Since that time, and as the defendant acknowledges, the statute has been amended; the requirement that the Commonwealth show that the defendant "carrie[d] [the firearm] on his person" has been eliminated. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 153 n.4, 879 N.E.2d 1253 (2008) ("the cases relied upon by the defendant all predate the 1990 amendment to G. L. c. 269, ยง 10 [a ], which eliminated the words โcarries on his personโ from ยง 10 [a ]. See St. 1990, c. 511, ยง 2.
โ[A]n appellate court is not required to โask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubtโ ... [n]or are we obligated to โreread the record from a [defendant]'s perspective.โ โ Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 150, 152 (2008) (citations omitted). The defendant turned and fled.
To sustain a conviction under G.L. c. 269, ยง 10(a), the Commonwealth must prove that the defendant (1) knowingly (2) had in his possession (3) a firearm (4) without a license. Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 153 (2008). Here, the defendant claims that there was insufficient evidence to establish his possession of the firearm.
Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk, 873 F.2d 491, 493 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 865 (1989). See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 152 (2008). Rather, the relevant "question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Gouse, 461 Mass. 787, 795 (2012). See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 461 Mass. 821, 824-825, 826 (2012) (reasonable inference from location of firearm in middle of walkway that it only recently had landed there); Commonwealth v. Ralph R., 100 Mass.App.Ct. 150, 163 (2021) (police recovered firearm in area within juvenile's path of flight); Commonwealth v. Grayson, 96 Mass.App.Ct. 748, 751 (2019) (firearm was found next to fence along defendant's flight path); Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 150, 153-154 (2008) (defendants were only persons in immediate vicinity of firearm). d. Limitations on defendant's ability to challenge firearm evidence.
Because the police officers who retraced the path of the defendants' flight saw no pedestrians or any other apparent source of the weapon, the jury reasonably could have inferred that the firearm had been thrown from the defendants' vehicle during the brief moment in the chase when the vehicle could not be seen from the police cruiser. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 150, 154, 879 N.E.2d 1253 (2008) (defendants were "only persons in the immediate vicinity" of firearm). This circumstantial evidence must be considered with other evidence that reasonably permitted the inference that the defendants had thrown some type of contraband from the vehicle during the chase.
Indeed, we have frequently observed that, 'it is 'the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts." Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 153-154 n.5 (2008), quoting from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). Reduced to its essentials, the defendant's arguments are directed to the weight and credibility of the evidence, a matter which lies wholly within the province of the jury.
December 17, 2008. Reported below: 71 Mass. App. Ct. 150 (2008). Orders.
Palmariello v. Superintendent of M.C.I. Norfolk, 873 F.2d 491, 493 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 865 (1989). See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 150, 152 (2008). Rather, the relevant "question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."
Commonwealth v. Fernandezr 48 Mass.App.Ct. 530, 532 (2000). "Rather, they are simply two possible ways of defining the same legal principle[;] [t]he essential elements of either sort of possession are knowledge plus ability and intention to control" (citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass.App.Ct. 150, 154 (2008). In sum, there was sufficient evidence, apart from mere presence in the truck where the gun and ammunition were found, from which a jury could have concluded that the defendant possessed the firearm and ammunition.