Opinion
1453 WDA 2023
10-01-2024
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. SINCERE DESHAWN DORSEY Appellant
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 4, 2023 In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0001037-2022
Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KING, J., and BENDER, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM
BENDER, P.J.E.
Appellant, Sincere Deshawn Dorsey, appeals from the aggregate judgment of sentence of 10 to 20 years' incarceration, imposed after he was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault and other, related offenses. Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions, as well as the discretionary aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.
Appellant summarized the facts and procedural history of his case, as follows:
We note that the trial court did not provide a summary of the facts of Appellant's case in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, nor did the Commonwealth provide a counterstatement of the facts and procedural history in its appellate brief. Thus, we presume the Commonwealth is not contesting the accuracy of Appellant's recitation.
Appellant's convictions stem from events that occurred during the month of March 2022. Pursuant to testimony from R.W. (born
September … 2006), she was 15 years old and living at 2046 Prospect Street in Erie, Pennsylvania[,] at that time with her father and sister.
On February 23, 2022, R.W. stated she was in her room when [] Appellant came to her house, uninvited in the middle of the night. R.W. testified she had previously dated [] Appellant and he was not permitted to be at her house. R.W. stated that she was in an argument over text message with [] Appellant when he appeared at her house and asked to come inside. R.W. further stated [] Appellant continually texted her asking her to come outside at 3:45 am. R.W. refused to see [] Appellant and stated [] Appellant [could] spend the night in the back hallway of her house. R.W. stated that she encountered [] Appellant in the back hallway and he grabbed her phone and ran out the door. R.W. stated she attempted to get her phone back from [] Appellant; however, she was unsuccessful in her attempt.
R.W. stated that one week after this encounter, she was at home, asleep, when she was awakened by loud noises. R.W. stated that she was afraid and hid under her bed after she attempted to lock the door to her room. R.W. stated [that,] as she was hiding, she saw [] Appellant walk into the room and start shooting. R.W. testified [Appellant] was wearing a ski mask and Adidas pants.
R.W. stated [Appellant] had a firearm with him and squatted down and started firing at her and did not say anything. R.W. estimated she was shot at approximately nine (9) times. R.W. stated the wounds she sustained required two (2) surgeries - one to her stomach, [and] one to her right leg.
Dr. Melissa Loveranes, a trauma surgeon at UPMC Hamot[,] testified that on March 12, 2022, she was on call when R.W. was brought to the hospital with gunshot wounds. Dr. Loveranes testified R.W. had approximately fifteen (15) gunshot wounds to her abdomen and legs.
Sargeant Daniel Morris of the City of Erie Police Department testified that he responded to a call for a home invasion with gunshots fired at 2046 Prospect Street on March 12, 2022. Sgt. Morris testified that he noticed shell casings on the kitchen floor when he entered the residence prior to encountering R.W. in the upstairs bedroom laying on the floor. Sgt. Morris further testified he saw approximately five (5) or six (6) wounds to R.W.'s legs. Sgt. Morris stated R.W. told him [] Appellant was the shooter.
Patrolman Donald Sornberger of the City of Erie Police Department testified that he responded to the Prospect Ave. residence between 2:00 am and 3:00 am. He testified that he encountered a male and female outside of the residence who told him there was a female shot inside. Ptl. Sornberger further stated he was told the shooter was wearing all black and fled southbound towards Fairmont Parkway.
Ptl. Sornberger recalled the weather was snowy and cold on March 12, 2022[,] and there was a lot of snow that had accumulated on the ground.
Patrolman William Fischer of the City of Erie Police Department stated that he was on patrol when the call cam[e] in. He traveled to the 2000 block of Linwood Avenue and saw a bicycle that was abandoned on the sidewalk. Ptl. Fischer testified that he followed the footprints in the snow through a yard towards 210 Glendale Ave. when he saw a black male wearing all black running eastbound. Ptl. Fischer stated the individual was eventually detained and a black Glock pistol was recovered in the snow.
Lieutenant Ken Kensill of the City of Erie Police Department testified that he processed the crime scene. Lt. Kensill stated that he located several shell casings that were all 9mm caliber. Lt. Kensill elaborated that, in total, eleven (11) shell casings were recovered - nine (9) in the bedroom where R.W. was found and two (2) in the kitchen, downstairs.
Lt. Kensill stated he further checked the recovered firearm for the presence of fingerprints and none, including [] Appellant's, were found. Further, there were no fingerprints or DNA lifted from the shell casings.
