But the provisions of G.L.c. 278, §§ 30 and 30A, for reports by judges of the Superior Court in criminal cases have not been expressly made applicable to the Housing Court. See Commonwealth v. Cronin, 245 Mass. 163, 164-165 (1923). Nevertheless, we think the Legislature has sufficiently indicated its intention that appellate review of decisions of the Housing Court is to be had directly by this court, and that the judge of the Housing Court is to exercise the powers of a Superior Court judge to that end.
It is well settled that "[t]he authority of a judge of . . . [an inferior court] to report questions of law for the decision of the full court is wholly the creature of statute." Commonwealth v. Cronin, 245 Mass. 163, 164, and cases cited. With this premise, the opinion in the Cronin case, decided in 1923, continued (p. 165): "The only right to report in criminal cases is found in G.L.c. 278, § 30, and is expressly confined to instances where a person has been convicted.
In view of the requirement of § 30 that the defendant must have been "convicted," and in view of what we shall say presently, we incline to the opinion that the case is not properly here by report. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 245 Mass. 163. But as the practical result will be the same we think it proper to discuss the case on the merits.
Sentence to the State prison for a term of not less than five, nor more than seven, years was imposed; but stay of execution was ordered and with consent of the defendant the question of law raised by the plea in bar was reported for determination by this court. G.L.c. 278, § 30. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 245 Mass. 163. Commonwealth v. Surridge, 265 Mass. 425, 426. The question thus reported is whether as matter of law the complaint, conviction and sentence in the Municipal Court were a bar to this indictment.
Before the jury were empanelled, the judge, with the consent of the defendant, reported the case to this court, which dismissed the report. ( 245 Mass. 163.) The defendant was again called for trial on the same indictments and was found guilty on each of them.
Terry v. Brightman, 129 Mass. 535. John Hetherington Sons, Ltd. v. William Firth Co. 212 Mass. 257, 259, and cases cited. Agoos v. Cosmopolitan Trust Co. 241 Mass. 103. Atlantic Maritime Co. v. Gloucester, 228 Mass. 519, 522. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 245 Mass. 163. The case at bar is quite distinguishable from Fuller v. Andrew, 230 Mass. 139. See Seccomb v. Provincial Ins. Co. 4 Allen, 152.
The word "conviction" is used in two different senses: it may include the judgment of the court following a verdict of guilty or confession of guilt, or may mean a verdict of guilty against the defendant or his confession in open court, without judgment or sentence. Commonwealth v. Gorham, 99 Mass. 420. Commonwealth v. Lockwood, 109 Mass. 323. Munkley v. Hoyt, 179 Mass. 108. Under this statute a judge of the Superior Court can report a case after a verdict of guilty and before sentence is imposed. See Commonwealth v. Carver, 224 Mass. 42; Commonwealth v. O'Neil, 233 Mass. 535, 543; Commonwealth v. Cronin, 245 Mass. 163. After the jury had returned a verdict of guilty in the cases numbered 9919 and 9926, they were placed on file. As to the filing of criminal cases and its effect see Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 537. The questions arising on the report in these cases present the questions already considered in the defendants' bill of exceptions.
Whether the rulings were subject to exceptions need not be considered because in any event the ultimate decision must be against the defendant, and in such case there seems to be no objection to stating the grounds of substantive law which support the result. Browne v. Turner, 176 Mass. 9, 12. Commonwealth v. McElhaney, 111 Mass. 439, 440. Newton Rubber Works v. de Las Casas, 198 Mass. 156. Boston v. Treasurer Receiver General, 237 Mass. 403, 410. Codman v. Crocker, 203 Mass. 146, 148. DeFerrari v. DeFerrari, 220 Mass. 38, 40. Knights v. Treasurer Receiver General, 237 Mass. 493, 494. Commonwealth v. Cronin, 245 Mass. 163. There is no dispute about the essential facts.