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Commonwealth v. Feliciano

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Dec 9, 2015
No. J-A28009-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2015)

Opinion

J-A28009-15 No. 752 EDA 2014

12-09-2015

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. ANGEL FELICIANO Appellant


NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence December 16, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): MC-51-CR-0039542-2013 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and SHOGAN, J. MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:

Appellant, Angel Feliciano, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered in the Philadelphia County Municipal court, as confirmed by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas on February 27, 2014, following the denial of his petition for writ of certiorari from his Municipal court convictions for possession of a controlled substance and possession of marijuana. We affirm.

35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(16), (31), respectively.

In its opinion, the Court of Common Pleas fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. We add only that Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on March 6, 2014. The Court of Common Pleas ordered Appellant on May 9, 2014, to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant timely complied on May 20, 2014. Therefore, we have no reason to restate them.

Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

WAS NOT [APPELLANT] UNLAWFULLY STOPPED AND SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 8 OF THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AS THE POLICE LACKED REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT HE WAS INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY; AND THEREFORE MUST NOT ALL THE FRUITS OF THAT UNLAWFUL DETENTION BE SUPPRESSED?
(Appellant's Brief at 3).

Appellate review of an order denying a suppression motion implicates the following principles:

Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.

[W]e may consider only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the record supports the findings of the suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the facts.
Commonwealth v. Williams , 941 A.2d 14, 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "It is within the suppression court's sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony." Commonwealth v. Clemens , 66 A.3d 373, 378 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Gallagher , 896 A.2d 583, 585 (Pa.Super. 2006)).

The focus of search and seizure law "remains on the delicate balance of protecting the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and protecting the safety of our citizens and police officers by allowing police to make limited intrusions on citizens while investigating crime." Commonwealth v. Moultrie , 870 A.2d 352, 356 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Blair , 860 A.2d 567, 571 (Pa.Super. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[I]n assessing the lawfulness of citizen/police encounters, a central, threshold issue is whether...the citizen-subject has been seized. Instances of police questioning involving no seizure or detentive aspect (mere or consensual encounters) need not be supported by any level of suspicion in order to maintain validity." Commonwealth v. Strickler , 563 Pa. 47, 57, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (2000). "A mere encounter is characterized by limited police presence and police conduct and questions that are not suggestive of coercion. It is only when such police presence becomes too intrusive, the interaction must be deemed an investigative detention or seizure." Commonwealth v. Hill , 874 A.2d 1214, 1220-21 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Reppert , 814 A.2d 1196 (Pa.Super. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Thus, the law recognizes some level of intrusiveness when a mere encounter occurs." Id. at 1221.

Additionally, "[t]he central Fourth Amendment inquiries in consent cases entail assessment of the constitutional validity of the citizen/police encounter giving rise to the consent; and, ultimately, the voluntariness of consent. Where the underlying encounter is found to be lawful, voluntariness becomes the exclusive focus." Moultrie , supra (quoting Commonwealth v. LaMonte , 859 A.2d 495 (Pa.Super. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In determining the validity of a given consent, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice—not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne—under the totality of the circumstances. The standard for measuring the scope of a person's consent is based on an objective evaluation of what a reasonable person would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the person who gave the consent. Such evaluation includes an objective examination of the maturity, sophistication and mental or emotional state of the defendant.... Gauging the scope of a defendant's consent is an inherent and necessary part of the process of determining, on the totality of the circumstances presented, whether the consent is objectively valid, or instead the product of coercion, deceit, or misrepresentation.
Commonwealth v. Smith , 621 Pa. 218, 236, 77 A.3d 562, 573 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore,
[T]here is no requirement that a police officer advise a person that he...may refuse consent to be searched. Unless the totality of factors indicate[s] that the consent was the product of express or implied duress or coercion...the mere fact that a police officer did not specifically inform an appellant that he...could refuse the
request will not in and of itself result in a determination that the subsequent search was involuntary.
Moultrie , supra at 360 (citing Commonwealth v. Key , 789 A.2d 282, 291 (Pa.Super. 2001)).

After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Joan A. Brown, we conclude Appellant's issue merits no relief. The Court of Common Pleas' opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of Appellant's question presented. ( See Court of Common Pleas Opinion, filed January 16, 2015, at 5-6) (finding: while dressed in uniform, Officer McClister initially approached Appellant on concourse of busy train station because he appeared to be under influence of drugs or alcohol; Officer McClister did not block Appellant's path or display any weapons; Officer McClister asked Appellant if he would mind speaking with Officer McClister, and Appellant agreed; Officer McClister asked Appellant whether he possessed any weapons or drugs, and Appellant voluntarily responded that he had "marijuana blunt"; no indication Appellant was aware of any other police officers other than Officer McClister, his partner, and his sergeant; record fails to show Officer McClister's tone of voice was authoritative or demanding; Officer McClister's questions were general and not accusatory; Appellant's admission to possession of marijuana escalated interaction from mere encounter to lawful arrest; court properly denied Appellant's petition for writ of certiorari). The record supports the court's decision; therefore, we have no reason to disturb it. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the Court of Common Pleas' opinion.

We observe that the trial court opinion at 4, first full paragraph, begins with the incorrect standard of review, i.e., the one pertaining to when the Commonwealth appeals from an order suppressing evidence. That standard differs from the one applicable to an appeal from an order denying suppression. The trial court opinion is otherwise accurate.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 12/9/2015

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Summaries of

Commonwealth v. Feliciano

SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA
Dec 9, 2015
No. J-A28009-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2015)
Case details for

Commonwealth v. Feliciano

Case Details

Full title:COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. ANGEL FELICIANO Appellant

Court:SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Date published: Dec 9, 2015

Citations

No. J-A28009-15 (Pa. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2015)