Opinion
753 MDA 2020
09-15-2021
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. TONY EDWARDS Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered May 14, 2020 In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-40-CR-0004026-2015
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., STABILE, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM
LAZARUS, J.
Tony Edwards appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, denying his petition filed pursuant to the Post-Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm on the basis of the opinion authored by the Honorable David W. Lupas.
Following are the facts of this case, as set forth in our decision in Edwards' direct appeal:
On April 4, 2015, [Edwards] and co-defendant, Wandalee Balcacer [Wandalee], conspired to, and did, confront victims Sherry Ann Rivera and Izhar Ramos-Ramirez about drugs Rivera allegedly stole from [Wandalee], and money she earned from their subsequent sale. [Edwards] and [Wandalee] threw the victims to the ground, and [Edwards] shot them, wounding Ramirez in the head and Rivera in the head and upper back. The Commonwealth filed an information against [Edwards] and [Wandalee] on December 8, 2015, which contained the aforementioned charges, plus criminal conspiracy to commit homicide, and persons not to possess firearms. [] On September 19, 2016, following trial, the jury convicted [Edwards] of two counts of criminal attempt to commit homicide. On November 8, 2016, the trial court sentenced [Edwards] to a term of not less than forty nor more than eighty years' incarceration. On November 14, 2016, the Commonwealth withdrew the charges for the firearms violations. Edwards filed a timely motion for modification of his sentence[, which] the court denied on November 28, 2016.Commonwealth v. Edwards, 14 MDA 2017 (Pa. Super. filed July 20, 2018), at 1-3 (unpublished memorandum decision) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
Edwards filed a direct appeal, wherein he challenged the trial court's denial of his motion to sever his trial from co-defendant Wandalee's trial. This Court affirmed Edwards' judgment of sentence, id., and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied his petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. Edwards, 199 A.3d 883 (Pa. 2018) (Table).
On March 7, 2019, Edwards filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The court appointed counsel and scheduled a hearing. Counsel filed an amended petition on May 28, 2019. At Edwards' request, the PCRA hearing was continued three times, and it was ultimately held on February 26, 2020.
On May 14, 2020, the PCRA court denied Edwards' petition. Edwards filed this timely appeal. Both the court and Edwards have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Edwards raises the following issues on appeal:
(1) Whether [Edwards'] trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not objecting to references to Detective [Matt] Stash, a Commonwealth witness, having been shot, and being a "hero?"
(2) Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not objecting to testimony about [Edwards] being given a gun prior to the shooting?
(3) Whether trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not requesting a mistrial after a witness referred to [Edwards'] reputation for something unspecified in Philadelphia?
(4) Whether the cumulative effect of individual alleged errors resulted in prejudice that would render defense counsel ineffective?Appellant's Brief, at 4.
Edwards argues the PCRA court erred in failing to find trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to Detective Stash's testimony that he was shot in the line of duty in the same area as the victims, and for not objecting to the prosecutor's statements in his closing argument that characterized Detective Stash as a "local hero." Appellant's Brief, at 9. Edwards claims both instances bolstered Detective Stash's credibility, which deprived Edwards of a fair trial. Id. Edwards also argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the testimony of Felipe Balcacer (Felipe) and Wandalee, both of whom testified that Adam Hobson gave Edwards a gun prior to the shooting. Id. Edwards contends these statements were hearsay, and no exception applied. Id. Next, Edwards argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a mistrial when Felipe testified that he told the victims that Edwards would shoot them based on "rumors that w[ere] told about [Edwards] around Philly." Id. at 10, citing N.T. Jury Trial, 9/19/16, at 857. Finally, Edwards argues that even if each individual claim did not rise to the level of prejudice, the cumulative effect of trial counsel's omissions amounted to prejudice and, thus, counsel was ineffective. Id. at 10-11. See also Amended PCRA Petition, 1/10/19, at 1-16. Edwards is entitled to no relief.