Detective Michael Marche of the City of Erie Police Department was on patrol around the 2000 block of Fairmount Parkway when he saw a bike tire trail. At 2004 Glendale Avenue, Det. Marche stated he saw someone lying underneath the back porch of the residence. Det. Marche stated the individual he saw underneath the porch was [] Appellant, and he was identified as a juvenile.
Det. Marche spoke with [] Appellant and [] Appellant indicated to him that he had been at the Shell Gas Station on East 6th and Parade Streets when he went to Woodlawn Avenue to meet a friend. [] Appellant denied any involvement in a shooting.
Mikayla Shaffer, a DNA scientist from Pennsylvania State Police[,] testified she swabbed the recovered firearm for the presence of DNA. Ms. Shaffer stated that she was able to obtain a mixture of three (3) DNA samples from the firearm - [the DNA samples were matched to] Appellant, and two (2) other unknown individuals.
Following the close of evidence and testimony, [] Appellant was acquitted of criminal attempt-criminal homicide. [] Appellant was convicted of [two counts of] aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by minor, possession of a weapon, tampering with/fabricating physical evidence, and burglary.
On October 4, 2023, [] Appellant was sentenced to serve an aggregate period of one-hundred twenty (120) to two-hundred forty (240) months of incarceration. On October 13, 2023, [] Appellant filed a post-sentence motion asking the trial court to reconsider or modify [] Appellant's sentence. Said motion was denied on October 16, 2023. A timely notice of appeal followed.Appellant's Brief at 5-10 (citations to the record and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Appellant complied with the trial court's order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and the court filed a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion. Herein, Appellant states two issues for our review:
A. Whether the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to convict [] Appellant beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm by a minor, possession of a weapon, tampering with evidence, and burglary?
B. Whether [] Appellant's sentence is manifestly excessive, clearly unreasonable and inconsistent with the objectives of the Sentencing Code?Id. at 4 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). First, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions.
"Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charge presents a question of law." Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d 29 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v. Walls, 144 A.3d 926 (Pa. Super. 2016). In conducting our inquiry, we examine[,]
whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, [is] sufficient to establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts regarding a defendant's guilt unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the fact-finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. For purposes of our review under these principles, we must review the entire record and consider all of the evidence introduced.
Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014) (quotation omitted).Commonwealth v. Rojas-Rolon, 256 A.3d 432, 436 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal denied, 285 A.3d 879 (Pa. 2022).
In this case, Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated assault under 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1) and (a)(4). Those offenses are defined as follows:
(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he:
(1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life;***
(4) attempts to cause or intentionally or knowingly causes bodily injury to another with a deadly weapon; ….18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1), (4).
Appellant first claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for these offenses, as well for burglary, because the Commonwealth failed to prove his identity as the shooter. Appellant claims that R.W. initially "was hesitant to cooperate with law enforcement" and did not identify him as the shooter. Appellant's Brief at 19. He further avers that she had a "tumultuous relationship" with Appellant, id., and that she only identified him as the shooter after she spoke with her father, id. at 15. Appellant also stresses that R.W. testified that she identified the shooter's gun as the one owned by Appellant "because it had a light on it[,]" but she "failed to give that information during her testimony at the preliminary hearing when she was directly asked [i]f there was anything about the gun that stood out." Id. at 16 (citation omitted). Appellant additionally argues that R.W.'s testimony was weak and incredible because she could not remember certain details of the shooting, such as how she was positioned under the bed and if her back was facing towards or away from the door. Id. (citation omitted). Consequently, he claims that the evidence failed to prove he was the person who shot R.W. and his convictions for aggravated assault and burglary must be reversed.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)(i) ("A person commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to commit a crime therein, the person: (1)(i) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied portion thereof, that is adapted for overnight accommodations in which at the time of the offense any person is present and the person commits, attempts or threatens to commit a bodily injury crime therein[.]").
Appellant also contends that the evidence was inadequate to prove that he "acted in a manner that manifested an extreme indifference to the value of human life[,] as the injuries incurred by R.W. were not to a vital part of the human body." Id. at 17. Appellant recognizes that malice is a crucial element of aggravated assault and
is established when there is a "wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social duty…[.]" Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d 1223, 1229 (Pa. Super. [] 2005)). In the absence of any specific argument, it has been held that a jury may infer malice "based on the defendant's use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim's body." Commonwealth v. Hitcho, 123 A.3d 731, 746 (Pa. 2015) [(citation omitted)].Id. at 18. According to Appellant, "[i]t has been held that the legs are not vital parts of the body, and [are] also not in the general area of any vital organs." Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Predmore, 199 A.3d 925 (Pa. Super. 2018)). Here, Appellant stresses that "R.W. was not struck by a bullet anywhere from the waist up" and "the majority of [her] gunshot wounds [were] to her legs." Id. Thus, he maintains that R.W. did not sustain wounds to a vital part of her body, and the jury could not infer that he acted with malice. Accordingly, he insists that his aggravated assault conviction under section 2702(a)(1) was not supported by adequate evidence.
