Opinion
19-P-670
06-01-2020
COMMONWEALTH v. ROBERT G. COLLINS.
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to its rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 (2009), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
The defendant was convicted by a District Court jury of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor (OUI), G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1). On appeal, he challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him. We affirm.
The defendant was also convicted of leaving the scene of property damage, G. L. c. 90, § 24 (2) (a). The defendant then waived his right to a jury trial on the subsequent offense portion of his OUI charge and was convicted as a second offender.
Discussion. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, "we ask whether, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth, 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Commonwealth v. Cohen (No. 1), 456 Mass. 94, 120 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979). The essential elements of OUI under G. L. c. 90, § 24, are "(1) operation of a motor vehicle, (2) on a public way, (3) under the influence of alcohol." Commonwealth v. O'Connor, 420 Mass. 630, 631 (1995).
The defendant's sole claim on appeal is that the evidence at trial was insufficient to establish the element of operation. We disagree. "[A] person operates a motor vehicle within the meaning of G. L. c. 90, § 24, when, in the vehicle, he intentionally does any act or makes use of any mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in motion the motive power of that vehicle." Commonwealth v. Plowman, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 230, 233-234 (1990). "Proof of operation of a motor vehicle may rest entirely on circumstantial evidence" (quotation and citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Petersen, 67 Mass. App. Ct. 49, 52 (2006).
Here the jury heard evidence that on June 22, 2017, just before 9 A.M., a woman who lived in the same residence as the defendant saw the defendant depart the residence alone in his white pickup truck. Minutes later, other witnesses saw a white pickup truck operated by a white male "driving erratically" and on the wrong side of the road. The white pickup truck ran over one stop sign, continued to run through a second stop sign, and crashed into a fence.
The woman who had witnessed the defendant leave his residence also left the house to run an errand. When she returned approximately thirty minutes later, she observed the defendant's white pickup truck parked in the backyard behind a shed. It appeared from tire tracks on the lawn that the white pickup truck had been driven across the lawn to the back of the house. The truck was not normally parked at that location.
Shortly after 9 A.M., Hudson Police Officer Wendy LaFlamme responded to a report that a vehicle had gone off the road on Palmieri Drive. At the defendant's residence at 6 Palmieri Drive, Officer LaFlamme observed tire tracks in the grass leading to a shed behind the residence. A white pickup truck was parked behind the shed. The front end of the truck was damaged, and there were tree branches stuck in the side mirrors. The hood of the truck was warm to the touch.
The defendant emerged from the house. Officer LaFlamme testified, "He was very disheveled. He reeked of alcohol. His eyes were red, [and he was] very unsteady on his feet." The defendant told Officer LaFlamme that a friend had borrowed his truck. When Office LaFlamme asked about taking the defendant to the hospital, the defendant "laughed it off and said he probably shouldn't be driving in the condition he was in." The defendant was transported to the hospital where a sample of his blood was drawn. Subsequent testing revealed that the defendant's blood alcohol content was .160.
This evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, allowed a rational inference that the white pickup truck that the defendant drove from his home that morning, which was found hidden behind his shed less than an hour later with front-end damage and tree branches stuck in the mirrors, was the same white pickup truck that had earlier crashed into a nearby fence and stop sign. A jury could also reasonably conclude from this circumstantial evidence that the defendant was the driver operating the white pickup truck when it crashed into the fence near his residence.
The jury were not required to give weight to the defendant's claim that someone borrowed his truck that morning. Whether a person other than the defendant could have committed the crime goes to the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. See, e.g., Pinney v. Commonwealth, 479 Mass. 1001, 1004 (2018). Simply put, the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Judgments affirmed.
By the Court (Sullivan, Kinder & Lemire, JJ.),
The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
/s/
Clerk Entered: June 1, 2020.