Opinion
J-S79014-17 No. 2237 EDA 2017
03-06-2018
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA v. WILLIAM D. DAVIS, Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence February 29, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0003579-2014 BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J. MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.:
William D. Davis appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on February 29, 2016, in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, following his conviction on charges of possession and possession with intent to deliver marijuana. Davis was sentenced to a term of 18 to 48 months' incarceration. In this timely appeal, Davis claims the trial court erred in failing to grant his motion to suppress. Davis argues Pennsylvania State Trooper Luke Straniere did not have either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct a K-9 sniff of the car he was driving. After a thorough review of the submissions by the parties, relevant law, and the certified record, we affirm.
35 P.S. § 780-113 (a)(16), (30).
The trial judge provided a detailed recitation of his findings of fact in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion. We have reviewed the certified record and determine that the record supports the findings of fact. Rather than repeat those facts here in toto, we adopt them as related on pages 1-11 of the Trial Court Opinion dated December 3, 2015. For ease of reference, we note that Trooper Straniere initially conducted a lawful traffic stop after witnessing the vehicle driven by Davis, following a tow truck too closely and travelling 73 mph in a 65 mph zone. This traffic stop occurred September 4, 2015, at 1:40 p.m., on I-76, approximately at mile marker 304, near West Nantmeal Township in Chester County. Trooper Straniere did not issue Davis a citation. After returning relevant paperwork to Davis and telling him he was free to leave, Trooper Straniere asked Davis more questions, which Davis voluntarily answered. Shortly into that conversation, the trooper asked Davis if he could search the car. Davis declined and sought to leave. However, Trooper Straniere had already determined Davis's passenger was wanted on a warrant out of Harrisburg. The trooper told Davis he was free to leave, but his car was not. At this point, the Commonwealth concedes, the interaction between Davis and Trooper Straniere went from a mere encounter to an investigative detention. Subsequently, back-up arrived and Davis's passenger, Abraham Reese, was taken into custody, and a K-9 unit arrived to conduct a sniff search of the car. The K-9 alerted to the trunk and approximately 14 pounds of marijuana were found therein.
See Commonwealth Brief at 15. --------
We begin our analysis by reciting our well-settled standard of review:
Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial court's denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.Commonwealth v Jones , 874 A.2d 108, 115 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).
Additionally, our review is limited to the record developed during the suppression hearing; we may not consider evidence presented only at trial. See generally In re L.J., 79 A.3d 1073 (Pa. 2013). This admonition is tempered herein by the fact that Davis was found guilty by stipulated facts from the suppression hearing. Accordingly, the evidence presented at the suppression hearing is identical to the trial evidence.
Further, "there need not be probable cause to conduct a canine search of a place; rather, the police need merely have a reasonable suspicion for believing that narcotics would be found in the place subject to the canine sniff." Commonwealth v. Rogers , 849 A.2d 1185, 1190 (Pa. 2004).
Finally, a determination of reasonable suspicion is based upon the totality of the circumstances. We recognize that,
the totality of the circumstances test does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further investigation by the police officer.Rogers , 849 A.2d at 1189 (citation omitted).
Given the facts as cited above and as found by the trial court, we must determine whether Trooper Straniere possessed a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot when he detained Davis. See Commonwealth v. Kemp , 961 A.2d 1247, 1260 (Pa. Super. 2008) (facts gathered during a legal traffic stop may support investigatory detention even after suspect has been informed he may leave). Here, Trooper Straniere, a veteran Trooper with significant specialized training in criminal interdiction, related multiple indicators that led to his suspicion. The trial court found the following:
The following circumstances are highlighted from the above findings of fact [pages 1-11] in support of this conclusion.
When the trooper first approached the car, [Davis] announced that the car was owned by a third party, before the officer had even spoken. [Davis] was very nervous throughout the incident; he was overly friendly, laughing, burping and joking.
When asked about his passenger, Reese, [Davis] again gave unsolicited information, telling the trooper that all the information the trooper had about Reese was correct, including his address. Reese's later answers to the trooper's questions contradicted what [Davis] had said.
[Davis] carried an air freshener spray in his pocket, which is an odd item to carry, and a product that can be a masking agent for odorous items such as marijuana.
Reese was highly nervous. He was sweating and would not engage in eye contact or conversation with the trooper. He was on his cell phone. Reese wore a long sleeved shirt depicting marijuana leaves.
The two men gave conflicting stories of where they had been and what they had done. Although separated after the stop, both men were on their phones and able to communicate with one another. After they had the opportunity to text one another, [Davis] interrupted an unrelated conversation with the trooper to change his initial version of events to align with Reese's version.
The two also gave conflicting answers about luggage. Initially, Reese responded that they had overnight bags. When [Davis] was asked if there was anything in the trunk, he said no, just personal. Later, when the trooper asked Reese if he had any weapons in his bags or luggage inside the car, Reese indicated he had no luggage.12
12 When he approached the car for the initial stop, the trooper noticed fresh handprints on the trunk of the car, indicative that someone had been in the trunk.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/3/2015 at 16-18.
Reese was wanted on warrants. (This involved the trooper's time throughout the stop, to gather information, arrange transport and await confirmation.) [Davis] was on federal probation. He also had a criminal record in Pennsylvania consisting of false reports in 2008, drugs in 2009, felony drugs in 2010, resisting arrest in 2011 and simple assault in 2014.
The vehicle was coming from a drug source city, Philadelphia, and headed to another, smaller drug distribution city, Harrisburg. [Davis] may have initially said they drove to Conshohocken because those involved in drug distribution are aware of the negative reputation Philadelphia has as a source city.
It is noted that all conversations were cordial. There was no physical threat towards the two individuals. The stop was early afternoon on September 4, 2014. The trooper's questions were appropriate, as the situation evolved. Even after he first knew that he wanted to search the trunk, Trooper Straniere acquired additional information, such as [Davis's] criminal record, the appearance of texting between the men, [Davis's] efforts to conform his version of events to match Reese's version, and the change in whether or not they had luggage. These additional facts strengthened the trooper's reasonable suspicion.
While many of these facts could be innocent, when taken together under the totality of the circumstances, they amounted to reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot and supported the investigative detention. It was proper for the trooper to have a canine sniff the vehicle.
In light of the foregoing, we find no error of law in the trial court's conclusion that, based upon the totality of the circumstances, Trooper Straniere possessed a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity sufficient to support the investigative detention of Davis and the canine sniff of Davis's vehicle. Accordingly, Davis is not entitled to relief.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary Date: 3/6/18
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