Opinion
J-S47027-17 No. 3124 EDA 2016
12-01-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee v. JOSEPH DYSON Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 14, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-09-CR-0005936-1992 BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MOULTON, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.:
Joseph Dyson appeals from the September 14, 2016 order entered in the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas denying his third petition for relief filed under the Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
The PCRA court set forth the lengthy factual and procedural history of this case in its Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a) opinion, which we adopt and incorporate herein. See Opinion, 11/30/16, at 1-5 ("1925(a) Op.").
On appeal, Dyson raises the following issues:
1. Where Miller [ v. Alabama , 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012),] and Montgomery [ v. Louisiana , 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016),] instruct that sentencing a youth to a mandatory sentence of life without possibility of parole, without considering the factor of age and its attendant effects, constitutes a denial
of the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment charge, did the lower [c]ourt err in not granting [Dyson] the right to be resentenced as the documentary evidence reflects that he was like those who were 56 days younger than he was?Dyson's Br. at 2-3 (trial court answers omitted).
2. Where it was clear that [Dyson] is similarly situated to those who were 56 days younger than he was, did the lower [c]ourt's failure to extend the Miller / Montgomery holding to him violate the equal protection clause?
3. Where [Dyson] is similarly situated to those 56 days younger than he was, did the [lower court's] failure to permit resentencing deny substantive and procedural due process, and access to the Courts?
4. Where the Court did not grant resentencing, were the PCRA statute, habeas corpus statute[,] and 18 Pa.C.S. §1102 unconstitutional as applied to [Dyson]?
Our review of an order denying PCRA relief is limited to determining "whether the decision of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error." Commonwealth v. Melendez-Negron , 123 A.3d 1087, 1090 (Pa.Super. 2015). We will not disturb the PCRA court's factual findings "unless there is no support for [those] findings in the certified record." Id.
We must first address the timeliness of Dyson's PCRA petition. See Commonwealth v. Brown , 111 A.3d 171, 175 (Pa.Super.), app. denied, 125 A.3d 1197 (Pa. 2015). In the absence of an applicable exception, a petitioner must file a PCRA petition, including a second or subsequent petition, within one year of the date his or her judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). This Court affirmed Dyson's judgment of sentence on October 30, 2001, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on June 12, 2002. Dyson did not seek further review in the United States Supreme Court, so his judgment of sentence became final 90 days later, on September 10, 2002. Dyson had one year from that date, or until September 10, 2003, to file a timely PCRA petition. Thus, the instant PCRA petition, filed on March 22, 2016, was facially untimely.
To overcome the time bar, Dyson was required to plead and prove one of the following exceptions: (i) unconstitutional interference by government officials; (ii) newly discovered facts that could not have been previously ascertained with due diligence; or (iii) a newly recognized constitutional right that has been held to apply retroactively. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). To invoke one of these exceptions, Dyson must have filed his petition within 60 days of the date the claim could have been presented. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
In his petition, Dyson alleged the new-constitutional-right exception to the one-year time bar. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Dyson relied on Miller , in which the United States Supreme Court held that a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional when imposed on defendants who were "under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes." 132 S.Ct. at 2460. Subsequently, in Montgomery , the Supreme Court held that Miller applied retroactively to cases on state collateral review. 136 S.Ct. at 736.
In his petition, Dyson also attempted to assert the newly-discovered-fact exception to the one-year time bar, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii), arguing that he filed his petition within 60 days of the Montgomery decision. It is well settled, however, that a judicial decision is not a "new fact" that qualifies as an exception under the PCRA. See Commonwealth v. Watts , 23 A.3d 980, 987 (Pa. 2011).
Here, Dyson was 18 years old at the time he committed the offenses for which he was convicted. This Court has held that Miller 's prohibition of life-without-parole sentences does not apply to defendants who were 18 years of age or older at the time of their offenses. See Commonwealth v. Cintora , 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa.Super. 2013) (where appellants were 19 and 21 at time of their offenses, "the holding in Miller [did] not create a newly-recognized constitutional right that can serve as the basis for relief"); accord Commonwealth v. Furgess , 149 A.3d 90, 94 (Pa.Super. 2016) (reaffirming Cintora 's holding that petitioners who were 18 or older "at the time they committed murder are not within the ambit of the Miller decision and therefore may not rely on that decision to bring themselves within the time-bar exception in Section 9545(b)(1)(iii)"). Therefore, because Dyson was 18 years old at the time of his offenses, Miller does not apply.
Dyson was born on August 21, 1974 and committed the offenses on October 16, 1992. At the time of the offenses, he was 18 years and 56 days old. --------
In his brief, Dyson contends that even though he was 18 at the time of his crimes, Miller 's holding should apply to him because "despite his age of 18 years and [56] days, he is just as deserving as those under age 18 to be granted resentencing." Dyson's Br. at 15. However, we rejected a similar argument in Cintora. In Cintora , the appellants had argued that Miller should apply to defendants who were under the age of 25 at the time of their offenses "because Miller created a new Eighth Amendment right, that those whose brains were not fully developed at the time of their crimes are free from mandatory life without parole sentences, and because research indicates that the human mind does not fully develop or mature until the age of 25." 69 A.3d at 764. We stated that the "contention that a newly-recognized constitutional right should be extended to others does not render their petition timely pursuant to section 9545(b)(1)(iii)." Id. (emphasis in original).
Finally, Dyson asserts that even if his PCRA petition is time-barred, he is entitled to habeas corpus relief. The PCRA court correctly concluded that Dyson's "claim falls squarely within the parameters of the PCRA, and . . . he is not entitled to seek habeas relief outside the PCRA." 1925(a) Op. at 8. We agree with and adopt the PCRA court's cogent reasoning. See id. at 7-8.
Accordingly, because Dyson failed to plead and prove an exception to the one-year time bar, the PCRA court properly denied his petition as untimely.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 12/1/2017
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