prejudice in permitting the jury to convict [the defendant] based on the distinct, yet interrelated, evidence of" a series of separate criminal offenses through which the defendant protected his drug trade). Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the Criminal Informations for trial. See id.
In his fourth claim, Forcades avers that the trial court erred in denying his post-sentence Motion challenging the weight of the evidence. Brief for Appellant at 20. Specifically, Forcades claims that his conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence, and "the determination that [] Forcades was the perpetrator of the offenses was based solely on [Trooper] Farrell's testimony and inconclusive photographic evidence." Id. at 21-22, 25-26. Forcades contends that the trial court ignored inconsistencies in Trooper Farrell's testimony. Id. at 22-23, 25. Forcades also claims that the Commonwealth failed to present the confidential source as a witness at trial to corroborate Trooper Farrell's testimony. Id. at 23.
We observe the following standard of review:
The finder of fact—here, the jury—exclusively weighs the evidence, assesses the credibility of witnesses, and may choose to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Issues of witness credibility include questions of inconsistent testimony and improper motive. A challenge to the weight of the evidence is directed to the discretion of the trial judge, who heard the same evidence and who possesses only narrow authority to upset a jury verdict. The trial judge may not grant relief based merely on some conflict in testimony or because the judge would reach a different conclusion on the same facts. Relief on a weight of the evidence claim is reserved for extraordinary circumstances, when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice and the award of a new trial is imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to prevail. On appeal, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the jury on issues of credibility, or that of the trial judge respecting weight. Or review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion; the Court's role precludes any de novo consideration of the underlying weight question.Commonwealth v. Sanchez , 36 A.3d 24, 39 (Pa. 2011) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Gibbs , 981 A.2d 274, 282 (Pa. Super. 2009) (stating that "[w]hen the challenge to the weight of the evidence is predicated on the credibility of trial testimony, our review of the trial court's decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless the evidence is so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict based thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable on appellate review." (citation omitted)).
Here, Forcades asks us to substitute our judgment for that of the jury, and to reassess the credibility of Trooper Farrell's testimony. From the verdict, it is apparent that the jury found Trooper Farrell's testimony credible, and we may not reconsider the credibility of that testimony on appeal. See Sanchez , supra ; see also Gibbs , supra. Because the evidence supports the jury's verdict, and we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court, this claim is without merit.
In his fifth claim, Forcades asserts that the trial court erred in denying his Motion to suppress because his arrest was not supported by probable cause. Brief for Appellant at 26, 30. Forcades contends that the physical description relied upon for the arrest "identified a suspect of a different race, weight, address, ethnicity, and skin color and, as such, [is] for an individual other than [] Forcades." Id. at 26. Forcades also argues that the police improperly relied on an "unproven, unnamed informant." Id. at 26, 29.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, our responsibility is to determine whether the record supports the suppression court's factual findings and legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings. If the suppression court held for the prosecution, we consider only the evidence of the prosecution's witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted. When the factual findings of the suppression court are supported by the evidence, the appellate court may reverse if there is an error in the legal conclusions drawn from those factual findings.Commonwealth v. Arnold , 932 A.2d 143, 145 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citation omitted).
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 513 provides that "[n]o arrest warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by one or more affidavits sworn to before the issuing authority...." Pa.R.Crim.P. 513. "The test in this Commonwealth for determining whether probable cause exists for the issuance of an arrest warrant is the 'totality of the circumstances.'" Commonwealth v. Taylor , 850 A.2d 684, 686-87 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citing Illinois v. Gates , 462 U.S. 213 (1983)).
The totality of the circumstances test requires a Court to determine whether the facts and circumstances which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.Commonwealth v. Smith , 979 A.2d 913, 916 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted).
The trial court considered Forcades's claim, and concluded that the perceived inconsistencies regarding Forcades's physical description were adequately clarified by Officer Lackner during pretrial hearings. See Trial Court Opinion, 7/25/16, at 11. The trial court also concluded that Forcades's arrest was supported by probable cause, based on the affidavit filed in support of the arrest warrant, photographic evidence of the controlled buy, and the in-court identification of Forcades. See id. at 11-12.