Finally, in attacking his aggravated assault conviction under section 2702(a)(4), as well as his convictions for possession of a firearm by a minor,possession of a weapon, and tampering with/fabricating evidence, Appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient because "the record is devoid of physical evidence that tied … Appellant to a weapon." Id. at 20. Appellant stresses that he did not have a firearm in his possession when he was detained by police, and the gun "that was eventually recovered by law enforcement was tested and no fingerprints were found on it." Id. at 20-21. He also notes that "there were no fingerprints or DNA found on the shell casings." Id. at 21. According to Appellant, "[t]he only forensics that were found on the firearm included a mixture of a DNA sample that included two unknown individuals" in addition to Appellant, and "neither [his] clothes nor his hands were tested for gunshot residue to determine if [he] had fired a gun." Id. Appellant also points out that, in regard to his tampering with/fabricating evidence conviction, there was no evidence "that the weapon that was recovered was … discarded or abandoned by him" and he was "never seen holding the gun or … tossing the gun by law enforcement." Id. at 23, 24.
18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.1(a) ("Except as provided in subsection (b), a person under 18 years of age shall not possess or transport a firearm anywhere in this Commonwealth.").
18 Pa.C.S. § 907(b) ("A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if he possesses a firearm or other weapon concealed upon his person with intent to employ it criminally.").
18 Pa.C.S. § 4910(1) ("A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted, he: (1) alters, destroys, conceals or removes any record, document or thing with intent to impair its verity or availability in such proceeding or investigation[.]").
After carefully considering all of Appellant's arguments, we conclude that no relief is due. Initially, Appellant's claim that the Commonwealth failed to establish his identity as the shooter is simply an attack on the credibility of R.W.'s identification of him as her assailant. Attacks on credibility determinations are challenges to the weight, not the sufficiency of the evidence. See Commonwealth v. Gaskins, 692 A.2d 224, 227 (Pa. Super. 1997).
Moreover, R.W.'s testimony was clearly sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant was the shooter. Specifically, as the trial court aptly explained:
[R.W.] testified she had been in an on-again/off-again relationship with Appellant, and had experienced a pattern of domestic abuse, leading up to the assault. At the time of the shooting, [R.W.] was hiding under a bed. She identified [] [A]ppellant as her shooter:
[The Commonwealth]: And when your (sic) were under the bed -- sorry, I have to ask you this -- what happens?
[R.W.:] He walked in the room and started shooting.
[The Commonwealth:] Okay. Who was he shooting at?
[R.W.:] Me.
[The Commonwealth:] All right. When he comes in -- first of all, when you say he, who do you mean?
[R.W.:] [Appellant].
[N.T. Trial, 6/22/23, at] … 72. [R.W.] testified that although the shooter was wearing a ski mask, she recognized Appellant's eyes
and saw that he was wearing Adidas pants. [See id. at 72-73.] [R.W. also] testified she recognized the gun. Id. []
[The Commonwealth:] Now, did you get to take a good look at the gun that day?
[R.W.:] Yes.
[The Commonwealth] Okay. In the past did you ever see [Appellant] with a gun?
[R.W.:] Yes.…
[The Commonwealth:] What is Commonwealth's Exhibit 2?
[R.W.:] His gun.
[The Commonwealth:] Okay. And how do you know it's his gun?
[R.W.:] Because I seen [sic] this before.
[The Commonwealth:] Okay, is there anything special on it that's a little different than other guns?
[R.W.:] Yes.
[The Commonwealth:] What's it have?
[R.W.:] A light.
[The Commonwealth:] And that would be this object right here?
[R.W.:] Yes.
[The Commonwealth:] Okay. Now, when was the last time before the day you get shot that you saw him with this gun?
[R.W.:] I don't remember.
[The Commonwealth:]. Would it be over the six months you guys were dating?
[R.W.:] Mm-hmm, yes.[Id. at] 79-80.
[R.W.] also identified the pants she saw Appellant wearing when she was shot[, which Appellant was wearing when he was apprehended shortly after the shooting]:
[The Commonwealth:] Now, you said you saw what pants he was wearing.
[R.W.:] Yes.
[The Commonwealth:] All right, do you remember saying that?
[R.W.:] Yes.
[The Commonwealth:] And what pants was he wearing?
[R.W.:] Some Adidas pants.
