See id . at 176-177, 243 N.E.2d 172. In Commonwealth v. Dellinger , 10 Mass.App.Ct. 549, 409 N.E.2d 1337 (1980), S .C C., 383 Mass. 780, 422 N.E.2d 1346 (1981), the Appeals Court stated more succinctly the principle as it applies to facts analogous to this case. "A burglarious intention can doubtless be inferred from mere possession of tools uniquely or very highly adapted to burglarious purposes ... but an intention to use ordinary tools for unlawful purposes must appear clearly from the circumstances in which they are found."

This he did by the statutory reference which in the present case conveyed by commonplace language a sufficient picture to the jury, against which the jury could measure the actual articulation by the conspirators of the purpose of the conspiracy to "go in and assault them," and so forth. To require specific analysis of the particular terms of § 18A would be rather incongruous with the propositions that the crime of conspiracy is distinct from the target offense envisaged, see Commonwealth v. D'Amour, 428 Mass. 725, 747 (1999), and is complete when an agreement for a criminal purpose, express or tacit, is formed, although the details of the agreement have not been worked out, Commonwealth v. Dellinger, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 556 (1980), S.C., 383 Mass. 780 (1981) (rev'd on other grounds). Nor need all the conspirators be equally cognizant of every part of what has been agreed or what is afoot, see Attorney Gen. v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 493 (1921).

In the present case, the indictment contained no allegation of the amount of money stolen, but it is clear from the sentence imposed (and as both counsel assumed at the hearing on the disposition) that the judge, sitting as the trier of fact, properly found that the defendant had stolen more than $100. It was in light of the foregoing that this court, in Commonwealth v. Dellinger, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 549 (1980), reiterated the view that larceny of property exceeding $100 in value is a lesser included offence of robbery. 10 Mass. App. Ct. at 557-558, 562.

Robbery unarmed, of course, is a lesser offense included within the crime of robbery while armed. See Commonwealth v. Novicki, 324 Mass. 461, 465-466 (1949). The issue here presented was left open in Commonwealth v. Dellinger, 383 Mass. 780, 783-785 (1981), a case which this court ( 10 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 555-562) had remanded for resentencing. There the trial judge had sentenced for conspiracy (G.L.c. 274, § 7) to rob (G.L.c. 265, §§ 17, 19) but the evidence (see 10 Mass. App. Ct. at 556-557) would not support more than guilt of conspiracy to commit grand larceny. G.L.c. 266, § 30. The Supreme Judicial Court noted ( 383 Mass. at 785) that "[t]he concept of a lesser included conspiracy seems not to have appeared in our law reports" but reversed the Superior Court judgments because (at 785) essential evidence relied on in the trial court should have been suppressed and the remaining evidence was insufficient to prove either conspiracy to rob or conspiracy to steal.

See Commonwealth v. Stewart, 365 Mass. 99, 309 N.E.2d 470, 476 (1974) (noting, while discussing whether jury instructions were proper, that “if force or threat of force had been applied to a customer [at a supermarket] ... who was trying to interpose himself or to call the police, a charge of robbery from that customer with respect to money of [the supermarket] could have been sustained” (emphasis added)); Commonwealth v. Rajotte, 23 Mass.App.Ct. 93, 499 N.E.2d 312, 313 (1986) (“[T]he defendant argues that the taking was not effected by force or threat of force and hence was only a larceny and not a robbery.” (emphasis added)); Commonwealth v. Dellinger, 10 Mass.App.Ct. 549, 409 N.E.2d 1337, 1342 (1980) (“One element of robbery is that the taking be by force or threat of force from a person.” (emphasis added)).

Similarly, although tire irons and automobile jacks are also ordinary tools that may be legally possessed, the intent to use them as burglarious tools can be proven by the circumstances. See Commonwealth v. Dellinger, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 561 (1980). Here, the defendant was seen using the tools to remove components of a vehicle belonging to another, where that vehicle was missing its radio and had damage to its ignition.

The defendants were convicted by a jury of conspiracy to commit robbery (G.L.c. 274, § 7), and possession of burglarious implements (G.L.c. 266, § 49). On their appeals the Appeals Court reversed the judgments, ordered judgments for the defendants on the burglarious implements indictments, and ordered resentencing on the conspiracy indictments for conspiracy to commit larceny of property of a value in excess of $100. 10 Mass. App. Ct. 549 (1980). We granted the applications of all parties for further appellate review.

Ordinary tools may be characterized as burglarious instruments if the Commonwealth can prove that the defendant intended to use them for burglarious purposes. See Commonwealth v. Dellinger, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 561 (1980). The intent "must appear clearly from the circumstances in which they are found."

G. L. c. 266, § 49, as appearing in St. 1966, c. 269, § 1. Ordinary tools may be characterized as burglarious instruments if the Commonwealth can prove that the defendant intended to use them for burglarious purposes. See Commonwealth v. Dellinger , 10 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 561 (1980). The intent "must appear clearly from the circumstances in which they are found."

Because the wire cutters found between the storm door and the front door are an ordinary tool, there must be proof of an intent to use them for burglarious purposes. Commonwealth v. Dellinger, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 549, 561 (1980). This intention "must appear clearly from the circumstances in which [the tool is] found."