Our review discloses that at the pretrial hearing, Forcades questioned Officer Lackner regarding perceived inconsistencies contained in the charging documents and arrest warrant regarding his physical description, i.e., errors or discrepancies regarding his race, address and weight. See N.T., 11/5/12, at 28. Officer Lackner testified that the criminal Complaint identifies Forcades's race as white, rather than Hispanic. See id. at 21. Officer Lackner provided the following explanation:
Forcades proceeded pro se during pretrial proceedings. --------
Well, it's through my training in inputting information into our systems, as well as when I was in uniform patrol I used to work in the central booking area of our department, and whenever someone was brought in that was of Hispanic race, we were told to list them as white, and then you would select whether they were—their ethnicity was either Hispanic or non-Hispanic. So that's how I had been trained and done it over the years. And a Spanish male is always a white male in my—in my eyes as far as entering it into the system, but then I would check the Hispanic or non-Hispanic ethnicity box, and that would differentiate their, I'll say, ethnicity from the Caucasian/white race.Id. at 22. Regarding the discrepancy between Forcades's address and the address listed on Trooper Farrell's police report, Officer Lackner testified that, although it was not his report, he could assume that the address listed on the police report was based on information the state police had at that time. See id. at 38; see also id. at 21 (wherein Officer Lackner explained that the address listed on the criminal Complaint was obtained through the records management system). Regarding the discrepancies in the notations of Forcades's weight in four documents (each of which described him as weighing between 300 and 380 pounds), Officer Lackner testified that the suspect's weight is determined by personal perception. See id. at 39. Additionally, Officer Lackner stated, "I was a little gracious to you from seeing you from a distance. When I actually saw you face-to-face, I saw that you were a little heavier. ... That's why the difference in the weight is there." Id. at 40.
Further, Officer Lackner testified that he was present in the area of 4th and Walnut Streets on January 4, 2012 as part of a narcotics investigation. See id. at 12. Officer Lackner stated that he observed Trooper Farrell make contact with Forcades in the area of 4th and Walnut Streets, and then travel to the 100 block of Walnut Street. See id. at 13. Officer Lackner testified that Forcades entered 117 Walnut Street, where he remained for a short period of time before exiting to meet Trooper Farrell. See id. at 13-14. Officer Lackner testified that he observed actions consistent with a drug transaction, and that another police officer took surveillance photographs of the interaction. See id. at 14; see also id. at 14-15 (wherein Officer Lackner identified Trooper Farrell and Forcades in a photograph of the drug transaction, and the trial court admitted the photograph into evidence). Officer Lackner also stated that the "off-white rock-like substance" Trooper Farrell purchased from Forcades tested positive for cocaine. See id. at 14-15. Officer Lackner testified that, based on the January 4, 2012 controlled buy, he filed a criminal Complaint and affidavit of probable cause on February 16, 2012, and the arrest warrant was issued the same day. See id. at 15-17.
Regarding Forcades's claim that the arrest warrant was defective because it relied on information from an unnamed informant, we note that the affidavit of probable cause attached to the criminal Complaint does not mention the use of a confidential informant. Rather, the affidavit describes the successful controlled buy of cocaine on January 4, 2012. Our review of the record discloses that Officer Lackner scheduled the controlled buy based on information he received from a confidential informant. See N.T., 10/8/13, at 43-45. However, the use of a confidential informant does not preclude the existence of probable cause, where the information provided by the confidential informant is corroborated by the police. See Commonwealth v. Clark , 28 A.3d 1284, 1292 (Pa. 2011) (concluding that, based on a totality of the circumstances, the search warrant was supported by probable cause where the information provided by a confidential informant was corroborated by independent police investigation, i.e., a controlled buy of narcotics).
Upon review, we conclude that the evidence of record supports the trial court's factual findings. See Arnold , 932 A.2d at 145. Initially, Officer Lackner explained, on the record, the purported inconsistencies in the charging documents and arrest warrant regarding Forcades's physical description. Additionally, Officer Lackner was present in the area of 4th and Walnut Streets on January 4, 2012, where he observed Trooper Farrell make contact with Forcades, and saw actions consistent with a drug transaction. To the extent that Officer Lackner relied on a confidential informant's tip in initially investigating Forcades, such information was independently corroborated by the successful controlled buy. Therefore, we discern no legal error in the trial court's conclusion that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, Forcades's arrest was supported by probable cause. Accordingly, Forcades is not entitled to relief on this claim.
Forcades's convictions affirmed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/17/2017