[The Commonwealth:] May I approach with what I'll mark as Commonwealth's Exhibit 3. Do you see Commonwealth's Exhibit 3?
[R.W.:] Yes.
[The Commonwealth:] And what type of pants are these?
[R.W.:] Adidas pants.
[The Commonwealth:] Where is the last time you saw these?
[R.W.:] When he shot me.
[Id. at] 81.
Thus, the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to enable the jury to have found that Appellant was the individual who shot [R.W].Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 3/6/24, at 2-4 (footnote and unnecessary capitalization omitted).
We agree. We also add that R.W.'s testimony was bolstered by the fact that Appellant was found hiding under a porch shortly after the shooting, and he was dressed in clothing matching that worn by R.W.'s assailant. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove Appellant's identity as the person who shot R.W.
Moreover, not only was R.W.'s testimony sufficient to establish that Appellant shot her, but it was also clearly sufficient to prove that he possessed a firearm. It is well-settled that "[t]he Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence." Commonwealth v. Lambert, 795 A.2d 1010, 1014 (Pa. Super. 2002). Additionally, "[p]ossession can be found by proving actual possession, constructive possession, or joint constructive possession." Commonwealth v. Heidler, 741 A.2d 213, 215 (Pa. Super. 1999). Under a sufficiency review, this Court has held that eyewitness testimony is sufficient to prove possession of a firearm. See Commonwealth v. Galindes, 786 A.2d 1004, 1010-11 (Pa. Super. 2001) (deeming evidence sufficient where witness did not see defendant possess firearm but saw accompanying flashes and heard gunshot sounds in witnessing crime).
Here, R.W.'s testimony that she saw Appellant in possession of a gun was sufficient to prove that Appellant possessed a firearm. This is especially true where a gun was found in close proximity to where Appellant was hiding under a porch, and later testing showed that that gun had Appellant's DNA on it. This evidence was also circumstantially sufficient for the jury to infer that Appellant discarded the weapon as he fled from the scene of the shooting, so as to support his tampering with/fabricating evidence conviction.
Finally, we reject Appellant's argument that his aggravated assault conviction under section 2702(a)(1) cannot stand because he did not shoot R.W. in a vital part of her body. First, we easily distinguish Predmore, the case on which Appellant relies to support his claim "that the legs are not vital parts of the body" and are not "in the general area of any vital organs." Appellant's Brief at 18. In Predmore, the victim "only suffered injury in the lower part of his legs[,]" and the Commonwealth did not dispute that the victim's calves were not vital body parts. Predmore, 199 A.3d at 931; id. at 931 n.3. In contrast, here, "the Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant shot [R.W.] in her legs and body[.]" TCO at 5 (emphasis added). Specifically, Dr. Loveranes, the trauma surgeon at UPMC Hamot who treated R.W., testified that R.W. had "injuries to her abdomen from penetration … that needed taken care of in the operating room." N.T. Trial at 138. During the emergency surgery on R.W.'s abdomen, Dr. Loveranes saw
injuries to multiple areas of [R.W.'s] small intestines that required [her] to perform a removal of parts of [R.W.'s] small intestines. And there was also an injury to part of [R.W.'s] large intestine, which is also called the colon, that also required repair.Id. at 141. The doctor explained that, had R.W. not received medical care, the injuries to her intestines would have resulted in her digestive organs not functioning properly, and R.W.'s becoming "very sick" from "infection because … the contents" of her intestines would be "leaking out." Id. at 143-44. R.W. also had approximately 15 bullet holes and "multiple broken bones" in both her legs. Id. at 139, 147. The breaks included "bilateral femur fractures," meaning that "both of her large bones in her thighs were broken." Id. at 147.
Clearly, R.W.'s injuries are distinguishable from the victim's calf wounds in Predmore, and constitute serious bodily injury. That term is defined as "[b]odily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." 18 Pa.C.S. § 2301. Dr. Loveranes' testimony that the injuries to R.W.'s intestines caused impairment to her digestive tract that required emergency surgery to repair, and that she had multiple bullet wounds to her legs which broke both her femur bones, shows that R.W. suffered serious bodily injury. We also observe that, to sustain a conviction for aggravated assault, the Commonwealth need not prove that serious bodily injury was actually inflicted, but only that Appellant acted with the specific intent to cause such injury. See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 564 (Pa. Super. 2006). Given that Appellant fired at least nine shots at R.W. at close range, it was reasonable for the jury to infer that he intended to cause her serious bodily injury.
