Opinion
J-S65044-17 No. 2640 EDA 2016
12-12-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. MALIK EASLEY, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 11, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Criminal Division, No(s): CP-51-CR-0010498-2013 BEFORE: OLSON, OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:
Malik Easley ("Easley") appeals from the judgment of sentence entered following his conviction of intimidation of a witness or victim, retaliation against a witness or victim, and criminal conspiracy. We affirm.
18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4952, 4953, 903. --------
In its Opinion, the trial court provided a comprehensive summary of the factual history underlying the instant appeal, which we adopt as though fully restated herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/20/17, at 2-8.
Prior to trial, Easley filed a Motion to dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(a). The trial court denied the Motion, after which the matter proceeded to a bench trial. The trial court found Easley guilty of the above-described charges. Easley subsequently filed two Motions for Extraordinary Relief, both of which the trial court denied. On August 11, 2017, the trial court sentenced Easley to an aggregate prison term of one to two years, plus six years of probation. Thereafter, Easley filed the instant, timely appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
Easley presents the following claims for our review:
A. [WHETHER] THE [TRIAL] COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT PERMITTED THE PROSECUTOR TO INTRODUCE THE COMPLAINING WITNESS'S RECORDED RECOLLECTION WHERE [THE] COMPLAINING WITNESS FAILED TO VOUCH FOR THE ACCURACY OF THE STATEMENT AS PER THE RULES OF EVIDENCE[?]Brief for Appellant at 6.
B. [WHETHER] THE [TRIAL] COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT PERMITTED THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS'S IDENTIFICATION OF [EASLEY] WHERE THE COMPLAINING WITNESS HAD NO SIGNIFICANT RECOLLECTION OF THE ON-STREET IDENTIFICATION AND WAS THEREFORE NOT SUBJECT TO ANY CROSS-EXAMINATION[?]
C. [WHETHER] THE [TRIAL] COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN, WITHOUT COUNSEL FOR EASLEY PRESENT, IT SUA SPONTE PROCLAIMED THE CO-DEFENDANT "NOT GUILTY" AFTER A FINDING OF "GUILTY"[?]
D. [WHETHER] THE [TRIAL] COURT COMMITTED ERROR WHEN IT DENIED [EASLEY'S] POST-TRIAL MOTION FOR EXTRAORDINARY RELIEF[,] WHICH OUTLINED THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT TRIAL, EVEN TAKEN IN THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO THE PROSECUTION, DID NOT SUPPORT A CONVICTION ON THE CHARGES OF 18 PA.C.S.[A. §] 4952 - INTIMIDATION OF A WITNESS AND 18 PA.C.S.[A. §] 4953 - RETALIATION OF A WITNESS[?]
Easley first claims that the trial court improperly admitted into evidence a recorded statement made by the complaining witness, Maneja Singleton ("Singleton"). Id. at 11. According to Easley, Pa.R.E. 803.1(3) provides that the statements are admissible as substantive evidence "so long as those statements, when given, were adopted by the witness in a signed writing or were verbatim contemporaneous recordings of oral statements." Brief for Appellant at 11. Easley contends that at trial, "Singleton was never able to vouch that the statement was accurate at the time that she provided the statement." Id. at 12. Easley asserts that the admission of the prior statement caused him prejudice, because Singleton could not identify Easley or his co-defendant at trial. Id.
The following standard governs our review of the admissibility of evidence:
Admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Admissibility depends on relevance and probative value. Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to establish a material fact in the case, tends to make a fact at issue more or less probable or supports a reasonable inference or presumption regarding a material fact.Commonwealth v. Borovichka , 18 A.3d 1242, 1253 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Levanduski , 907 A.2d 3, 13-14 (Pa. Super. 2006) (en banc) (internal citations omitted)).
Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.
In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed this claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/20/17, at 10-11. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis as to Easley's first claim. See id.
In his second claim of error, Easley contends that the trial court improperly admitted the hearsay testimony of Singleton's identification of Easley as the perpetrator, "where the complaining witness had no significant recollection of the on-street identification[,] and was therefore not subject to any effective cross-examination." Brief for Appellant at 12 (capitalization omitted). Relying on Pa.R.E. 803.1(2), Easley argues that, although Singleton was in court, she was unable to be effectively cross-examined because she could not recall the prior identification. Brief for Appellant at 13. Easley argues that the admission of Singleton's prior identification caused him prejudice, because that was the only evidence identifying him as a perpetrator. Id.
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Singleton's challenge to the identification evidence as inadmissible hearsay, and concluded that the claim lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/20/17, at 11-12. We agree with the reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and discern no error or abuse of discretion in this regard. Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's Opinion with regard to Easley's second claim. See id.
In his third claim of error, Easley argues that, without his counsel present, the trial court improperly declared that his co-defendant was "not guilty," after initially finding his co-defendant "guilty." Brief for Appellant at 13. Easley contends that his counsel "should have been present to make argument as to why his client should also be acquitted. Id. at 14.
Easley has no standing to challenge the verdict as to his co-defendant. Certainly, an appellant "lacks standing to object to a violation of his co-defendant's rights." Commonwealth v. Johnson , 378 A.2d 859, 860 (Pa. 1977); accord Commonwealth v. Baker , 614 A.2d 663, 670 (Pa. 1972). Easley has not offered any case law or argument as to how his co-defendant's verdict caused him prejudice, or infringed upon his rights. As such, we cannot grant Easley relief on this claim.
In his fourth claim of error, Easley argues that the trial court improperly denied his post-trial Motion for Extraordinary Relief, which challenged the verdicts as against the sufficiency of the evidence. Brief for Appellant at 14. Easley argues that, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence did not show that "a harm was caused nor repeated action of conduct[,] which is required to support a conviction under the statute[s]." Id.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
[t]he standard we apply ... is whether[,] viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the
above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [finder] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Fabian , 60 A.3d 146, 150-151 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted). "This standard of deference is not altered in cases involving a bench trial, because the province of a trial judge sitting without a jury is to do what a jury is required to do." Commonwealth v. Lee , 956 A.2d 1024, 1027 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Easley's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 1/20/17, at 13-16. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial court, as set forth in its Opinion, and affirm on this basis as to Easley's final claim.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Ott joins the memorandum.
Judge Olson concurs in the result. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 12/12/2017
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