Opinion
No. 15–P–926.
10-26-2016
COMMONWEALTH v. Antoine CLARK.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
Seven years after his conviction in the Superior Court, the defendant moved to vacate his guilty pleas after learning of the misconduct of Annie Dookhan, the chemist who tested the suspected cocaine in his case. Following an evidentiary hearing, a Superior Court judge denied the motion, concluding that in light of the benefits he received under the plea agreement, the defendant had failed to establish a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Dookhan's misconduct. The defendant challenges that decision on appeal. We affirm.
Dookhan pleaded guilty to multiple counts of evidence tampering and obstruction of justice, all related to her handling and testing of drug samples at the Hinton drug laboratory.
Background. On April 15, 2006, the defendant and a codefendant solicited an undercover Boston police officer for sex. As other officers moved in to make an arrest, the defendant sped off in his vehicle, striking and injuring the undercover officer and his codefendant in the process. Other officers gave chase and apprehended the defendant shortly thereafter. At the time of his arrest the defendant had seventy bags of what appeared to be crack cocaine on his person and $1,317 in cash. The certificate of drug analysis shows that Dookhan was the chemist who tested the suspected contraband. It also reflects that the seized substances weighed 22.85 grams and tested positive for cocaine.
The defendant was indicted for trafficking in over fourteen grams of cocaine, engaging in sex for a fee, two counts of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon, and two counts of leaving the scene of an accident causing injury. In addition, the defendant was on probation for kidnapping and faced a nine to ten year suspended prison sentence on that conviction.
On June 8, 2007, the defendant pleaded guilty to all of the charges with the exception of soliciting sex for a fee. As a result, he was found to be in violation of probation in the kidnapping case. Pursuant to a negotiated agreement and a joint recommendation, he was sentenced to six years to six years and one day in prison on the trafficking charge, a concurrent term of two years in the house of correction on his convictions for leaving the scene, and a three-year term of probation to be served after imprisonment on the charges of assault and battery by means of a dangerous weapon. By agreement, probation on the kidnapping case was terminated and the suspended sentence was not imposed.
The charge of soliciting sex for a fee was dismissed.
Discussion. We review the defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas as a motion for new trial. Commonwealth v. Furr, 454 Mass. 101, 106 (2009). We evaluate the decision “only to determine whether there has been a significant error of law or other abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Acevedo, 446 Mass. 435, 441 (2006), quoting from Commonwealth v. Grace, 397 Mass. 303, 307 (1986).
To prevail on his motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, the defendant was required to establish that (1) there was egregious government misconduct in his case, and (2) the egregious misconduct materially influenced his decision to plead guilty. Commonwealth v. Scott, 467 Mass. 336, 347–357 (2014). As the Commonwealth conceded, Dookhan's participation in the analysis of the seized substance was sufficient to establish a conclusive presumption of egregious government misconduct. Id. at 354. However, after considering the totality of the circumstances, the judge concluded that the defendant failed to satisfy the second prong of Scott. That is, the defendant failed to “demonstrate [that there was] a reasonable probability that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of Dookhan's misconduct.” Id. at 355. We discern no abuse of discretion in this conclusion.
In Scott, the Supreme Judicial Court recognized that “a defendant's decision to tender a guilty plea is a unique, individualized decision, and the relevant factors and their relative weight will differ from one case to the next.” Id. at 356. Among the factors a motion judge should consider is the benefit the defendant received from the plea agreement, including the sentence reduction. Id. at 355–357.
Here, even assuming that Dookhan's misconduct would have provided a substantial ground of defense on the drug trafficking charge, the defendant faced significant sentences on the nondrug charges in which Dookhan had no involvement. Each charge of assault by means of a dangerous weapon carried a potential prison sentence of ten years. See G.L. c. 265, § 15A(b). Given the strength of the evidence, the injuries sustained by the victims, and the defendant's criminal history, the likelihood of conviction and significant State prison sentences on the assault charges was high. The defendant was also aware that conviction on the assault charges could result in sentences from and after the nine to ten year suspended sentence on the kidnapping conviction, imposition of which would be automatic upon any new conviction. Accordingly, we agree with the motion judge's assessment that the termination of probation and imposition of a six-year prison sentence was a substantial benefit to the defendant in exchange for his guilty plea.
Simply put, in the totality of these circumstances, where (1) the defendant risked a far greater period of incarceration if he proceeded to trial, (2) the evidence against him on the nondrug offenses was strong, (3) Dookhan's testimony was not necessary to prove the nondrug charges, and (4) the defendant avoided a nine to ten year suspended sentence in an unrelated case, the motion judge did not abuse his discretion when he found that no reasonable defendant would have chosen a trial.