Opinion
16-P-1043
05-12-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Michael FARRIER.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted on three indictments for statutory rape and one indictment for indecent assault and battery on a child under the age of fourteen. On appeal, he argues that the admission of testimony from two expert witnesses called by the Commonwealth constitutes prejudicial error worthy of reversing his convictions. Finding no error, we affirm.
At the time of trial, the victim was twenty-one years old. The three sexual assaults that she was able to specifically recall had taken place when she was between the ages of eight and eleven. At trial, the Commonwealth called several witnesses, including the victim, the first-complaint witness (the victim's god mother), and two expert witnesses: Dr. Amy Tishelman, a clinical psychologist at Boston Children's Hospital and Massachusetts General Hospital, and Dr. Celeste Wilson, a child abuse pediatrician at Boston Children's Hospital. Each expert witness was allowed to testify over the defendant's objection, and neither had met the victim. Dr. Tishelman testified generally about the behavior of child victims of sexual abuse, particularly in regards to the ways in which children disclose such abuse, and the reasons for nondisclosure. Dr. Wilson testified in general terms about the examinations that are done on female pre-pubertal and adolescent victims of sexual abuse, the healing of vaginal tears, and the reasons why vaginal penetration does not always result in lasting signs of injury.
The defendant asserts that the admission of Dr. Tishelman's testimony was an abuse of the judge's discretion, because she impliedly vouched for the credibility of the victim's earlier testimony. He further argues that the probative value of Dr. Tishelman's testimony was outweighed by the prejudice it caused him. The defendant similarly attacks Dr. Wilson's testimony concerning the healing of injuries from sexual abuse as providing minimal probative value which is outweighed by the prejudice against him.
We review the admission of the experts' testimony for abuse of discretion, considering "whether the judge made a ‘clear error of judgment in weighting’ the relevant factors ‘such that the decision falls outside the range of reasonable alternatives.’ " Commonwealth v. Snyder, 475 Mass. 445, 452 (2016), quoting from L.L. v. Commonwealth, 470 Mass. 169, 185 n.27 (2014).
"[A]n expert opinion is admissible only where it will ‘help jurors interpret evidence that lies outside of common experience.’ " Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 541-542 (2013), quoting from Commonwealth v. Tanner, 45 Mass. App. Ct. 576, 581 (1998). Accordingly, expert opinions are "admissible only where an expert possesses scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge that will assist the jury in understanding a fact in issue, and where the expert has applied reliable principles and methods to the facts of the case." Canty, supra at 541.
We conclude that it was well within the judge's discretion to allow the testimony of both expert witnesses called by the Commonwealth. Considering the physical and psychological complexity that pervaded this child sexual assault case, the judge was certainly warranted in allowing the kind of generalized expert testimony offered by the two witnesses. Dr. Tishelman testified to a broad range of reasons for delayed disclosure in child sexual assault cases. She made no comment on the facts or parties of this case and testified that, to her knowledge, she had never met the victim nor reviewed the facts of this case. Dr. Wilson explained that vaginal tearing heals quickly, and that the signs of a vaginal tear from childhood would be difficult to find once a child victim reached puberty. Their testimony acted as a useful supplement to the victim's testimony, providing context that could more easily allow the jury to reach an educated verdict. See Commonwealth v. Allen, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 458, 465 (1996) ("An expert may testify about general syndromes associated with sexual abuse"); Commonwealth v. Calderon, 65 Mass. App. Ct. 590, 591 (2006) ("In general, expert testimony in a child sexual abuse case is appropriate to explain to the jury the presence or absence of physical injury"). Further, as each expert's testimony was clearly relevant to the ultimate issue at trial and did not exceed the scope of permissible testimony, there was no error in the judge's decision that its prejudicial effect would not outweigh its probative value.
The judge was careful to instruct the jury that Dr. Tishelman's testimony was "not to be considered in any way as a comment on the truthfulness of any witness, including [the victim].... [Her testimony] is simply specialized knowledge in the field that she is describing about general behavioral characteristics of sexually abused children."
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Judgments affirmed.