On February 12, another item reported stolen, a necklace shaped like the Star of David, was found in an apartment the defendant was seen leaving on February 10. The evidence here was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the defendant had broken into the Meeks' home and stole property. Furthermore, it substantially exceeds the evidence in those cases cited by the defendant in which the Latimore standard was not met. Compare Commonwealth v. Bennefield, 373 Mass. 452, 453 (1977); Commonwealth v. Morris, 422 Mass. 254, 256 (1996); Commonwealth v. Estremera, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 924 (1994). Among these was a particularly distinctive item, namely an LL Bean backpack with a light blue Hawaiian print, embroidered with the initials of Caitlyn Meeks, one of the occupants of 62 Higley Road.

Thereafter, assuming the other foundational matters are satisfied, it was for the jury to weigh the ultimate probative value of the evidence. In two decisions cited by the defendant, Commonwealth v. Morris, 422 Mass. 254, 259-260 (1996), and Commonwealth v. Estremera, 37 Mass. App. Ct. 923, 924 (1994), fingerprint evidence alone was found insufficient to satisfy a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which is not the standard relevant to the admissibility of the evidence here. In a third case, Commonwealth v. Kosior, 280 Mass. 418, 423 (1932), we concluded that the admission of a statement made by an accused arsonist to a police officer, that he had collected on his insurance claims for other fires, to be prejudicial error.

. Contrast Commonwealth v. Estremera, 37 Mass.App.Ct. 923, 923–924, 639 N.E.2d 731 (1994) (“latent fingerprints on and above the outside door handle on the driver's side [of the vehicle], on the outside and inside of the window on the driver's side, and on the inside of the window on the passenger side” did not standing alone demonstrate that defendant possessed or was ever inside vehicle).