Opinion
16-P-827
06-23-2017
COMMONWEALTH v. Joelene CATAQUET.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 1:28
After a jury-waived trial in the Superior Court, the defendant was convicted of possession of a loaded firearm in a vehicle, G. L. c. 269, § 10(a ) & (n ) ; and possession of a firearm in a vehicle, G. L. c. 269, § 10(a ). On appeal, the defendant claims that her due process rights were violated when the Commonwealth presented inconsistent theories at her trial and that of her codefendant, Tyriek Brown. We affirm.
The defendant was found not guilty of possession of a firearm with defaced serial numbers, G. L. c. 269, § 11C. Prior to trial, the charge of possession of ammunition without a firearm identification card, G. L. c. 269, § 10(h ), was dismissed with the defendant's consent.
Brown is not involved in this appeal.
Background. On July 4, 2013, Massachusetts State Trooper Matthew Moran stopped a Chrysler Pacifica automobile driven by Brown because the left rear taillight was not functioning. The defendant was a passenger in the backseat of the Chrysler. When Trooper Moran determined that Brown's driver's license was suspended, he was arrested. Because neither the defendant nor the other passenger in the Chrysler had a valid driver's license, Trooper Moran decided to tow the car. Consistent with State police policy, Trooper Moran conducted an inventory search of the vehicle before it was towed. During the search, a loaded firearm was found in the backseat center console within an arm's length of where the defendant had been seated. The defendant was then placed under arrest.
Following the administration of Miranda warnings, the defendant acknowledged that the firearm was hers. She explained that Brown and the other passenger were not aware that she had the firearm, which she possessed for personal protection. The defendant further explained that she initially denied ownership of the gun because she was scared.
The defendant and Brown were both indicted for illegal possession of the firearm. The cases were severed for trial, and Brown was tried first. At Brown's trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that Brown also had confessed to possession of the firearm. Trooper Patrick Mahady testified that Brown told him that earlier in the day he had taken the firearm from his former girl friend's sister while she was engaged in an argument with an unknown male. Brown then took the firearm to the car and handed it to the defendant.
The defendant's confession was admitted at her trial over her objection. Brown's admission regarding the firearm was not introduced at the defendant's trial.
Discussion. "[S]ome courts have found, mainly in cases involving the death penalty, that the use of inherently factually contradictory theories against different defendants for the same crime violates the principles of due process." Commonwealth v. Keo, 467 Mass. 25, 36 (2014). "For a due process violation to occur, ‘an inconsistency must exist at the core of the prosecutor's cases against the defendants for the same crime.’ " Ibid., quoting from Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1047, 1051-1052 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 985 (2000). "Discrepancies based on rational inferences from ambiguous evidence will not support a due process violation provided the two theories are supported by consistent underlying facts." Commonwealth v. Housen, 458 Mass. 702, 709 (2011), quoting from Sifrit v. State, 383 Md. 77, 106 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1056 (2005).
We do not reach the question whether due process rights can be violated in a noncapital case based on inconsistent theories of prosecution.
Here, the defendant argues that her due process rights were violated when the judge admitted her confession because the Commonwealth's theory of the case at her trial conflicted with the Commonwealth's theory at Brown's trial. Specifically, the defendant claims that it was fundamentally unfair for the Commonwealth to argue against the admission of her confession at Brown's trial, and then introduce the same statement against the defendant at her trial. According to the defendant, this fundamental unfairness violated her right to due process. See Commonwealth v. Vith Ly, 450 Mass. 16, 22 (2007). We reject the argument, concluding that the theories presented by the Commonwealth at each trial were not irreconcilably inconsistent.
Here, the Commonwealth's core theory was that the firearm was jointly possessed. "Possession need not be exclusive, and joint possession may be proved circumstantially." Commonwealth v. Watson, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 252, 259 (1994). See Commonwealth v. Duncan, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 150, 154 (2008) (single firearm recovered from trash sufficient to establish constructive possession by both defendants). The Commonwealth's theory at Brown's trial was based on his admission that he took the firearm from his former girl friend's apartment and handed it to the defendant who then placed it in the rear center console of the Chrysler. At the defendant's trial, the Commonwealth relied on the defendant's admission that she had the firearm in her purse and then moved it to the rear center console. The theory of joint possession was supported by the seizure of the firearm from the console within an arm's length of the defendant in a car driven by Brown. The inconsistency in the Commonwealth's position regarding the admissibility of the confessions does not change that core theory. See Commonwealth v. Housen, 458 Mass. at 709 (no due process violation where prosecutor identified different shooters at codefendants' separate trials when inconsistency did not undermine core theory of joint venture); Commonwealth v. Keo, 467 Mass. at 38 (same). Because we see nothing irreconcilably inconsistent in the Commonwealth's presentation of evidence in this case, we discern no abuse of discretion in the admission of the defendant's confession and no due process violation.
"Other points, relied on by the defendant[ ] but not discussed ..., have not been overlooked. We find nothing in them that requires discussion." Commonwealth v. Domanski, 332 Mass. 66, 78 (1954).
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Judgments affirmed.