Opinion
No. 11–P–1805.
2013-01-16
COMMONWEALTH v. James DONNELLY.
By the Court (KANTROWITZ, KATZMANN & HANLON, JJ).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After a five-day trial, a Superior Court jury convicted the defendant of leaving the scene of an accident after causing personal injury resulting in death, G.L. c. 90, § 24(2)( a 1/2)(2).
The defendant now appeals and raises the following issues: (1) the Commonwealth failed to provide sufficient evidence at trial to establish an essential element of the crime—that the defendant fled the scene of the accident in order to avoid prosecution or evade apprehension; and (2) the Commonwealth failed to meet its evidentiary burden in refuting the defense of necessity. We affirm.
The elements of G.L. c. 90, § 24(2)( a 1/2)(2), are: (1) operating a motor vehicle; (2) upon a public way; (3) knowingly colliding with or otherwise injuring any person; (4) going away without making known one's name, residence, and motor vehicle registration number; (5) in order to avoid prosecution or evade apprehension; resulting in (6) death of the victim as a result of the injuries sustained in the collision.
Discussion. 1. The defendant's intent to avoid prosecution or apprehension. In evaluating whether the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence at trial to prove an essential element of the charged offense, we consider whether “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). “To make this determination, we look only to the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, and disregard any contrary evidence presented by the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Platt, 440 Mass. 396, 400–401 (2003). We conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably find that the defendant left the scene of the accident in order to avoid prosecution or apprehension. The accident at issue arose from a prolonged dispute between the victim and the defendant. The two individuals were fighting over a woman, with whom both men had been romantically involved. On the day of the accident, the victim came to the defendant's home, and a fight broke out between the two individuals. In an attempt to escape, the defendant drove off in the victim's truck, but the victim jumped onto the bed of the truck and the two continued fighting while the defendant drove. Eventually, the defendant lost control of the car and crashed. The victim died from the collision, and the defendant fled the scene and hid in the surrounding woods.
At trial, the defendant argued that he fled the scene of the accident in order to escape the victim. The defendant mistakenly believed that the victim survived the crash. The Commonwealth presented competing evidence to demonstrate that if the defendant feared for his safety, he failed to take advantage of opportunities to secure assistance. First, the Commonwealth presented evidence that there were various bystanders at the scene of the crash, at least one of whom expressed repeated concern for the defendant's physical safety. However, the defendant made no effort to seek assistance from any of them. Similarly, once the police located the defendant in the woods, the defendant did not turn to them for assistance, but instead attempted to run from them.
“To the extent that conflicting inferences are possible from the evidence, it is for the jury to determine where the truth lies.” Commonwealth v. Wilborne, 382 Mass. 241, 245 (1981) (citation omitted). The jury could choose to credit the Commonwealth's evidence, which was sufficient to support a reasonable determination that the defendant intended to avoid prosecution or apprehension.
Additionally, the defendant argues that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence to convict the defendant because the Commonwealth improperly relied upon the defendant's flight from the scene of the accident as evidence of consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Tu Trinh, 458 Mass. 776, 780 (2011). While the defendant correctly notes that a conviction may not solely rely upon consciousness of guilt evidence, this legal principle is inapplicable to the case at bar because the defendant's conviction is not solely based upon a consciousness of guilt determination. Rather, the conviction rested upon six different elements and, additionally, a jury “may ... consider [consciousness of guilt] evidence as one of the factors tending to prove the guilt of the defendant.” Ibid., quoting from Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 585 (1982). As to the one contested element of the crime charged—flight from the scene of the accident to avoid prosecution or apprehension—in the past, we have found this element to be inextricably connected to consciousness of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Henault, 54 Mass.App.Ct. 8, 14–15 (2002). Thus, the Commonwealth did not improperly present or rely upon consciousness of guilt evidence.
2. Commonwealth's response to the defendant's necessity defense . The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he did not act out of necessity when he fled from the scene of the accident.
We also review this claim under the familiar Latimore standard. See Commonwealth v. Latimore, supra.
The defense of necessity provides that “a crime committed under the pressure of imminent danger may be excused if the harm sought to be avoided far exceeds the harm resulting from the crime committed.” Commonwealth v. Schuchardt, 408 Mass. 347, 349 (1990). Since the defendant properly raised this defense, the Commonwealth then had the burden to prove the absence of necessity beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v. Livingston, 70 Mass.App.Ct. 745, 748–749 (2007).
First, the defendant, who claimed to fear for his life, failed to call 911 either while running from the scene or while hiding in the woods. See Commonwealth v. Donohue, 41 Mass.App.Ct. 91, 94 (1996) (“in the circumstances present here, the statute would have been satisfied if the defendant ... immediately called the police and gave the necessary information”). Instead, while hiding in the woods, the defendant called his former girlfriend. Second, the defendant chose not to accept the assistance of concerned bystanders. Given these facts, we conclude that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence for the jury to reasonably find that the defendant did not flee from the scene in order to protect himself.
Judgment affirmed.