Opinion
J-A04027-17 No. 2063 EDA 2016
11-13-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, Appellee v. ISAAC DOUGBA, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 6, 2016 in the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-23-SA-0000793-2015 BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., SOLANO, J., and PLATT, J. MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, Isaac Dougba, appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his bench conviction of the summary offense of harassment. We affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
In its opinion, the trial court fully and correctly sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history of this case. ( See Trial Court Opinion, 8/18/16, at 1-2). Therefore, we have no reason to restate them at length here.
For the convenience of the reader, we note briefly that a magisterial district judge found Appellant guilty of harassment on August 5, 2015. He filed a summary appeal to the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas on September 1, 2015. On April 12, 2016, the court held a summary appeal trial, and took the matter under advisement. On June 6, 2016, it found Appellant guilty, and sentenced him to pay a fine of $50.00 plus court costs. Appellant timely appealed, and filed a timely concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on July 28, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The court entered an opinion on August 18, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Appellant's two and one-half page Rule 1925(b) statement is non-compliant. It includes inappropriate argument, excerpts of trial testimony, and discussion of case law, and it fails to coherently state the two appellate issues listed infra , in violation of Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii), (iv) ("The Statement shall concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge[.] . . . The Statement should not be redundant or provide lengthy explanations as to any error."); ( see also Rule 1925(b) Statement, 7/28/16, at unnumbered pages 1-3). Although we could find Appellant's issues waived on this basis, we decline to do so, in the interest of judicial economy. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) ("Issues not . . . raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.").
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court commit reversible error in finding [A]ppellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Harassment (18 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 2709(a)(2)) despite not only insufficient evidence as a matter of law that the [A]ppellant had the criminal intent to "harass, annoy, or alarm" the complainant but also despite insufficient evidence as a matter of law that the [A]ppellant "followed" the complainant?(Appellant's Brief, at 4).
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error in finding [A]ppellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by failing to give proper weight and consideration to unrebutted evidence of his excellent reputation for being honest, law-abiding, and non-violent following the non-incriminating testimony of the Commonwealth's sole witness?
Although aptly set forth by the trial court in its opinion, we emphasize our standards of review for sufficiency and weight claims, respectively:
The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.Commonwealth v. Tucker , 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 165 A.3d 895 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted; emphasis added).
The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny justice. On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the . . . verdict did not shock one's conscience. Thus, appellate review of a weight claim consists of a review of the trial court's exercise of discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. An appellate court may not
reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice.Commonwealth v. Diaz , 152 A.3d 1040, 1046 (Pa. Super. 2016), appeal denied, 2017 WL 2264119 (Pa. May 23, 2017) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
With respect to Appellant's weight claim, we note that "a defendant in a summary appeal case is not permitted to file post-sentence motions." Commonwealth v. Dixon , 66 A.3d 794, 797 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D)); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 607(A)(3). --------
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court, we conclude that there is no merit to the issues Appellant has raised on appeal. The trial court's opinion properly disposes of the questions presented. ( See Trial Ct. Op., at 4-8) (determining: (1) evidence was sufficient and adequate to support conviction and elements of harassment were met; (2) Appellant followed S.H. in public with intent to harass, annoy, or alarm her, where record reflects that, as S.H. ignored Appellant and moved away from him on the sidewalk, he: continued to beep his horn and motion towards her; moved inside his truck as if to grab her; and drove by her home; and (3) S.H.'s version of events was credible, Appellant's character witness was unpersuasive, and Appellant's individual actions towards the thirteen-year-old girl cannot be viewed in a vacuum). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court's opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Shogan joins the Memorandum.
Judge Solano files a Dissenting Memorandum. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 11/13/2017
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