In sum, the evidence was clearly sufficient to prove that Appellant was the person who shot R.W., that he caused her serious bodily injury, and that he possessed a firearm, which he discarded as he fled the scene. Accordingly, his sufficiency challenges are meritless.
Next, Appellant takes issue with the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an appellant to review as of right. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910, 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether [the] appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the] appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, … 909 A.2d 303 ([Pa.] 2006). Objections to the discretionary aspects of a sentence are generally waived if they are not raised at the sentencing hearing or in a motion to modify the sentence imposed. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, … 831 A.2d 599 ([Pa.] 2003).
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). A substantial question exists "only when the appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing process." Sierra, supra at 912-13.Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010)).
Here, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a timely post-sentence motion. He has also included a Rule 2119(f) statement in his appellate brief. However, therein, Appellant only details the sentences he received for each offense, and then vaguely asserts that "[w]hen imposing a sentence, the sentencing court must consider the factors set out in 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9721(b), that is, the protection of the public, gravity of the offense in relation to [the] impact on [the] victim and community, and [the] rehabilitative needs of the defendant[,] … [a]nd, of course, the court must consider the sentencing guidelines." Appellant's Brief at 13. Appellant offers no discussion of which of these factors the court purportedly failed to consider in this case.
Additionally, Appellant also argues that the sentence violates the Sentencing Code that states, in part:
(c) Determination on appeal.--The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court with instructions if it finds:
(1) the sentencing court purported to sentence within the sentencing guidelines but applied the guidelines erroneously;
(2) the sentencing court sentenced within the sentencing guidelines but the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would be clearly unreasonable; or
(3) the sentencing court sentenced outside the sentencing guidelines and the sentence is unreasonable.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9781[(c)].Id. Again, however, Appellant offers no specific explanation for how the court violated this provision. He also does not cite any legal authority to show that his vague arguments constitute substantial questions for our review. Thus, Appellant has failed to demonstrate that a substantial question warranting our review exists in this case.
Nevertheless, even if Appellant had raised a substantial question, we would not find any merit to the claims he raises in the Argument portion of his brief. Initially, we are mindful that:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.Commonwealth v. Shugars, 895 A.2d 1270, 1275 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Here, Appellant contends that "the sentencing court failed to take into consideration [his] young age at the time of the offense and his lack of any prior record." Appellant's Brief at 27. He also insists the court did not properly "consider his background and his family support in terms of his potential for rehabilitation[,]" id., including his apology to R.W. and the testimony offered by his mother about his "non-violent nature and his gentile [sic] disposition around family and friends." Id. at 28.
Given the record before us, we would conclude that Appellant's arguments are meritless. First, as Appellant acknowledges, all of his sentences were in the standard range of the sentencing guidelines, and the court imposed most of his sentences to run concurrently. See id. at 10-13. Second, the court had the benefit of a presentence report and, thus, "we can assume the sentencing court was aware of relevant information regarding the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors." Moury, 992 A.2d at 171 (cleaned up).
Third, the court's statements at sentencing demonstrate that it considered the mitigating circumstances cited by Appellant, as well as the section 9721(b) factors. For instance, the court explained:
THE COURT: … [T]he court has considered the statements of defense counsel, [Appellant], the people who spoke on his behalf, the letters I received on his behalf, the attorney for the Commonwealth, as well as the witness on behalf of the victim, who wrote a letter read today in court.
The court has considered [Appellant's] age, background, criminal record, character, rehabilitative needs, the nature, circumstance, and seriousness of the offense, the protection of the community, the sentencing guidelines, impact of the crime on the victim, and the [pres]entence report.
And, obviously, sir, there are a lot of people who wrote in your support. You have some good qualities, and you are young. But this crime is, to put it lightly, very disturbing.
Basically, the circumstances show that you hunted a 15 year-old girl down, and when you had her cornered, you showed no mercy and you repeatedly shot her nine times. I don't know what drives you to do that. But that's not the person who I received a series of letters about. And that is concerning to the court[,] that that's somewhere inside of you that you could do that.
So, I think the sentencing must reflect the seriousness of that, and also a possible danger to the community, as well as what happened to the victim.N.T. Sentencing, 10/4/23, at 24-25 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Overall, it is apparent that the court considered the requisite statutory factors, as well as the mitigating circumstances in this case, but afforded greater weight to the seriousness of Appellant's offenses, the impact to the victim, and the risk he poses to the community. Nevertheless, the court imposed standard range sentences, most of which it ran concurrently. We would discern no abuse of discretion in the court's sentencing decision, even had Appellant raised a substantial question for our review. Thus, no relief is due.
Judgment of sentence affirmed
Judge Dubow joins this memorandum. Judge King concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.