Our well-settled standard of review for an order denying a PCRA petition is as follows:
We review an order dismissing a petition under the PCRA in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the PCRA level. This review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record. We will not disturb a PCRA court's ruling if it is supported by evidence of record and is free of legal error. This Court may affirm a PCRA court's decision on any grounds if the record supports it. Further, we grant great deference to the factual findings of the PCRA court and will not disturb those findings unless they have no support in the record. However, we afford no such deference to its legal conclusions. Where the petitioner raises questions of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review plenary.Commonwealth v. Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted). The PCRA court's credibility findings are binding on the appellate courts where such determinations are supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Treiber, 121 A.3d 435, 444 (Pa. 2015).
Our Supreme Court has explained that:
To obtain PCRA relief, appellant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence [that]: (1) his conviction or sentence resulted from one or more of the errors enumerated in 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2); (2) his claims have not been previously litigated or waived, id., § 9543(a)(3); and (3) "the failure to litigate the issue prior to or during trial . . . or on direct appeal could not have been the result of any rational, strategic[, ] or tactical decision by counsel[, ]" id., § 9543(a)(4). An issue is previously litigated if "the highest appellate court in which appellant could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue." Id., § 9544(a)(2). "An issue is waived if appellant could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, . . . on appeal or in a prior state postconviction proceeding." Id., § 9544(b).
To be entitled to relief on an ineffectiveness claim, a PCRA petitioner must establish [that]: (1) the underlying claim has arguable merit; (2) no reasonable basis existed for counsel's action or failure to act; and (3) he suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's error, with prejudice measured by whether there is a reasonable probability the result of the proceeding would have been different. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, [] 30 A.3d 1111, 1127 ([Pa.] 2011) ([citing] Commonwealth v. Pierce, [] 527 A.2d 973, 975-76 ([Pa.] 1987)). Counsel is presumed to have rendered effective assistance. Commonwealth v. Ali, [] 10 A.3d 282, 291 ([Pa.] 2010). Additionally, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. Commonwealth v. Jones, [] 912 A.2d 268, 278 ([Pa.] 2006). Finally, because a PCRA petitioner must establish all the Pierce prongs to be entitled to relief, we are not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any specific order; thus, if a claim fails under any required element, we may dismiss the claim on that basis.Treiber, 121 A.3d at 444-45 (brackets and footnote omitted).
Here, we have reviewed the record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, and conclude that the opinion authored by Judge Lupas correctly disposes of Edwards' claims on appeal. Specifically, Judge Lupas notes that: (1) Officer Stash's testimony, which included a narrative of his experience as an officer and the prosecutor's passing characterization of Officer Stash as a "hero," were insufficient to grant a mistrial and thus did not establish prejudice under Pierce; (2) hearsay testimony from both Felipe and Wandalee that they heard "Adam" say he gave Edwards a gun also did not establish prejudice under Pierce, where Felipe had already testified that he witnessed Edwards holding a gun, and the jury heard testimony from a total of three witnesses who watched Edwards shoot the victims; (3) with respect to Felipe's testimony that he told the victims Edwards would shoot them based on "rumors that w[ere] told about him around Philly[, ]" trial counsel objected and the court sustained the objection and directed the jury to disregard the statement and the court noted that Edwards mischaracterized the testimony in his Rule 1925(b) statement and it would not have granted a mistrial had counsel requested one; and (4) the cumulative effect of these claims did not establish prejudice, as "the purported errors are not related to each other sequentially or logically and thus the cumulative effect of the whole is no greater than the inconsequential effect of the individual parts." See Trial Court Opinion, 10/9/20, at 8-9, 12-14. The court concluded that given the "clear, unequivocal and overwhelming evidence of [Edwards'] guilt, none of the somewhat minor and inconsequential items complained of[, ] individually or cumulatively[, ] could have produced any reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different[.]" Id. at 14.
In light of the foregoing, we affirm the denial of PCRA relief on the basis of Judge Lupas' opinion and direct the parties to attach a copy of that opinion in the event of further proceedings in this matter.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.